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authorAlexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com>2018-08-17 01:16:58 +0300
committerKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>2018-09-04 10:35:47 -0700
commitafaef01c001537fa97a25092d7f54d764dc7d8c1 (patch)
tree199a05427ea4c1e0c735058f322a5b21625b9ecd /arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
parent57361846b52bc686112da6ca5368d11210796804 (diff)
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x86/entry: Add STACKLEAK erasing the kernel stack at the end of syscalls
The STACKLEAK feature (initially developed by PaX Team) has the following benefits: 1. Reduces the information that can be revealed through kernel stack leak bugs. The idea of erasing the thread stack at the end of syscalls is similar to CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING and memzero_explicit() in kernel crypto, which all comply with FDP_RIP.2 (Full Residual Information Protection) of the Common Criteria standard. 2. Blocks some uninitialized stack variable attacks (e.g. CVE-2017-17712, CVE-2010-2963). That kind of bugs should be killed by improving C compilers in future, which might take a long time. This commit introduces the code filling the used part of the kernel stack with a poison value before returning to userspace. Full STACKLEAK feature also contains the gcc plugin which comes in a separate commit. The STACKLEAK feature is ported from grsecurity/PaX. More information at: https://grsecurity.net/ https://pax.grsecurity.net/ This code is modified from Brad Spengler/PaX Team's code in the last public patch of grsecurity/PaX based on our understanding of the code. Changes or omissions from the original code are ours and don't reflect the original grsecurity/PaX code. Performance impact: Hardware: Intel Core i7-4770, 16 GB RAM Test #1: building the Linux kernel on a single core 0.91% slowdown Test #2: hackbench -s 4096 -l 2000 -g 15 -f 25 -P 4.2% slowdown So the STACKLEAK description in Kconfig includes: "The tradeoff is the performance impact: on a single CPU system kernel compilation sees a 1% slowdown, other systems and workloads may vary and you are advised to test this feature on your expected workload before deploying it". Signed-off-by: Alexander Popov <alex.popov@linux.com> Acked-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S7
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
index 2767c625a52c..dfb975b4c981 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_32.S
@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@
#include <asm/frame.h>
#include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
+#include "calling.h"
+
.section .entry.text, "ax"
/*
@@ -711,6 +713,7 @@ ENTRY(ret_from_fork)
/* When we fork, we trace the syscall return in the child, too. */
movl %esp, %eax
call syscall_return_slowpath
+ STACKLEAK_ERASE
jmp restore_all
/* kernel thread */
@@ -885,6 +888,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_SYSENTER_32)
ALTERNATIVE "testl %eax, %eax; jz .Lsyscall_32_done", \
"jmp .Lsyscall_32_done", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
+ STACKLEAK_ERASE
+
/* Opportunistic SYSEXIT */
TRACE_IRQS_ON /* User mode traces as IRQs on. */
@@ -996,6 +1001,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_32)
call do_int80_syscall_32
.Lsyscall_32_done:
+ STACKLEAK_ERASE
+
restore_all:
TRACE_IRQS_IRET
SWITCH_TO_ENTRY_STACK