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authorBrijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>2017-10-05 15:16:42 -0500
committerLaszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>2017-10-17 21:28:27 +0200
commit6041ac65ae879389f3ab5c0699f916d3e71c97fe (patch)
tree7fc1093afd722d3c8c2eb47c30d382746c2cabce /OvmfPkg/PlatformPei
parent071f1d19ddbc4abaaccbddfc7d6fcc5677f9b5c3 (diff)
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OvmfPkg/PlatformPei: DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION when SEV is active
The following commit: 1fea9ddb4e3f OvmfPkg: execute option ROM images regardless of Secure Boot sets the OptionRomImageVerificationPolicy to ALWAYS_EXECUTE the expansion ROMs attached to the emulated PCI devices. A expansion ROM constitute another channel through which a cloud provider (i.e hypervisor) can inject a code in guest boot flow to compromise it. When SEV is enabled, the bios code has been verified by the guest owner via the SEV guest launch sequence before its executed. When secure boot, is enabled, lets make sure that we do not allow guest bios to execute a code which is not signed by the guest owner. Fixes: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=728 Cc: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.1 Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Reviewed-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'OvmfPkg/PlatformPei')
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c7
-rw-r--r--OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf2
2 files changed, 9 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
index 26f7c3fdbb..1539e5b5cd 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/AmdSev.c
@@ -59,4 +59,11 @@ AmdSevInitialize (
ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
DEBUG ((DEBUG_INFO, "SEV is enabled (mask 0x%lx)\n", EncryptionMask));
+
+ //
+ // Set Pcd to Deny the execution of option ROM when security
+ // violation.
+ //
+ PcdStatus = PcdSet32S (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy, 0x4);
+ ASSERT_RETURN_ERROR (PcdStatus);
}
diff --git a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
index 16a8db7b0b..de7434d93d 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
+++ b/OvmfPkg/PlatformPei/PlatformPei.inf
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
IntelFrameworkModulePkg/IntelFrameworkModulePkg.dec
MdePkg/MdePkg.dec
MdeModulePkg/MdeModulePkg.dec
+ SecurityPkg/SecurityPkg.dec
UefiCpuPkg/UefiCpuPkg.dec
OvmfPkg/OvmfPkg.dec
@@ -96,6 +97,7 @@
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPropertiesTableEnable
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdAcpiS3Enable
gEfiMdeModulePkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdPteMemoryEncryptionAddressOrMask
+ gEfiSecurityPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuLocalApicBaseAddress
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuMaxLogicalProcessorNumber
gUefiCpuPkgTokenSpaceGuid.PcdCpuApInitTimeOutInMicroSeconds