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author | Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de> | 2020-09-07 15:15:46 +0200 |
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committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2020-09-09 11:33:19 +0200 |
commit | a13644f3a53de4e95a7bce6459f834e832ea44c5 (patch) | |
tree | 9c5cb65710578399714129dd0482ee18e7ae1238 /arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | |
parent | 6b27edd74a5e9669120f7bd0ae1f475d124c1042 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-a13644f3a53de4e95a7bce6459f834e832ea44c5.tar.gz linux-stable-a13644f3a53de4e95a7bce6459f834e832ea44c5.tar.bz2 linux-stable-a13644f3a53de4e95a7bce6459f834e832ea44c5.zip |
x86/entry/64: Add entry code for #VC handler
The #VC handler needs special entry code because:
1. It runs on an IST stack
2. It needs to be able to handle nested #VC exceptions
To make this work, the entry code is implemented to pretend it doesn't
use an IST stack. When entered from user-mode or early SYSCALL entry
path it switches to the task stack. If entered from kernel-mode it tries
to switch back to the previous stack in the IRET frame.
The stack found in the IRET frame is validated first, and if it is not
safe to use it for the #VC handler, the code will switch to a
fall-back stack (the #VC2 IST stack). From there, it can cause nested
exceptions again.
Signed-off-by: Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200907131613.12703-46-joro@8bytes.org
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/traps.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 45 |
1 files changed, 45 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c index 2dc32b0ca38e..fc1ed40ce97d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c @@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ #include <asm/stacktrace.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/debugreg.h> +#include <asm/realmode.h> #include <asm/text-patching.h> #include <asm/ftrace.h> #include <asm/traps.h> @@ -673,6 +674,50 @@ asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *sync_regs(struct pt_regs *eregs) return regs; } +#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT +asmlinkage __visible noinstr struct pt_regs *vc_switch_off_ist(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + unsigned long sp, *stack; + struct stack_info info; + struct pt_regs *regs_ret; + + /* + * In the SYSCALL entry path the RSP value comes from user-space - don't + * trust it and switch to the current kernel stack + */ + if (regs->ip >= (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64 && + regs->ip < (unsigned long)entry_SYSCALL_64_safe_stack) { + sp = this_cpu_read(cpu_current_top_of_stack); + goto sync; + } + + /* + * From here on the RSP value is trusted. Now check whether entry + * happened from a safe stack. Not safe are the entry or unknown stacks, + * use the fall-back stack instead in this case. + */ + sp = regs->sp; + stack = (unsigned long *)sp; + + if (!get_stack_info_noinstr(stack, current, &info) || info.type == STACK_TYPE_ENTRY || + info.type >= STACK_TYPE_EXCEPTION_LAST) + sp = __this_cpu_ist_top_va(VC2); + +sync: + /* + * Found a safe stack - switch to it as if the entry didn't happen via + * IST stack. The code below only copies pt_regs, the real switch happens + * in assembly code. + */ + sp = ALIGN_DOWN(sp, 8) - sizeof(*regs_ret); + + regs_ret = (struct pt_regs *)sp; + *regs_ret = *regs; + + return regs_ret; +} +#endif + struct bad_iret_stack { void *error_entry_ret; struct pt_regs regs; |