diff options
author | Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> | 2022-06-22 22:12:16 +0200 |
---|---|---|
committer | Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org> | 2022-10-26 10:02:34 +0200 |
commit | a2bd096fb2d7f50fb4db246b33e7bfcf5e2eda3a (patch) | |
tree | f51ed8d520fcc0ae36e9a4cd3ea19a33968bad21 | |
parent | 9c4f28ddfb9c2e674fca24f68f12c1ffbfbffe41 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-a2bd096fb2d7f50fb4db246b33e7bfcf5e2eda3a.tar.gz linux-stable-a2bd096fb2d7f50fb4db246b33e7bfcf5e2eda3a.tar.bz2 linux-stable-a2bd096fb2d7f50fb4db246b33e7bfcf5e2eda3a.zip |
fs: use type safe idmapping helpers
We already ported most parts and filesystems over for v6.0 to the new
vfs{g,u}id_t type and associated helpers for v6.0. Convert the remaining
places so we can remove all the old helpers.
This is a non-functional change.
Reviewed-by: Seth Forshee (DigitalOcean) <sforshee@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <brauner@kernel.org>
-rw-r--r-- | fs/coredump.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/exec.c | 16 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/inode.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/namei.c | 40 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/remap_range.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | fs/stat.c | 7 |
6 files changed, 40 insertions, 37 deletions
diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c index 7bad7785e8e6..a133103eb721 100644 --- a/fs/coredump.c +++ b/fs/coredump.c @@ -716,8 +716,8 @@ void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo) * filesystem. */ mnt_userns = file_mnt_user_ns(cprm.file); - if (!uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), - current_fsuid())) { + if (!vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), + current_fsuid())) { pr_info_ratelimited("Core dump to %s aborted: cannot preserve file owner\n", cn.corename); goto close_fail; diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 349a5da91efe..dd91adec7a11 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1591,8 +1591,8 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); unsigned int mode; - kuid_t uid; - kgid_t gid; + vfsuid_t vfsuid; + vfsgid_t vfsgid; if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt)) return; @@ -1611,23 +1611,23 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) /* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */ mode = inode->i_mode; - uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); - gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); + vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode); + vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode); inode_unlock(inode); /* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */ - if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) || - !kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid)) + if (!vfsuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, vfsuid) || + !vfsgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, vfsgid)) return; if (mode & S_ISUID) { bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - bprm->cred->euid = uid; + bprm->cred->euid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); } if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - bprm->cred->egid = gid; + bprm->cred->egid = vfsgid_into_kgid(vfsgid); } } diff --git a/fs/inode.c b/fs/inode.c index 8c4078889754..757cac29bd5a 100644 --- a/fs/inode.c +++ b/fs/inode.c @@ -2326,15 +2326,15 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_owner); bool inode_owner_or_capable(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct inode *inode) { - kuid_t i_uid; + vfsuid_t vfsuid; struct user_namespace *ns; - i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); - if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid)) + vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode); + if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid())) return true; ns = current_user_ns(); - if (kuid_has_mapping(ns, i_uid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER)) + if (vfsuid_has_mapping(ns, vfsuid) && ns_capable(ns, CAP_FOWNER)) return true; return false; } diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c index 578c2110df02..d5c5cb7dd023 100644 --- a/fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/namei.c @@ -336,11 +336,11 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, int mask) { unsigned int mode = inode->i_mode; - kuid_t i_uid; + vfsuid_t vfsuid; /* Are we the owner? If so, ACL's don't matter */ - i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); - if (likely(uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid))) { + vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode); + if (likely(vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid()))) { mask &= 7; mode >>= 6; return (mask & ~mode) ? -EACCES : 0; @@ -362,8 +362,8 @@ static int acl_permission_check(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, * about? Need to check group ownership if so. */ if (mask & (mode ^ (mode >> 3))) { - kgid_t kgid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); - if (in_group_p(kgid)) + vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode); + if (vfsgid_in_group_p(vfsgid)) mode >>= 3; } @@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ struct nameidata { struct nameidata *saved; unsigned root_seq; int dfd; - kuid_t dir_uid; + vfsuid_t dir_vfsuid; umode_t dir_mode; } __randomize_layout; @@ -1095,15 +1095,15 @@ fs_initcall(init_fs_namei_sysctls); static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inode) { struct user_namespace *mnt_userns; - kuid_t i_uid; + vfsuid_t vfsuid; if (!sysctl_protected_symlinks) return 0; mnt_userns = mnt_user_ns(nd->path.mnt); - i_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); + vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode); /* Allowed if owner and follower match. */ - if (uid_eq(current_cred()->fsuid, i_uid)) + if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(vfsuid, current_fsuid())) return 0; /* Allowed if parent directory not sticky and world-writable. */ @@ -1111,7 +1111,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd, const struct inode *inod return 0; /* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */ - if (uid_valid(nd->dir_uid) && uid_eq(nd->dir_uid, i_uid)) + if (vfsuid_valid(nd->dir_vfsuid) && vfsuid_eq(nd->dir_vfsuid, vfsuid)) return 0; if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU) @@ -1183,8 +1183,8 @@ int may_linkat(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, const struct path *link) struct inode *inode = link->dentry->d_inode; /* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */ - if (!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) || - !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode))) + if (!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode)) || + !vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode))) return -EOVERFLOW; if (!sysctl_protected_hardlinks) @@ -1232,13 +1232,13 @@ static int may_create_in_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct nameidata *nd, struct inode *const inode) { umode_t dir_mode = nd->dir_mode; - kuid_t dir_uid = nd->dir_uid; + vfsuid_t dir_vfsuid = nd->dir_vfsuid; if ((!sysctl_protected_fifos && S_ISFIFO(inode->i_mode)) || (!sysctl_protected_regular && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode)) || likely(!(dir_mode & S_ISVTX)) || - uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), dir_uid) || - uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode))) + vfsuid_eq(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), dir_vfsuid) || + vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), current_fsuid())) return 0; if (likely(dir_mode & 0002) || @@ -2307,7 +2307,7 @@ static int link_path_walk(const char *name, struct nameidata *nd) OK: /* pathname or trailing symlink, done */ if (!depth) { - nd->dir_uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, nd->inode); + nd->dir_vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, nd->inode); nd->dir_mode = nd->inode->i_mode; nd->flags &= ~LOOKUP_PARENT; return 0; @@ -2885,9 +2885,9 @@ int __check_sticky(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, { kuid_t fsuid = current_fsuid(); - if (uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode), fsuid)) + if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), fsuid)) return 0; - if (uid_eq(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, dir), fsuid)) + if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, dir), fsuid)) return 0; return !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(mnt_userns, inode, CAP_FOWNER); } @@ -2926,8 +2926,8 @@ static int may_delete(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *dir, BUG_ON(victim->d_parent->d_inode != dir); /* Inode writeback is not safe when the uid or gid are invalid. */ - if (!uid_valid(i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode)) || - !gid_valid(i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode))) + if (!vfsuid_valid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode)) || + !vfsgid_valid(i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode))) return -EOVERFLOW; audit_inode_child(dir, victim, AUDIT_TYPE_CHILD_DELETE); diff --git a/fs/remap_range.c b/fs/remap_range.c index 654912d06862..290743c8d226 100644 --- a/fs/remap_range.c +++ b/fs/remap_range.c @@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static bool allow_file_dedupe(struct file *file) return true; if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) return true; - if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode))) + if (vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode), current_fsuid())) return true; if (!inode_permission(mnt_userns, inode, MAY_WRITE)) return true; diff --git a/fs/stat.c b/fs/stat.c index ef50573c72a2..d6cc74ca8486 100644 --- a/fs/stat.c +++ b/fs/stat.c @@ -44,12 +44,15 @@ void generic_fillattr(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, struct kstat *stat) { + vfsuid_t vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(mnt_userns, inode); + vfsgid_t vfsgid = i_gid_into_vfsgid(mnt_userns, inode); + stat->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; stat->ino = inode->i_ino; stat->mode = inode->i_mode; stat->nlink = inode->i_nlink; - stat->uid = i_uid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); - stat->gid = i_gid_into_mnt(mnt_userns, inode); + stat->uid = vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid); + stat->gid = vfsgid_into_kgid(vfsgid); stat->rdev = inode->i_rdev; stat->size = i_size_read(inode); stat->atime = inode->i_atime; |