SecurityPkg: AuthVariableLib: Remove Customized SecureBoot Mode transition.

  Remove Customized SecureBoot Mode transition logic for Mantis 1263, including AuditMode/DeployedMode/PK update management.
  Also remove image verification logic in AuditMode.
The feature has been moved to
  https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/Customized-Secure-Boot
Previous check-in hash is
  SHA-1: 4fc08e8d683522f255727626197d919a40d4836c

Contributed-under: TianoCore Contribution Agreement 1.0
Signed-off-by: Chao Zhang <chao.b.zhang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: El-Haj-Mahmoud Samer <samer.el-haj-mahmoud@hpe.com>
Reviewed-by: Fu Siyuan <siyuan.fu@intel.com>

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 604 deletions

diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
index 8cedb1bfb0..4b0e3f1fbd 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/DxeImageVerificationLib/DxeImageVerificationLib.c
@@ -712,58 +712,6 @@ GetImageExeInfoTableSize (
 }

 

 /**

-  Create signature list based on input signature data and certificate type GUID. Caller is reposible 

-  to free new created SignatureList.

-

-  @param[in]   SignatureData           Signature data in SignatureList.

-  @param[in]   SignatureDataSize       Signature data size.

-  @param[in]   CertType                Certificate Type.

-  @param[out]  SignatureList           Created SignatureList.

-  @param[out]  SignatureListSize       Created SignatureListSize.

-

-  @return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES         The operation is failed due to lack of resources.

-  @retval EFI_SUCCESS          Successfully create signature list.

-

-**/

-EFI_STATUS

-CreateSignatureList(

-  IN UINT8                *SignatureData,

-  IN UINTN                SignatureDataSize,

-  IN EFI_GUID             *CertType,

-  OUT EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  **SignatureList,

-  OUT UINTN               *SignatureListSize

-  )

-{

-  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST   *SignList;

-  UINTN                SignListSize;

-  EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA   *Signature;

-

-  SignList       = NULL;

-  *SignatureList = NULL;

-

-  SignListSize = sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST) + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1 + SignatureDataSize;

-  SignList     = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *) AllocateZeroPool (SignListSize);

-  if (SignList == NULL) {

-    return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;

-  }

-

-  SignList->SignatureHeaderSize = 0;

-  SignList->SignatureListSize   = (UINT32) SignListSize;

-  SignList->SignatureSize       = (UINT32) SignatureDataSize + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA) - 1;

-  CopyMem (&SignList->SignatureType, CertType, sizeof (EFI_GUID));

-

-  DEBUG((EFI_D_INFO, "SignatureDataSize %x\n", SignatureDataSize));

-  Signature = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *) ((UINT8 *) SignList + sizeof (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST));

-  CopyMem (Signature->SignatureData, SignatureData, SignatureDataSize);

-

-  *SignatureList     = SignList;

-  *SignatureListSize = SignListSize;

-

-  return EFI_SUCCESS;

-

-}

-

-/**

   Create an Image Execution Information Table entry and add it to system configuration table.

 

   @param[in]  Action          Describes the action taken by the firmware regarding this image.

@@ -1149,53 +1097,6 @@ IsTimeZero (
 }

 

 /**

-  Record multiple certificate list & verification state of a verified image to 

-  IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.

-

-  @param[in]  CertBuf              Certificate list buffer.

-  @param[in]  CertBufLength        Certificate list buffer.

-  @param[in]  Action               Certificate list action to be record.

-  @param[in]  ImageName            Image name.

-  @param[in]  ImageDevicePath      Image device path.

-

-**/

-VOID 

-RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(

-  IN UINT8                          *CertBuf,

-  IN UINTN                           CertBufLength,

-  IN EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION      Action,

-  IN CHAR16                         *ImageName OPTIONAL,

-  IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL

-  )

-{

-  UINT8               CertNumber;

-  UINT8               *CertPtr;

-  UINTN               Index;

-  UINT8               *Cert;

-  UINTN               CertSize;

-  EFI_STATUS          Status;

-  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST  *SignatureList;

-  UINTN               SignatureListSize;

-

-  CertNumber = (UINT8) (*CertBuf);

-  CertPtr    = CertBuf + 1;

-  for (Index = 0; Index < CertNumber; Index++) {

-    CertSize = (UINTN) ReadUnaligned32 ((UINT32 *)CertPtr);

-    Cert     = (UINT8 *)CertPtr + sizeof (UINT32);

-

-    //

-    // Record all cert in cert chain to be passed

-    //

-    Status = CreateSignatureList(Cert, CertSize, &gEfiCertX509Guid, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);

-    if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

-      AddImageExeInfo (Action, ImageName, ImageDevicePath, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);

-      FreePool (SignatureList);

-    }

-  }

-}

-

-

-/**

   Check whether the timestamp signature is valid and the signing time is also earlier than 

   the revocation time.

 

@@ -1305,23 +1206,17 @@ Done:
   Check whether the image signature is forbidden by the forbidden database (dbx).

   The image is forbidden to load if any certificates for signing are revoked before signing time.

 

-  @param[in]  AuthData             Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.

-  @param[in]  AuthDataSize         Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.

-  @param[in]  IsAuditMode          Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in AuditMode.

-  @param[in]  ImageName            Name of the image to verify.

-  @param[in]  ImageDevicePath      DevicePath of the image to verify.

+  @param[in]  AuthData      Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from the signed image.

+  @param[in]  AuthDataSize  Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.

 

   @retval TRUE              Image is forbidden by dbx.

   @retval FALSE             Image is not forbidden by dbx.

 

 **/

 BOOLEAN

-IsForbiddenByDbx (

-  IN UINT8                          *AuthData,

-  IN UINTN                          AuthDataSize,

-  IN BOOLEAN                        IsAuditMode,

-  IN CHAR16                         *ImageName OPTIONAL,

-  IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL

+IsForbiddenByDbx (  

+  IN UINT8                  *AuthData,

+  IN UINTN                  AuthDataSize  

   )

 {

   EFI_STATUS                Status;

@@ -1344,10 +1239,6 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx (
   UINT8                     *Cert;

   UINTN                     CertSize;

   EFI_TIME                  RevocationTime;

-  UINT8                     *SignerCert;

-  UINTN                     SignerCertLength;

-  UINT8                     *UnchainCert;

-  UINTN                     UnchainCertLength;

   //

   // Variable Initialization

   //

@@ -1362,10 +1253,6 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx (
   BufferLength      = 0;

   TrustedCert       = NULL;

   TrustedCertLength = 0;

-  SignerCert        = NULL;

-  SignerCertLength  = 0;

-  UnchainCert       = NULL;

-  UnchainCertLength = 0;

 

   //

   // The image will not be forbidden if dbx can't be got.

@@ -1480,41 +1367,12 @@ IsForbiddenByDbx (
   }

 

 Done:

-  if (IsForbidden && IsAuditMode) {

-    Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData, AuthDataSize, &SignerCert, &SignerCertLength, &UnchainCert, &UnchainCertLength);

-

-    //

-    // Record all certs in image to be failed

-    //

-    if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {

-      RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(

-        SignerCert,

-        SignerCertLength,

-        EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,

-        ImageName,

-        ImageDevicePath

-        );

-    }

-

-    if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {

-      RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(

-        UnchainCert,

-        UnchainCertLength,

-        EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,

-        ImageName,

-        ImageDevicePath

-        );

-    }

-  }

-

   if (Data != NULL) {

     FreePool (Data);

   }

 

   Pkcs7FreeSigners (CertBuffer);

   Pkcs7FreeSigners (TrustedCert);

-  Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert);

-  Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert);

 

   return IsForbidden;

 }

@@ -1523,11 +1381,8 @@ Done:
 /**

   Check whether the image signature can be verified by the trusted certificates in DB database.

 

-  @param[in]  AuthData              Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.

-  @param[in]  AuthDataSize          Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.

-  @param[in]  IsAuditMode           Whether system Secure Boot Mode is in AuditMode.

-  @param[in]  ImageName             Name of the image to verify.

-  @param[in]  ImageDevicePath       DevicePath of the image to verify.

+  @param[in]  AuthData      Pointer to the Authenticode signature retrieved from signed image.

+  @param[in]  AuthDataSize  Size of the Authenticode signature in bytes.

 

   @retval TRUE         Image passed verification using certificate in db.

   @retval FALSE        Image didn't pass verification using certificate in db.

@@ -1535,11 +1390,8 @@ Done:
 **/

 BOOLEAN

 IsAllowedByDb (

-  IN UINT8                          *AuthData,

-  IN UINTN                          AuthDataSize,

-  IN BOOLEAN                        IsAuditMode,

-  IN CHAR16                         *ImageName OPTIONAL,

-  IN CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *ImageDevicePath OPTIONAL

+  IN UINT8              *AuthData,

+  IN UINTN              AuthDataSize

   )

 {

   EFI_STATUS                Status;

@@ -1555,10 +1407,6 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
   UINTN                     DbxDataSize;

   UINT8                     *DbxData;

   EFI_TIME                  RevocationTime;

-  UINT8                     *SignerCert;

-  UINTN                     SignerCertLength;

-  UINT8                     *UnchainCert;

-  UINTN                     UnchainCertLength;

 

   Data              = NULL;

   CertList          = NULL;

@@ -1567,10 +1415,6 @@ IsAllowedByDb (
   DbxData           = NULL;

   RootCertSize      = 0;

   VerifyStatus      = FALSE;

-  SignerCert        = NULL;

-  SignerCertLength  = 0;

-  UnchainCert       = NULL;

-  UnchainCertLength = 0;

 

   DataSize = 0;

   Status   = gRT->GetVariable (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, NULL, &DataSize, NULL);

@@ -1655,62 +1499,6 @@ Done:
     SecureBootHook (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid, CertList->SignatureSize, CertData);

   }

 

-  if (IsAuditMode) {

-

-    Pkcs7GetCertificatesList(AuthData, AuthDataSize, &SignerCert, &SignerCertLength, &UnchainCert, &UnchainCertLength);

-    if (VerifyStatus) {

-      if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {

-        //

-        // Record all cert in signer's cert chain to be passed

-        //

-        RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(

-          SignerCert,

-          SignerCertLength,

-          EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,

-          ImageName,

-          ImageDevicePath

-          );

-      }

-

-      if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {

-        //

-        // Record all certs in unchained certificates lists to be failed

-        //

-        RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(

-          UnchainCert,

-          UnchainCertLength,

-          EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,

-          ImageName,

-          ImageDevicePath

-          );

-      }

-    } else {

-      //

-      // Record all certs in image to be failed

-      //

-      if ((SignerCertLength != 0) && (SignerCert != NULL)) {

-        RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(

-          SignerCert,

-          SignerCertLength,

-          EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,

-          ImageName,

-          ImageDevicePath

-          );

-      }

-

-      if ((UnchainCertLength != 0) && (UnchainCert != NULL)) {

-        RecordCertListToImageExeuctionTable(

-          UnchainCert,

-          UnchainCertLength,

-          EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED,

-          ImageName,

-          ImageDevicePath

-          );

-      }

-    }

-  }

-

-

   if (Data != NULL) {

     FreePool (Data);

   }

@@ -1718,370 +1506,10 @@ Done:
     FreePool (DbxData);

   }

 

-  Pkcs7FreeSigners (SignerCert);

-  Pkcs7FreeSigners (UnchainCert);

-

   return VerifyStatus;

 }

 

 /**

-  Provide verification service for signed images in AuditMode, which include both signature validation

-  and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and

-  MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported. 

-

-  In this implementation, only verify external executables when in AuditMode.

-  Executables from FV is bypass, so pass in AuthenticationStatus is ignored. Other authentication status

-  are record into IMAGE_EXECUTION_TABLE.

-

-  The image verification policy is:

-    If the image is signed,

-      At least one valid signature or at least one hash value of the image must match a record

-      in the security database "db", and no valid signature nor any hash value of the image may

-      be reflected in the security database "dbx".

-    Otherwise, the image is not signed,

-      The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db", and

-      not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".

-

-  Caution: This function may receive untrusted input.

-  PE/COFF image is external input, so this function will validate its data structure

-  within this image buffer before use.

-

-  @param[in]    AuthenticationStatus

-                           This is the authentication status returned from the security

-                           measurement services for the input file.

-  @param[in]    File       This is a pointer to the device path of the file that is

-                           being dispatched. This will optionally be used for logging.

-  @param[in]    FileBuffer File buffer matches the input file device path.

-  @param[in]    FileSize   Size of File buffer matches the input file device path.

-  @param[in]    BootPolicy A boot policy that was used to call LoadImage() UEFI service.

-

-  @retval EFI_SUCCESS            The authenticate info is sucessfully stored for the file 

-                                 specified by DevicePath and non-NULL FileBuffer 

-  @retval EFI_ACCESS_DENIED      The file specified by File and FileBuffer did not

-                                 authenticate, and the platform policy dictates that the DXE

-                                 Foundation many not use File.

-

-**/

-EFI_STATUS

-EFIAPI

-ImageVerificationInAuditMode (

-  IN  UINT32                           AuthenticationStatus,

-  IN  CONST EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL   *File,

-  IN  VOID                             *FileBuffer,

-  IN  UINTN                            FileSize,

-  IN  BOOLEAN                          BootPolicy

-  )

-{

-  EFI_STATUS                           Status;

-  UINT16                               Magic;

-  EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER                 *DosHdr;

-  EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST                   *SignatureList;

-  EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION           Action;

-  WIN_CERTIFICATE                      *WinCertificate;

-  UINT32                               Policy;

-  PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT         ImageContext;

-  UINT32                               NumberOfRvaAndSizes;

-  WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS             *PkcsCertData;

-  WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID            *WinCertUefiGuid;

-  UINT8                                *AuthData;

-  UINTN                                AuthDataSize;

-  EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY             *SecDataDir;

-  UINT32                               OffSet;

-  CHAR16                               *FilePathStr;

-  UINTN                                SignatureListSize;

-

-  SignatureList     = NULL;

-  WinCertificate    = NULL;

-  SecDataDir        = NULL;

-  PkcsCertData      = NULL;

-  FilePathStr       = NULL;

-  Action            = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;

-  Status            = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

-

-

-  //

-  // Check the image type and get policy setting.

-  //

-  switch (GetImageType (File)) {

-

-  case IMAGE_FROM_FV:

-    Policy = ALWAYS_EXECUTE;

-    break;

-

-  case IMAGE_FROM_OPTION_ROM:

-    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdOptionRomImageVerificationPolicy);

-    break;

-

-  case IMAGE_FROM_REMOVABLE_MEDIA:

-    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdRemovableMediaImageVerificationPolicy);

-    break;

-

-  case IMAGE_FROM_FIXED_MEDIA:

-    Policy = PcdGet32 (PcdFixedMediaImageVerificationPolicy);

-    break;

-

-  default:

-    Policy = DENY_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION;

-    break;

-  }

-

-  //

-  // If policy is always/never execute, return directly.

-  //

-  if (Policy == ALWAYS_EXECUTE) {

-    return EFI_SUCCESS;

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Get Image Device Path Str

-  //

-  FilePathStr = ConvertDevicePathToText (File, FALSE, TRUE);

-

-  //

-  // Authentication failed because of (unspecified) firmware security policy

-  //

-  if (Policy == NEVER_EXECUTE) {

-    //

-    // No signature, record FilePath/FilePathStr only

-    //

-    AddImageExeInfo (EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_POLICY_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED, FilePathStr, File, NULL, 0);

-    goto END;

-  }

-

-  //

-  // The policy QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION and ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION

-  // violates the UEFI spec and has been removed.

-  //

-  ASSERT (Policy != QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION && Policy != ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION);

-  if (Policy == QUERY_USER_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION || Policy == ALLOW_EXECUTE_ON_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {

-    CpuDeadLoop ();

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Read the Dos header.

-  //

-  if (FileBuffer == NULL) {

-    Status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;

-    goto END;

-  }

-

-  mImageBase  = (UINT8 *) FileBuffer;

-  mImageSize  = FileSize;

-

-  ZeroMem (&ImageContext, sizeof (ImageContext));

-  ImageContext.Handle    = (VOID *) FileBuffer;

-  ImageContext.ImageRead = (PE_COFF_LOADER_READ_FILE) DxeImageVerificationLibImageRead;

-

-  //

-  // Get information about the image being loaded

-  //

-  Status = PeCoffLoaderGetImageInfo (&ImageContext);

-  if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-    //

-    // The information can't be got from the invalid PeImage

-    //

-    goto END;

-  }

-

-

-  DosHdr = (EFI_IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *) mImageBase;

-  if (DosHdr->e_magic == EFI_IMAGE_DOS_SIGNATURE) {

-    //

-    // DOS image header is present,

-    // so read the PE header after the DOS image header.

-    //

-    mPeCoffHeaderOffset = DosHdr->e_lfanew;

-  } else {

-    mPeCoffHeaderOffset = 0;

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Check PE/COFF image.

-  //

-  mNtHeader.Pe32 = (EFI_IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *) (mImageBase + mPeCoffHeaderOffset);

-  if (mNtHeader.Pe32->Signature != EFI_IMAGE_NT_SIGNATURE) {

-    //

-    // It is not a valid Pe/Coff file.

-    //

-    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

-    goto END;

-  }

-

-  if (mNtHeader.Pe32->FileHeader.Machine == IMAGE_FILE_MACHINE_IA64 && mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {

-    //

-    // NOTE: Some versions of Linux ELILO for Itanium have an incorrect magic value

-    //       in the PE/COFF Header. If the MachineType is Itanium(IA64) and the

-    //       Magic value in the OptionalHeader is EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC

-    //       then override the magic value to EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC

-    //

-    Magic = EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC;

-  } else {

-    //

-    // Get the magic value from the PE/COFF Optional Header

-    //

-    Magic = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.Magic;

-  }

-

-  if (Magic == EFI_IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) {

-    //

-    // Use PE32 offset.

-    //

-    NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;

-    if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {

-      SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];

-    }

-  } else {

-    //

-    // Use PE32+ offset.

-    //

-    NumberOfRvaAndSizes = mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.NumberOfRvaAndSizes;

-    if (NumberOfRvaAndSizes > EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY) {

-      SecDataDir = (EFI_IMAGE_DATA_DIRECTORY *) &mNtHeader.Pe32Plus->OptionalHeader.DataDirectory[EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_SECURITY];

-    }

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Start Image Validation.

-  //

-  if (SecDataDir == NULL || SecDataDir->Size == 0) {

-    //

-    // This image is not signed. The SHA256 hash value of the image must match a record in the security database "db",

-    // and not be reflected in the security data base "dbx".

-    //

-    if (!HashPeImage (HASHALG_SHA256)) {

-      Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

-      goto END;

-    }

-

-    //

-    // Image Hash is in forbidden database (DBX).

-    //

-    if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

-      //

-      // Image Hash is in allowed database (DB).

-      //

-      if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

-        Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;

-      }

-    }

-

-    //

-    // Add HASH digest for image without signature

-    //

-    Status = CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize, &mCertType, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);

-    if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

-      AddImageExeInfo (Action, FilePathStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);

-      FreePool (SignatureList);

-    }

-    goto END;

-  }

-

-  //

-  // Verify the signature of the image, multiple signatures are allowed as per PE/COFF Section 4.7

-  // "Attribute Certificate Table".

-  // The first certificate starts at offset (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress) from the start of the file.

-  //

-  for (OffSet = SecDataDir->VirtualAddress;

-       OffSet < (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size);

-       OffSet += (WinCertificate->dwLength + ALIGN_SIZE (WinCertificate->dwLength))) {

-    WinCertificate = (WIN_CERTIFICATE *) (mImageBase + OffSet);

-    if ((SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) <= sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE) ||

-        (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size - OffSet) < WinCertificate->dwLength) {

-      break;

-    }

-

-    //

-    // Verify the image's Authenticode signature, only DER-encoded PKCS#7 signed data is supported.

-    //

-    if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA) {

-      //

-      // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS which is described in the

-      // Authenticode specification.

-      //

-      PkcsCertData = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *) WinCertificate;

-      if (PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength <= sizeof (PkcsCertData->Hdr)) {

-        break;

-      }

-      AuthData   = PkcsCertData->CertData;

-      AuthDataSize = PkcsCertData->Hdr.dwLength - sizeof(PkcsCertData->Hdr);

-    } else if (WinCertificate->wCertificateType == WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID) {

-      //

-      // The certificate is formatted as WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID which is described in UEFI Spec.

-      //

-      WinCertUefiGuid = (WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID *) WinCertificate;

-      if (WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength <= OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData)) {

-        break;

-      }

-      if (!CompareGuid (&WinCertUefiGuid->CertType, &gEfiCertPkcs7Guid)) {

-        continue;

-      }

-      AuthData = WinCertUefiGuid->CertData;

-      AuthDataSize = WinCertUefiGuid->Hdr.dwLength - OFFSET_OF(WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID, CertData);

-    } else {

-      if (WinCertificate->dwLength < sizeof (WIN_CERTIFICATE)) {

-        break;

-      }

-      continue;

-    }

-

-    Status = HashPeImageByType (AuthData, AuthDataSize);

-    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {

-      continue;

-    }

-

-    Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED;

-

-    //

-    // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).

-    // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).

-    //

-    if (!IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize, TRUE, FilePathStr, File)) {

-      IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize, TRUE, FilePathStr, File);

-    }

-

-    //

-    // Check the image's hash value.

-    //

-    if (!IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

-      if (IsSignatureFoundInDatabase (EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE, mImageDigest, &mCertType, mImageDigestSize)) {

-        Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_PASSED | EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_INITIALIZED; 

-      }

-    }

-

-    //

-    // Add HASH digest for image with signature

-    //

-    Status = CreateSignatureList(mImageDigest, mImageDigestSize, &mCertType, &SignatureList, &SignatureListSize);

-

-    if (!EFI_ERROR(Status)) {

-      AddImageExeInfo (Action, FilePathStr, File, SignatureList, SignatureListSize);

-      FreePool (SignatureList);

-    } else {

-      goto END;

-    }

-  }

-

-

-  if (OffSet != (SecDataDir->VirtualAddress + SecDataDir->Size)) {

-    //

-    // The Size in Certificate Table or the attribute certicate table is corrupted.

-    //

-    Status = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

-  } else {

-    Status = EFI_SUCCESS;

-  }

-

-END:

-

-  if (FilePathStr != NULL) {

-    FreePool(FilePathStr);

-    FilePathStr = NULL;

-  }

-

-  return Status;

-}

-

-/**

   Provide verification service for signed images, which include both signature validation

   and platform policy control. For signature types, both UEFI WIN_CERTIFICATE_UEFI_GUID and

   MSFT Authenticode type signatures are supported.

@@ -2148,9 +1576,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_ACTION           Action;

   WIN_CERTIFICATE                      *WinCertificate;

   UINT32                               Policy;

-  UINT8                                *VarData;

-  UINT8                                SecureBoot;

-  UINT8                                AuditMode;

+  UINT8                                *SecureBoot;

   PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT         ImageContext;

   UINT32                               NumberOfRvaAndSizes;

   WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS             *PkcsCertData;

@@ -2170,19 +1596,6 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
   Status            = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

   VerifyStatus      = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

 

-  GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_AUDIT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&VarData, NULL);

-  //

-  // Skip verification if AuditMode variable doesn't exist. AuditMode should always exist

-  //

-  if (VarData == NULL) {

-    return EFI_SUCCESS;

-  }

-  AuditMode = *VarData;

-  FreePool(VarData);

-

-  if (AuditMode == AUDIT_MODE_ENABLE) {

-    return ImageVerificationInAuditMode(AuthenticationStatus, File, FileBuffer, FileSize, BootPolicy);

-  }

 

   //

   // Check the image type and get policy setting.

@@ -2227,22 +1640,22 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     CpuDeadLoop ();

   }

 

-  GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&VarData, NULL);

+  GetEfiGlobalVariable2 (EFI_SECURE_BOOT_MODE_NAME, (VOID**)&SecureBoot, NULL);

   //

   // Skip verification if SecureBoot variable doesn't exist.

   //

-  if (VarData == NULL) {

+  if (SecureBoot == NULL) {

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

-  SecureBoot = *VarData;

-  FreePool(VarData);

 

   //

   // Skip verification if SecureBoot is disabled but not AuditMode

   //

-  if (SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {

+  if (*SecureBoot == SECURE_BOOT_MODE_DISABLE) {

+    FreePool (SecureBoot);

     return EFI_SUCCESS;

   }

+  FreePool (SecureBoot);

 

   //

   // Read the Dos header.

@@ -2413,7 +1826,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     //

     // Check the digital signature against the revoked certificate in forbidden database (dbx).

     //

-    if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize, FALSE, NULL, NULL)) {

+    if (IsForbiddenByDbx (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {

       Action = EFI_IMAGE_EXECUTION_AUTH_SIG_FAILED;

       VerifyStatus = EFI_ACCESS_DENIED;

       break;

@@ -2423,7 +1836,7 @@ DxeImageVerificationHandler (
     // Check the digital signature against the valid certificate in allowed database (db).

     //

     if (EFI_ERROR (VerifyStatus)) {

-      if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize, FALSE, NULL, NULL)) {

+      if (IsAllowedByDb (AuthData, AuthDataSize)) {

         VerifyStatus = EFI_SUCCESS;

       }

     }