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authorKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2016-08-10 16:28:09 -0700
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2016-08-30 16:12:46 -0700
commit485a252a5559b45d7df04c819ec91177c62c270b (patch)
tree09b7e7696e039b6e0a471c685cb1a286aaa485b7
parentef0e1ea8856bed6ff8394d3dfe77f2cab487ecea (diff)
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seccomp: Fix tracer exit notifications during fatal signals
This fixes a ptrace vs fatal pending signals bug as manifested in seccomp now that seccomp was reordered to happen after ptrace. The short version is that seccomp should not attempt to call do_exit() while fatal signals are pending under a tracer. The existing code was trying to be as defensively paranoid as possible, but it now ends up confusing ptrace. Instead, the syscall can just be skipped (which solves the original concern that the do_exit() was addressing) and normal signal handling, tracer notification, and process death can happen. Paraphrasing from the original bug report: If a tracee task is in a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP trap, or has been resumed after such a trap but not yet been scheduled, and another task in the thread-group calls exit_group(), then the tracee task exits without the ptracer receiving a PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT notification. Test case here: https://gist.github.com/khuey/3c43ac247c72cef8c956ca73281c9be7 The bug happens because when __seccomp_filter() detects fatal_signal_pending(), it calls do_exit() without dequeuing the fatal signal. When do_exit() sends the PTRACE_EVENT_EXIT notification and that task is descheduled, __schedule() notices that there is a fatal signal pending and changes its state from TASK_TRACED to TASK_RUNNING. That prevents the ptracer's waitpid() from returning the ptrace event. A more detailed analysis is here: https://github.com/mozilla/rr/issues/1762#issuecomment-237396255. Reported-by: Robert O'Callahan <robert@ocallahan.org> Reported-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Tested-by: Kyle Huey <khuey@kylehuey.com> Fixes: 93e35efb8de4 ("x86/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace") Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Acked-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
-rw-r--r--kernel/seccomp.c12
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index ef6c6c3f9d8a..0db7c8a2afe2 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -605,12 +605,16 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
ptrace_event(PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP, data);
/*
* The delivery of a fatal signal during event
- * notification may silently skip tracer notification.
- * Terminating the task now avoids executing a system
- * call that may not be intended.
+ * notification may silently skip tracer notification,
+ * which could leave us with a potentially unmodified
+ * syscall that the tracer would have liked to have
+ * changed. Since the process is about to die, we just
+ * force the syscall to be skipped and let the signal
+ * kill the process and correctly handle any tracer exit
+ * notifications.
*/
if (fatal_signal_pending(current))
- do_exit(SIGSYS);
+ goto skip;
/* Check if the tracer forced the syscall to be skipped. */
this_syscall = syscall_get_nr(current, task_pt_regs(current));
if (this_syscall < 0)