SecurityPkg: AuthVariableLib: Customized SecureBoot Mode transition.

  Implement Customized SecureBoot Mode transition logic according to Mantis 1263, including AuditMode/DeployedMode/PK update management.
  Also implement image verification logic in AuditMode. Image Certificate & Hash are recorded to EFI Image Execution Table.
  https://mantis.uefi.org/mantis/view.php?id=1263

Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Zeng Star <star.zeng@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Long Qin <qin.long@intel.com>

git-svn-id: https://svn.code.sf.net/p/edk2/code/trunk/edk2@19133 6f19259b-4bc3-4df7-8a09-765794883524

4 files changed, 1278 insertions, 232 deletions

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
index 1f9ba15384..5546c2e5c9 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
@@ -56,6 +56,54 @@ EFI_SIGNATURE_ITEM mSupportSigItem[] = {
   {EFI_CERT_X509_SHA512_GUID,     0,               80           }

 };

 

+//

+// Secure Boot Mode state machine

+//

+SECURE_BOOT_MODE mSecureBootState[SecureBootModeTypeMax] = {

+  // USER MODE

+  {

+      AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE,                        // AuditMode

+      FALSE,                                     // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW

+      DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE,                     // DeployedMode

+      FALSE,                                     // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RW

+      SETUP_MODE_DISABLE,                        // SetupMode

+                                                 // SetupMode is always RO

+      SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE                    // SecureBoot

+  },

+  // SETUP MODE

+  {

+      AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE,                        // AuditMode

+      FALSE,                                     // IsAuditModeRO, AuditMode is RW

+      DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE,                     // DeployedMode

+      TRUE,                                      // IsDeployedModeRO, DeployedMode is RO

+      SETUP_MODE_ENABLE,                         // SetupMode

+                                                 // SetupMode is always RO

+      SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE                   // SecureBoot

+  },

+  // AUDIT MODE

+  {

+      AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE,                         // AuditMode

+      TRUE,                                      // AuditModeValAttr RO, AuditMode is RO

+      DEPLOYED_MODE_DISABLE,                     // DeployedMode

+      TRUE,                                      // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO

+      SETUP_MODE_ENABLE,                         // SetupMode

+                                                 // SetupMode is always RO

+      SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE                   // SecureBoot

+  },

+  // DEPLOYED MODE

+  {

+      AUDIT_MODE_DISABLE,                        // AuditMode, AuditMode is RO

+      TRUE,                                      // AuditModeValAttr RO

+      DEPLOYED_MODE_ENABLE,                      // DeployedMode

+      TRUE,                                      // DeployedModeValAttr RO, DeployedMode is RO

+      SETUP_MODE_DISABLE,                        // SetupMode

+                                                 // SetupMode is always RO

+      SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE                    // SecureBoot

+  }

+};

+

+SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE  mSecureBootMode;

+

 /**

   Finds variable in storage blocks of volatile and non-volatile storage areas.

 

@@ -250,6 +298,914 @@ AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (
 }

 

 /**

+  Initialize Secure Boot variables.

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS               The initialization operation is successful.

+  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES      There is not enough resource.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+InitSecureBootVariables (

+  VOID

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS             Status;

+  UINT8                  *Data;

+  UINTN                  DataSize;

+  UINT32                 SecureBoot;

+  UINT8                  SecureBootEnable;

+  SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE  SecureBootMode;

+  BOOLEAN                IsPkPresent;

+

+  //

+  // Find "PK" variable

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    IsPkPresent = FALSE;

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));

+  } else {

+    IsPkPresent = TRUE;

+    DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Init "SecureBootMode" variable.

+  // Initial case

+  //   SecureBootMode doesn't exist. Init it with PK state

+  // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync

+  //   1.1 Add PK     -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var

+  //   1.2 Delete PK  -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var

+  //   1.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK  -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    //

+    // Variable driver Initial Case

+    //

+    if (IsPkPresent) {

+      SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;

+    } else {

+      SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;

+    }

+  } else {

+    //

+    // 3 inconsistency cases need to sync

+    //

+    SecureBootMode = (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data;

+    ASSERT(SecureBootMode < SecureBootModeTypeMax);

+

+    if (IsPkPresent) {

+      //

+      // 3.1 Add PK     -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var

+      //

+      if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {

+        SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeUserMode;

+      } else if (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {

+        SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode;

+      }

+    } else {

+      //

+      // 3.2 Delete PK -> system break -> update SecureBootMode Var

+      // 3.3 Set AuditMode ->Delete PK  -> system break -> Update SecureBootMode Var. Reinit to be SetupMode

+      //

+      if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {

+        SecureBootMode = SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode;

+      }

+    }

+  }

+

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status) || (SecureBootMode != (SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE)*Data)) {

+    //

+    // Update SecureBootMode Var

+    //

+    Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+               EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

+               &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,

+               &SecureBootMode,

+               sizeof (UINT8),

+               EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS

+               );

+    if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+      return Status;

+    }

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Init "AuditMode"

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+             EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].AuditMode,

+             sizeof(UINT8),

+             EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Init "DeployedMode"

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+             EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].DeployedMode,

+             sizeof(UINT8),

+             EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Init "SetupMode"

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+             EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &mSecureBootState[SecureBootMode].SetupMode,

+             sizeof(UINT8),

+             EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    return Status;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.

+  // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in User Mode or Deployed Mode, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.

+  // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.

+  //

+  SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **)&Data, &DataSize);

+  if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    if (!IsPkPresent) {

+      //

+      // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before reboot

+      // Delete "SecureBootMode"

+      //

+      Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+                 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

+                 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

+                 &SecureBootEnable,

+                 0,

+                 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

+                 );

+    } else {

+      SecureBootEnable = *Data;

+    }

+  } else if ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {

+    //

+    // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in User Mode or Deployed Mode.

+    //

+    SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;

+    Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+               EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

+               &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

+               &SecureBootEnable,

+               sizeof (UINT8),

+               EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

+               );

+    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+      return Status;

+    }

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.

+  //

+  if ((SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE) 

+  && ((SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (SecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode))) {

+    SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;

+  } else {

+    SecureBoot = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;

+  }

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SecureBoot,

+             sizeof (UINT8),

+             EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

+             );

+

+  DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode is %x\n", SecureBootMode));

+  DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBoot));

+  DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));

+

+  //

+  // Save SecureBootMode in global space

+  //

+  mSecureBootMode = SecureBootMode;

+

+  return Status;

+}

+

+/**

+  Update SecureBootMode variable.

+

+  @param[in] NewMode                New Secure Boot Mode.

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS               The initialization operation is successful.

+  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES      There is not enough resource.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+UpdateSecureBootMode(

+  IN  SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE  NewMode

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS              Status;

+

+  //

+  // Update "SecureBootMode" variable to new Secure Boot Mode

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+             EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,

+             &NewMode,

+             sizeof (UINT8),

+             EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS

+             );

+

+  if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SecureBootMode Update to %x\n", NewMode));

+    mSecureBootMode = NewMode;

+  } else {

+    DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "SecureBootMode Update failure %x\n", Status));

+  }

+

+  return Status;

+}

+

+/**

+  Current secure boot mode is AuditMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition

+  to a new mode.

+

+  @param[in] NewMode                New Secure Boot Mode.

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS               The initialization operation is successful.

+  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES      There is not enough resource.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+TransitionFromAuditMode(

+  IN  SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE               NewMode

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS  Status;

+  UINT8       *AuditVarData;

+  UINT8       *DeployedVarData;

+  UINT8       *SetupVarData;

+  UINT8       *SecureBootVarData;

+  UINT8       SecureBootEnable;

+  UINTN       DataSize;

+

+  //

+  // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver

+  // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &AuditVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &DeployedVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SetupVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SecureBootVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC

+  // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.

+  // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.

+  //

+  Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));

+  }

+

+  if (NewMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {

+    //

+    // Since PK is enrolled, can't rollback, always update SecureBootMode in memory

+    //

+    mSecureBootMode = NewMode;

+    Status          = EFI_SUCCESS;

+

+    //

+    // AuditMode ----> DeployedMode

+    // Side Effects

+    //   AuditMode =: 0 / DeployedMode := 1 / SetupMode := 0

+    //

+    // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+    // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+    //

+    CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+    //

+    // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+    // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+    //

+    CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+    //

+    // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+    // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+    //

+    CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+    if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {

+      //

+      // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating

+      // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot

+      // Variable in runtime.

+      //

+      return Status;

+    }

+

+    //

+    // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+    // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+    //

+    CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+    //

+    // Create "SecureBootEnable" variable  as secure boot is enabled.

+    //

+    SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;

+    AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+      EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

+      &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

+      &SecureBootEnable,

+      sizeof (SecureBootEnable),

+      EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

+      );

+  } else {

+    DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode, NewMode));

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  return Status;

+}

+

+/**

+  Current secure boot mode is DeployedMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition

+  to a new mode.

+

+  @param[in] NewMode                New Secure Boot Mode.

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS               The initialization operation is successful.

+  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES      There is not enough resource.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+TransitionFromDeployedMode(

+  IN  SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE               NewMode

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS  Status;

+  UINT8       *DeployedVarData;

+  UINT8       *SetupVarData;

+  UINT8       *SecureBootVarData;

+  UINT8       SecureBootEnable;

+  UINTN       DataSize;

+

+  //

+  // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver

+  // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &DeployedVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SetupVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SecureBootVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC

+  // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.

+  // other tranisition logic are all memory operations.

+  //

+  Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));

+  }

+

+  switch(NewMode) {

+    case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:

+      //

+      // DeployedMode ----> UserMode

+      // Side Effects

+      //   DeployedMode := 0

+      //

+      // Platform Specific DeployedMode clear. UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition

+      //

+      if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+        return Status;

+      }

+      CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+      break;

+

+    case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:

+      //

+      // Since PK is processed before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory

+      //

+      mSecureBootMode = NewMode;

+      Status          = EFI_SUCCESS;

+

+      //

+      // DeployedMode ----> SetupMode

+      //

+      // Platform Specific PKpub clear or Delete Pkpub

+      // Side Effects

+      //   DeployedMode := 0 / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0

+      //

+      // Update the value of DeployedMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+      // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+      //

+      CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+      //

+      // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+      // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+      //

+      CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+      if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {

+        //

+        // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating

+        // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot

+        // Variable in runtime.

+        //

+        return Status;

+      }

+

+      //

+      // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+      // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+      //

+      CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+      //

+      // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.

+      //

+      SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;

+      AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+        EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

+        &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

+        &SecureBootEnable,

+        0,

+        EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

+        );

+      break;

+

+    default:

+      DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode, NewMode));

+      ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  return Status;

+}

+

+/**

+  Current secure boot mode is UserMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition

+  to a new mode.

+

+  @param[in] NewMode                New Secure Boot Mode.

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS               The initialization operation is successful.

+  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES      There is not enough resource.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+TransitionFromUserMode(

+  IN  SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE               NewMode

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS   Status;

+  UINT8        *AuditVarData;

+  UINT8        *DeployedVarData;

+  UINT8        *SetupVarData;

+  UINT8        *PkVarData;

+  UINT8        *SecureBootVarData;

+  UINT8        SecureBootEnable;

+  UINTN        DataSize;

+  VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY  VariableEntry;

+

+  //

+  // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver

+  // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &AuditVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &DeployedVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SetupVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SecureBootVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC

+  // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow. 

+  // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.

+  //

+  if (NewMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {

+    Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);

+    if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+      DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));

+    }

+  } else {

+    //

+    // UserMode -----> AuditMode. Check RemainingSpace for SecureBootMode var first.

+    // Will update SecureBootMode after DeletePK logic

+    //

+    VariableEntry.VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);

+    VariableEntry.Guid         = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;

+    VariableEntry.Name         = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;

+    if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry, NULL)) {

+      return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

+    }

+  }

+

+  switch(NewMode) {

+    case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:

+      //

+      // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition

+      //

+      if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+        return Status;

+      }

+

+      //

+      // UserMode ----> DeployedMode

+      // Side Effects

+      //   DeployedMode := 1

+      //

+      CopyMem (DeployedVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].DeployedMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+      break;

+

+    case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:

+      //

+      // UserMode ----> AuditMode

+      // Side Effects

+      //   Delete PKpub / SetupMode := 1 / SecureBoot := 0

+      //

+      // Delete PKpub without verification. Should always succeed.

+      //

+      PkVarData = NULL;

+      Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+                 EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,

+                 &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+                 PkVarData,

+                 0,

+                 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS

+                 );

+      if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+        DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "UserMode -> AuditMode. Delete PK fail %x\n", Status));

+        ASSERT(FALSE);

+      }

+

+      //

+      // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable

+      //

+      Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);

+      if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+        //

+        // Since PK is deleted successfully, Doesn't break, continue to update other variable.

+        //

+        DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));

+      }

+      CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+      //

+      // Fall into SetupMode logic

+      //

+    case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:

+      //

+      // Since PK is deleted before , can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory

+      //

+      mSecureBootMode = NewMode;

+      Status          = EFI_SUCCESS;

+

+      //

+      // UserMode ----> SetupMode

+      //  Side Effects

+      //    DeployedMode :=0 / SetupMode :=1 / SecureBoot :=0

+      //

+      // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+      // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+      //

+      CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+      if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {

+        //

+        // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating

+        // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot

+        // Variable in runtime.

+        //

+        return Status;

+      }

+

+      //

+      // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+      // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+      //

+      CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+      //

+      // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is Disabled.

+      //

+      SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;

+      AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+        EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

+        &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

+        &SecureBootEnable,

+        0,

+        EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

+        );

+

+      break;

+

+    default:

+      DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeUserMode, NewMode));

+      ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  return Status;

+}

+

+/**

+  Current secure boot mode is SetupMode. This function performs secure boot mode transition

+  to a new mode.

+

+  @param[in] NewMode                New Secure Boot Mode.

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS               The initialization operation is successful.

+  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES      There is not enough resource.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+TransitionFromSetupMode(

+  IN  SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE              NewMode

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS   Status;

+  UINT8        *AuditVarData;

+  UINT8        *SetupVarData;

+  UINT8        *SecureBootVarData;

+  UINT8        SecureBootEnable;

+  UINTN        DataSize;

+

+  //

+  // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver

+  // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &AuditVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SetupVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

+             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

+             &SecureBootVarData,

+             &DataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Make Secure Boot Mode transition ATOMIC

+  // Update Private NV SecureBootMode Variable first, because it may fail due to NV range overflow.

+  // Other tranisition logic are all memory operations and PK delete is assumed to be always successful.

+  //

+  Status = UpdateSecureBootMode(NewMode);

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Update SecureBootMode Variable fail %x\n", Status));

+  }

+

+  switch(NewMode) {

+    case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:

+      //

+      // UpdateSecureBootMode fails and no other variables are updated before. rollback this transition

+      //

+      if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+        return Status;

+      }

+

+      //

+      // SetupMode ----> AuditMode

+      // Side Effects

+      //   AuditMode := 1

+      //

+      // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+      // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+      //

+      CopyMem (AuditVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].AuditMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+      break;

+

+    case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:

+      //

+      // Since PK is enrolled before, can't rollback, still update SecureBootMode in memory

+      //

+      mSecureBootMode = NewMode;

+      Status          = EFI_SUCCESS;

+

+      //

+      // SetupMode ----> UserMode

+      // Side Effects

+      //   SetupMode := 0 / SecureBoot := 1

+      //

+      // Update the value of AuditMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+      // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+      //

+      CopyMem (SetupVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SetupMode, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+      if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {

+        //

+        // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating

+        // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot

+        // Variable in runtime.

+        //

+        return Status;

+      }

+

+      //

+      // Update the value of SecureBoot variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

+      // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

+      //

+      CopyMem (SecureBootVarData, &mSecureBootState[NewMode].SecureBoot, sizeof(UINT8));

+

+      //

+      // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.

+      //

+      SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;

+      AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

+        EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

+        &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

+        &SecureBootEnable,

+        sizeof (SecureBootEnable),

+        EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

+        );

+      break;

+

+    default:

+      DEBUG((EFI_D_ERROR, "Invalid state tranition from %x to %x\n", SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode, NewMode));

+      ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  return Status;

+}

+

+/**

+  This function performs main secure boot mode transition logic.

+

+  @param[in] CurMode                Current Secure Boot Mode.

+  @param[in] NewMode                New Secure Boot Mode.

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS               The initialization operation is successful.

+  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES      There is not enough resource.

+  @retval EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER     The Current Secure Boot Mode is wrong.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+SecureBootModeTransition(

+  IN  SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE  CurMode,

+  IN  SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE  NewMode

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS Status;

+

+  //

+  // SecureBootMode transition

+  //

+  switch (CurMode) {

+    case SecureBootModeTypeUserMode:

+      Status = TransitionFromUserMode(NewMode);

+      break;

+

+    case SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode:

+      Status = TransitionFromSetupMode(NewMode);

+      break;

+

+    case SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode:

+      Status = TransitionFromAuditMode(NewMode);

+      break;

+

+    case SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode:

+      Status = TransitionFromDeployedMode(NewMode);

+      break;

+

+    default:

+      Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+      ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  return Status;

+

+}

+

+/**

   Determine whether this operation needs a physical present user.

 

   @param[in]      VariableName            Name of the Variable.

@@ -597,129 +1553,6 @@ Done:
   }

 }

 

-/**

-  Update platform mode.

-

-  @param[in]      Mode                    SETUP_MODE or USER_MODE.

-

-  @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER           Invalid parameter.

-  @return EFI_SUCCESS                     Update platform mode successfully.

-

-**/

-EFI_STATUS

-UpdatePlatformMode (

-  IN  UINT32                    Mode

-  )

-{

-  EFI_STATUS              Status;

-  VOID                    *Data;

-  UINTN                   DataSize;

-  UINT8                   SecureBootMode;

-  UINT8                   SecureBootEnable;

-  UINTN                   VariableDataSize;

-

-  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

-             EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,

-             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

-             &Data,

-             &DataSize

-             );

-  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Update the value of SetupMode variable by a simple mem copy, this could avoid possible

-  // variable storage reclaim at runtime.

-  //

-  mPlatformMode = (UINT8) Mode;

-  CopyMem (Data, &mPlatformMode, sizeof(UINT8));

-

-  if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime ()) {

-    //

-    // SecureBoot Variable indicates whether the platform firmware is operating

-    // in Secure boot mode (1) or not (0), so we should not change SecureBoot

-    // Variable in runtime.

-    //

-    return Status;

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Check "SecureBoot" variable's existence.

-  // If it doesn't exist, firmware has no capability to perform driver signing verification,

-  // then set "SecureBoot" to 0.

-  //

-  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

-             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

-             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

-             &Data,

-             &DataSize

-             );

-  //

-  // If "SecureBoot" variable exists, then check "SetupMode" variable update.

-  // If "SetupMode" variable is USER_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 1.

-  // If "SetupMode" variable is SETUP_MODE, "SecureBoot" variable is set to 0.

-  //

-  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;

-  } else {

-    if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {

-      SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;

-    } else if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE) {

-      SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;

-    } else {

-      return EFI_NOT_FOUND;

-    }

-  }

-

-  Status  = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

-              EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

-              &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

-              &SecureBootMode,

-              sizeof(UINT8),

-              EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

-              );

-  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Check "SecureBootEnable" variable's existence. It can enable/disable secure boot feature.

-  //

-  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

-             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

-             &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

-             &Data,

-             &DataSize

-             );

-

-  if (SecureBootMode == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE) {

-    //

-    // Create the "SecureBootEnable" variable as secure boot is enabled.

-    //

-    SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;

-    VariableDataSize = sizeof (SecureBootEnable);

-  } else {

-    //

-    // Delete the "SecureBootEnable" variable if this variable exist as "SecureBoot"

-    // variable is not in secure boot state.

-    //

-    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-      return EFI_SUCCESS;

-    }

-    SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;

-    VariableDataSize = 0;

-  }

-

-  Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

-             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

-             &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

-             &SecureBootEnable,

-             VariableDataSize,

-             EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

-             );

-  return Status;

-}

 

 /**

   Check input data form to make sure it is a valid EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST for PK/KEK/db/dbx/dbt variable.

@@ -880,6 +1713,121 @@ VendorKeyIsModified (
 }

 

 /**

+  Process Secure Boot Mode variable.

+

+  Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.

+  This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.

+  This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.

+  This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like

+  buffer overflow, integer overflow.

+  This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.

+

+  @param[in]  VariableName                Name of Variable to be found.

+  @param[in]  VendorGuid                  Variable vendor GUID.

+  @param[in]  Data                        Data pointer.

+  @param[in]  DataSize                    Size of Data found. If size is less than the

+                                          data, this value contains the required size.

+  @param[in]  Attributes                  Attribute value of the variable

+

+  @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER           Invalid parameter

+  @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION          The variable does NOT pass the validation

+                                          check carried out by the firmware.

+  @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED             Variable is Read-Only.

+  @return EFI_SUCCESS                     Variable passed validation successfully.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+ProcessSecureBootModeVar (

+  IN  CHAR16         *VariableName,

+  IN  EFI_GUID       *VendorGuid,

+  IN  VOID           *Data,

+  IN  UINTN          DataSize,

+  IN  UINT32         Attributes OPTIONAL

+  )

+{

+  EFI_STATUS    Status;

+  UINT8         *VarData;

+  UINTN         VarDataSize;

+

+  //

+  // Check "AuditMode", "DeployedMode" Variable ReadWrite Attributes

+  //  if in Runtime,  Always RO

+  //  if in Boottime, Depends on current Secure Boot Mode

+  //

+  if (mAuthVarLibContextIn->AtRuntime()) {

+    return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Delete not OK

+  //

+  if ((DataSize != sizeof(UINT8)) || (Attributes == 0)) {

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+  }

+

+  if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {

+    if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsAuditModeRO) {

+      return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;

+    }

+  } else {

+    //

+    // Platform specific deployedMode clear. Set DeployedMode = RW

+    //

+    if (!InCustomMode() || !UserPhysicalPresent() || mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {

+      if(mSecureBootState[mSecureBootMode].IsDeployedModeRO) {

+        return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED;

+      }

+    }

+  }

+

+  if (*(UINT8 *)Data != 0 && *(UINT8 *)Data != 1) {

+    return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // AuditMode/DeployedMode/SetupMode/SecureBoot are all NON_NV variable maintained by Variable driver

+  // they can be RW. but can't be deleted. so they can always be found.

+  //

+  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (

+             VariableName,

+             VendorGuid,

+             &VarData,

+             &VarDataSize

+             );

+  if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

+    ASSERT(FALSE);

+  }

+

+  //

+  // If AuditMode/DeployedMode is assigned same value. Simply return EFI_SUCCESS

+  //

+  if (*VarData == *(UINT8 *)Data) {

+    return EFI_SUCCESS;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Perform SecureBootMode transition

+  //

+  if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0) {

+    DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode));

+    return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode);

+  } else if (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0) {

+    if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {

+      //

+      // Platform specific DeployedMode clear. InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent() is checked before

+      //

+      DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode));

+      return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);

+    } else {

+      DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "Current SecureBootMode %x. Transfer to SecureBootMode %x\n", mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode));

+      return SecureBootModeTransition(mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);

+    }

+  }

+

+  return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

+}

+

+/**

   Process variable with platform key for verification.

 

   Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.

@@ -917,6 +1865,7 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
   BOOLEAN                     Del;

   UINT8                       *Payload;

   UINTN                       PayloadSize;

+  VARIABLE_ENTRY_CONSISTENCY  VariableEntry[2];

 

   if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE) == 0 ||

       (Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) == 0) {

@@ -927,19 +1876,55 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
     return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

   }

 

+  //

+  // Init state of Del. State may change due to secure check

+  //

   Del = FALSE;

-  if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !IsPk)) {

-    Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);

-    PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);

-    if (PayloadSize == 0) {

-      Del = TRUE;

-    }

+  Payload = (UINT8 *) Data + AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);

+  PayloadSize = DataSize - AUTHINFO2_SIZE (Data);

+  if (PayloadSize == 0) {

+    Del = TRUE;

+  }

+

+  //

+  // Check the variable space for both PKpub and SecureBootMode variable.

+  //

+  VariableEntry[0].VariableSize = PayloadSize;

+  VariableEntry[0].Guid         = &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid;

+  VariableEntry[0].Name         = EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME;

+

+  VariableEntry[1].VariableSize = sizeof(UINT8);

+  VariableEntry[1].Guid         = &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid;

+  VariableEntry[1].Name         = EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME;

+

+  if ((InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent()) || 

+      (((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) && !IsPk)) {

 

     Status = CheckSignatureListFormat(VariableName, VendorGuid, Payload, PayloadSize);

     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

       return Status;

     }

 

+    //

+    // If delete PKpub, only check for "SecureBootMode" only

+    // if update / add PKpub, check both NewPKpub & "SecureBootMode"

+    //

+    if (IsPk) {

+      //

+      // Delete PKpub

+      //

+      if (Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) 

+          && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){

+        return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

+      //

+      // Add PKpub

+      //

+      } else if (!Del && ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode))

+                 && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {

+        return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

+      }

+    }

+

     Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariableWithTimeStamp (

                VariableName,

                VendorGuid,

@@ -952,10 +1937,17 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
       return Status;

     }

 

-    if ((mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) || IsPk) {

+    if (((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) || IsPk) {

       Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();

     }

-  } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {

+  } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode) {

+    //

+    // If delete PKpub, check "SecureBootMode" only

+    //

+    if (IsPk && Del && !mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[1], NULL)){

+      return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

+    }

+

     //

     // Verify against X509 Cert in PK database.

     //

@@ -970,8 +1962,19 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
                );

   } else {

     //

+    // SetupMode or  AuditMode to add PK

     // Verify against the certificate in data payload.

     //

+    //

+    // Check PKpub & SecureBootMode variable space consistency

+    //

+    if (!mAuthVarLibContextIn->CheckRemainingSpaceForConsistency (VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT, &VariableEntry[0], &VariableEntry[1], NULL)) {

+      //

+      // No enough variable space to set PK successfully.

+      //

+      return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

+    }

+

     Status = VerifyTimeBasedPayloadAndUpdate (

                VariableName,

                VendorGuid,

@@ -984,16 +1987,30 @@ ProcessVarWithPk (
   }

 

   if (!EFI_ERROR(Status) && IsPk) {

-    if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE && !Del) {

-      //

-      // If enroll PK in setup mode, need change to user mode.

-      //

-      Status = UpdatePlatformMode (USER_MODE);

-    } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && Del){

-      //

-      // If delete PK in user mode, need change to setup mode.

-      //

-      Status = UpdatePlatformMode (SETUP_MODE);

+    //

+    // Delete or Enroll PK causes SecureBootMode change

+    //

+    if (!Del) {

+      if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) {

+        //

+        // If enroll PK in setup mode,  change to user mode.

+        //

+        Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeUserMode);

+      } else if (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode) {

+        //

+        // If enroll PK in Audit mode,  change to Deployed mode.

+        //

+        Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode);

+      } else {

+        DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "PK is updated in %x mode. No SecureBootMode change.\n", mSecureBootMode));

+      }

+    } else {

+      if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode) || (mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)) {

+        //

+        // If delete PK in User Mode or DeployedMode,  change to Setup Mode.

+        //

+        Status = SecureBootModeTransition (mSecureBootMode, SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode);

+      }

     }

   }

 

@@ -1046,7 +2063,8 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
   }

 

   Status = EFI_SUCCESS;

-  if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {

+  if ((mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeUserMode || mSecureBootMode == SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode)

+   && !(InCustomMode() && UserPhysicalPresent())) {

     //

     // Time-based, verify against X509 Cert KEK.

     //

@@ -1083,7 +2101,7 @@ ProcessVarWithKek (
       return Status;

     }

 

-    if (mPlatformMode != SETUP_MODE) {

+    if ((mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode) && (mSecureBootMode != SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode)) {

       Status = VendorKeyIsModified ();

     }

   }

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h
index add05c21cc..ec4b3d97f5 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthServiceInternal.h
@@ -117,6 +117,54 @@ typedef struct {
 } AUTH_CERT_DB_DATA;

 #pragma pack()

 

+///

+/// "SecureBootMode" variable stores current secure boot mode.

+/// The value type is SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE.

+///

+#define EDKII_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME    L"SecureBootMode"

+

+typedef enum { 

+  SecureBootModeTypeUserMode,

+  SecureBootModeTypeSetupMode,

+  SecureBootModeTypeAuditMode,

+  SecureBootModeTypeDeployedMode,

+  SecureBootModeTypeMax

+} SECURE_BOOT_MODE_TYPE;

+

+//

+// Record status info of Customized Secure Boot Mode.

+//

+typedef struct {

+  ///

+  /// AuditMode variable value

+  ///

+  UINT8   AuditMode;

+  ///

+  /// AuditMode variable RW

+  ///

+  BOOLEAN IsAuditModeRO;

+  ///

+  /// DeployedMode variable value

+  ///

+  UINT8   DeployedMode;

+  ///

+  /// AuditMode variable RW

+  ///

+  BOOLEAN IsDeployedModeRO;

+  ///

+  /// SetupMode variable value

+  ///

+  UINT8   SetupMode;

+  /// 

+  /// SetupMode is always RO. Skip IsSetupModeRO;              

+  ///

+

+  ///

+  /// SecureBoot variable value

+  ///

+  UINT8   SecureBoot;

+} SECURE_BOOT_MODE;

+

 extern UINT8    *mPubKeyStore;

 extern UINT32   mPubKeyNumber;

 extern UINT32   mMaxKeyNumber;

@@ -131,6 +179,18 @@ extern VOID     *mHashCtx;
 extern AUTH_VAR_LIB_CONTEXT_IN *mAuthVarLibContextIn;

 

 /**

+  Initialize Secure Boot variables.

+

+  @retval EFI_SUCCESS               The initialization operation is successful.

+  @retval EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES      There is not enough resource.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS 

+InitSecureBootVariables (

+  VOID

+  );

+

+/**

   Process variable with EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS set

 

   Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.

@@ -220,6 +280,39 @@ FilterSignatureList (
   );

 

 /**

+  Process Secure Boot Mode variable.

+

+  Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.

+  This function may be invoked in SMM mode, and datasize and data are external input.

+  This function will do basic validation, before parse the data.

+  This function will parse the authentication carefully to avoid security issues, like

+  buffer overflow, integer overflow.

+  This function will check attribute carefully to avoid authentication bypass.

+

+  @param[in]  VariableName                Name of Variable to be found.

+  @param[in]  VendorGuid                  Variable vendor GUID.

+  @param[in]  Data                        Data pointer.

+  @param[in]  DataSize                    Size of Data found. If size is less than the

+                                          data, this value contains the required size.

+  @param[in]  Attributes                  Attribute value of the variable

+

+  @return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER           Invalid parameter

+  @return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION          The variable does NOT pass the validation

+                                          check carried out by the firmware.

+  @return EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED             Variable is Read-Only.

+  @return EFI_SUCCESS                     Variable passed validation successfully.

+

+**/

+EFI_STATUS

+ProcessSecureBootModeVar (

+  IN  CHAR16         *VariableName,

+  IN  EFI_GUID       *VendorGuid,

+  IN  VOID           *Data,

+  IN  UINTN          DataSize,

+  IN  UINT32         Attributes OPTIONAL

+  );

+

+/**

   Process variable with platform key for verification.

 

   Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c
index a54eaaa066..dee5e1dd9d 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.c
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@ UINT32   mMaxKeyNumber;
 UINT32   mMaxKeyDbSize;

 UINT8    *mCertDbStore;

 UINT32   mMaxCertDbSize;

-UINT32   mPlatformMode;

 UINT8    mVendorKeyState;

 

 EFI_GUID mSignatureSupport[] = {EFI_CERT_SHA1_GUID, EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID, EFI_CERT_X509_GUID};

@@ -99,6 +98,17 @@ VARIABLE_ENTRY_PROPERTY mAuthVarEntry[] = {
       MAX_UINTN

     }

   },

+  {

+    &gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid,

+    L"SecureBootMode",

+    {

+      VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_REVISION,

+      VAR_CHECK_VARIABLE_PROPERTY_READ_ONLY,

+      VARIABLE_ATTRIBUTE_NV_BS_RT,

+      sizeof (UINT8),

+      sizeof (UINT8)

+    }

+  }

 };

 

 VOID **mAuthVarAddressPointer[10];

@@ -132,8 +142,6 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize (
   UINT8                 *Data;

   UINTN                 DataSize;

   UINTN                 CtxSize;

-  UINT8                 SecureBootMode;

-  UINT8                 SecureBootEnable;

   UINT8                 CustomMode;

   UINT32                ListSize;

 

@@ -208,31 +216,11 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize (
     mPubKeyNumber = (UINT32) (DataSize / sizeof (AUTHVAR_KEY_DB_DATA));

   }

 

-  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);

-  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s does not exist.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));

-  } else {

-    DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s exists.\n", EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME));

-  }

-

   //

-  // Create "SetupMode" variable with BS+RT attribute set.

+  // Init Secure Boot variables

   //

-  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    mPlatformMode = SETUP_MODE;

-  } else {

-    mPlatformMode = USER_MODE;

-  }

-  Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

-             EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME,

-             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

-             &mPlatformMode,

-             sizeof(UINT8),

-             EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS

-             );

-  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

-  }

+  Status = InitSecureBootVariables ();

+

 

   //

   // Create "SignatureSupport" variable with BS+RT attribute set.

@@ -249,69 +237,6 @@ AuthVariableLibInitialize (
   }

 

   //

-  // If "SecureBootEnable" variable exists, then update "SecureBoot" variable.

-  // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE and in USER_MODE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE.

-  // If "SecureBootEnable" variable is SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE, Set "SecureBoot" variable to SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE.

-  //

-  SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_DISABLE;

-  Status = AuthServiceInternalFindVariable (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid, (VOID **) &Data, &DataSize);

-  if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    if (mPlatformMode == SETUP_MODE){

-      //

-      // PK is cleared in runtime. "SecureBootMode" is not updated before reboot

-      // Delete "SecureBootMode" in SetupMode

-      //

-      Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

-                 EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

-                 &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

-                 &SecureBootEnable,

-                 0,

-                 EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

-                 );

-    } else {

-      SecureBootEnable = *(UINT8 *) Data;

-    }

-  } else if (mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {

-    //

-    // "SecureBootEnable" not exist, initialize it in USER_MODE.

-    //

-    SecureBootEnable = SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE;

-    Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

-               EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME,

-               &gEfiSecureBootEnableDisableGuid,

-               &SecureBootEnable,

-               sizeof (UINT8),

-               EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

-               );

-    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-      return Status;

-    }

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Create "SecureBoot" variable with BS+RT attribute set.

-  //

-  if (SecureBootEnable == SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE && mPlatformMode == USER_MODE) {

-    SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_ENABLE;

-  } else {

-    SecureBootMode = SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE;

-  }

-  Status = AuthServiceInternalUpdateVariable (

-             EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME,

-             &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,

-             &SecureBootMode,

-             sizeof (UINT8),

-             EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS

-             );

-  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    return Status;

-  }

-

-  DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SETUP_MODE_NAME, mPlatformMode));

-  DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, SecureBootMode));

-  DEBUG ((EFI_D_INFO, "Variable %s is %x\n", EFI_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLE_NAME, SecureBootEnable));

-

-  //

   // Initialize "CustomMode" in STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE state.

   //

   CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;

@@ -455,10 +380,16 @@ AuthVariableLibProcessVariable (
 {

   EFI_STATUS        Status;

 

+  //

+  // Process PK, KEK, Sigdb, AuditMode, DeployedMode separately.

+  //

   if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME) == 0)){

     Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, TRUE);

   } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME) == 0)) {

     Status = ProcessVarWithPk (VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes, FALSE);

+  } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid) 

+          && (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME) == 0 || StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_DEPLOYED_MODE_NAME) == 0)) {

+    Status = ProcessSecureBootModeVar(VariableName, VendorGuid, Data, DataSize, Attributes);

   } else if (CompareGuid (VendorGuid, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid) &&

              ((StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE)  == 0) ||

               (StrCmp (VariableName, EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1) == 0) ||

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf
index 3709f7baae..07a3ed5419 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthVariableLib.inf
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
   ## PRODUCES            ## Variable:L"AuthVarKeyDatabase"

   gEfiAuthenticatedVariableGuid

 

+  ## CONSUMES            ## Variable:L"SecureBootMode"

+  ## PRODUCES            ## Variable:L"SecureBootMode"

+  gEdkiiSecureBootModeGuid

+

   gEfiCertTypeRsa2048Sha256Guid  ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES   ## GUID  # Unique ID for the type of the certificate.

   gEfiCertPkcs7Guid              ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES   ## GUID  # Unique ID for the type of the certificate.

   gEfiCertX509Guid               ## SOMETIMES_CONSUMES   ## GUID  # Unique ID for the type of the signature.