diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-03-05 11:27:48 -0800 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2023-03-05 11:27:48 -0800 |
commit | 7f9ec7d8169b5281eff2b907d8ffb1bf56045f73 (patch) | |
tree | a48e3363789751bf9df08caf409248e04a9ce0c3 /arch/x86/kernel/cpu | |
parent | 4e9c542c7a51bcc8f6ce283459900ba47a6690f5 (diff) | |
parent | dd093fb08e8f8a958fec4eef36f9f09eac047f60 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-7f9ec7d8169b5281eff2b907d8ffb1bf56045f73.tar.gz linux-stable-7f9ec7d8169b5281eff2b907d8ffb1bf56045f73.tar.bz2 linux-stable-7f9ec7d8169b5281eff2b907d8ffb1bf56045f73.zip |
Merge tag 'x86-urgent-2023-03-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 updates from Thomas Gleixner:
"A small set of updates for x86:
- Return -EIO instead of success when the certificate buffer for SEV
guests is not large enough
- Allow STIPB to be enabled with legacy IBSR. Legacy IBRS is cleared
on return to userspace for performance reasons, but the leaves user
space vulnerable to cross-thread attacks which STIBP prevents.
Update the documentation accordingly"
* tag 'x86-urgent-2023-03-05' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
virt/sev-guest: Return -EIO if certificate buffer is not large enough
Documentation/hw-vuln: Document the interaction between IBRS and STIBP
x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRS
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/cpu')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 25 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index cf81848b72f4..f9d060e71c3e 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -1133,14 +1133,18 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void) return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) { - return mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || - mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + return mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE; } +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ + return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode) || mode == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS; +} + static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) { @@ -1203,12 +1207,19 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void) } /* - * If no STIBP, IBRS or enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, - * STIBP is not required. + * If no STIBP, enhanced IBRS is enabled, or SMT impossible, STIBP + * is not required. + * + * Enhanced IBRS also protects against cross-thread branch target + * injection in user-mode as the IBRS bit remains always set which + * implicitly enables cross-thread protections. However, in legacy IBRS + * mode, the IBRS bit is set only on kernel entry and cleared on return + * to userspace. This disables the implicit cross-thread protection, + * so allow for STIBP to be selected in that case. */ if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) || !smt_possible || - spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return; /* @@ -2340,7 +2351,7 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf) static char *stibp_state(void) { - if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) + if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled)) return ""; switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) { |