Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netdev/net

Cross-merge networking fixes after downstream PR.

No conflicts.

Adjacent changes:

drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c
  06b412589eef ("igc: Add lock to safeguard global Qbv variables")
  d3750076d464 ("igc: Add TransmissionOverrun counter")

drivers/net/ethernet/microsoft/mana/mana_en.c
  a7dfeda6fdec ("net: mana: Fix MANA VF unload when hardware is unresponsive")
  a9ca9f9ceff3 ("page_pool: split types and declarations from page_pool.h")
  92272ec4107e ("eth: add missing xdp.h includes in drivers")

net/mptcp/protocol.h
  511b90e39250 ("mptcp: fix disconnect vs accept race")
  b8dc6d6ce931 ("mptcp: fix rcv buffer auto-tuning")

tools/testing/selftests/net/mptcp/mptcp_join.sh
  c8c101ae390a ("selftests: mptcp: join: fix 'implicit EP' test")
  03668c65d153 ("selftests: mptcp: join: rework detailed report")

Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>

46 files changed, 890 insertions, 210 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h
index 8e5ffb58f83e..b7afaa026842 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/el2_setup.h
@@ -31,6 +31,13 @@
 .Lskip_hcrx_\@:
 .endm
 
+/* Check if running in host at EL2 mode, i.e., (h)VHE. Jump to fail if not. */
+.macro __check_hvhe fail, tmp
+	mrs	\tmp, hcr_el2
+	and	\tmp, \tmp, #HCR_E2H
+	cbz	\tmp, \fail
+.endm
+
 /*
  * Allow Non-secure EL1 and EL0 to access physical timer and counter.
  * This is not necessary for VHE, since the host kernel runs in EL2,
@@ -43,9 +50,7 @@
  */
 .macro __init_el2_timers
 	mov	x0, #3				// Enable EL1 physical timers
-	mrs	x1, hcr_el2
-	and	x1, x1, #HCR_E2H
-	cbz	x1, .LnVHE_\@
+	__check_hvhe .LnVHE_\@, x1
 	lsl	x0, x0, #10
 .LnVHE_\@:
 	msr	cnthctl_el2, x0
@@ -139,15 +144,14 @@
 
 /* Coprocessor traps */
 .macro __init_el2_cptr
-	mrs	x1, hcr_el2
-	and	x1, x1, #HCR_E2H
-	cbz	x1, .LnVHE_\@
+	__check_hvhe .LnVHE_\@, x1
 	mov	x0, #(CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN)
-	b	.Lset_cptr_\@
+	msr	cpacr_el1, x0
+	b	.Lskip_set_cptr_\@
 .LnVHE_\@:
 	mov	x0, #0x33ff
-.Lset_cptr_\@:
 	msr	cptr_el2, x0			// Disable copro. traps to EL2
+.Lskip_set_cptr_\@:
 .endm
 
 /* Disable any fine grained traps */
@@ -268,19 +272,19 @@
 	check_override id_aa64pfr0, ID_AA64PFR0_EL1_SVE_SHIFT, .Linit_sve_\@, .Lskip_sve_\@, x1, x2
 
 .Linit_sve_\@:	/* SVE register access */
-	mrs	x0, cptr_el2			// Disable SVE traps
-	mrs	x1, hcr_el2
-	and	x1, x1, #HCR_E2H
-	cbz	x1, .Lcptr_nvhe_\@
+	__check_hvhe .Lcptr_nvhe_\@, x1
 
-	// VHE case
+	// (h)VHE case
+	mrs	x0, cpacr_el1			// Disable SVE traps
 	orr	x0, x0, #(CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN)
-	b	.Lset_cptr_\@
+	msr	cpacr_el1, x0
+	b	.Lskip_set_cptr_\@
 
 .Lcptr_nvhe_\@: // nVHE case
+	mrs	x0, cptr_el2			// Disable SVE traps
 	bic	x0, x0, #CPTR_EL2_TZ
-.Lset_cptr_\@:
 	msr	cptr_el2, x0
+.Lskip_set_cptr_\@:
 	isb
 	mov	x1, #ZCR_ELx_LEN_MASK		// SVE: Enable full vector
 	msr_s	SYS_ZCR_EL2, x1			// length for EL1.
@@ -289,9 +293,19 @@
 	check_override id_aa64pfr1, ID_AA64PFR1_EL1_SME_SHIFT, .Linit_sme_\@, .Lskip_sme_\@, x1, x2
 
 .Linit_sme_\@:	/* SME register access and priority mapping */
+	__check_hvhe .Lcptr_nvhe_sme_\@, x1
+
+	// (h)VHE case
+	mrs	x0, cpacr_el1			// Disable SME traps
+	orr	x0, x0, #(CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN)
+	msr	cpacr_el1, x0
+	b	.Lskip_set_cptr_sme_\@
+
+.Lcptr_nvhe_sme_\@: // nVHE case
 	mrs	x0, cptr_el2			// Disable SME traps
 	bic	x0, x0, #CPTR_EL2_TSM
 	msr	cptr_el2, x0
+.Lskip_set_cptr_sme_\@:
 	isb
 
 	mrs	x1, sctlr_el2
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
index 7d170aaa2db4..24e28bb2d95b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_asm.h
@@ -278,7 +278,7 @@ asmlinkage void __noreturn hyp_panic_bad_stack(void);
 asmlinkage void kvm_unexpected_el2_exception(void);
 struct kvm_cpu_context;
 void handle_trap(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt);
-asmlinkage void __noreturn kvm_host_psci_cpu_entry(bool is_cpu_on);
+asmlinkage void __noreturn __kvm_host_psci_cpu_entry(bool is_cpu_on);
 void __noreturn __pkvm_init_finalise(void);
 void kvm_nvhe_prepare_backtrace(unsigned long fp, unsigned long pc);
 void kvm_patch_vector_branch(struct alt_instr *alt,
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
index efc0b45d79c3..3d6725ff0bf6 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_emulate.h
@@ -571,6 +571,14 @@ static inline bool vcpu_has_feature(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int feature)
 	return test_bit(feature, vcpu->arch.features);
 }
 
+static __always_inline void kvm_write_cptr_el2(u64 val)
+{
+	if (has_vhe() || has_hvhe())
+		write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
+	else
+		write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2);
+}
+
 static __always_inline u64 kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	u64 val;
@@ -578,8 +586,16 @@ static __always_inline u64 kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	if (has_vhe()) {
 		val = (CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN |
 		       CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN);
+		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
+			val |= CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN;
 	} else if (has_hvhe()) {
 		val = (CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL0EN | CPACR_EL1_FPEN_EL1EN);
+
+		if (!vcpu_has_sve(vcpu) ||
+		    (vcpu->arch.fp_state != FP_STATE_GUEST_OWNED))
+			val |= CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_ZEN_EL0EN;
+		if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_SME))
+			val |= CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL1EN | CPACR_EL1_SMEN_EL0EN;
 	} else {
 		val = CPTR_NVHE_EL2_RES1;
 
@@ -597,9 +613,6 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_reset_cptr_el2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	u64 val = kvm_get_reset_cptr_el2(vcpu);
 
-	if (has_vhe() || has_hvhe())
-		write_sysreg(val, cpacr_el1);
-	else
-		write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2);
+	kvm_write_cptr_el2(val);
 }
 #endif /* __ARM64_KVM_EMULATE_H__ */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
index 520b681a07bb..75c37b1c55aa 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/fpsimd.c
@@ -679,7 +679,7 @@ static void fpsimd_to_sve(struct task_struct *task)
 	void *sst = task->thread.sve_state;
 	struct user_fpsimd_state const *fst = &task->thread.uw.fpsimd_state;
 
-	if (!system_supports_sve())
+	if (!system_supports_sve() && !system_supports_sme())
 		return;
 
 	vq = sve_vq_from_vl(thread_get_cur_vl(&task->thread));
@@ -705,7 +705,7 @@ static void sve_to_fpsimd(struct task_struct *task)
 	unsigned int i;
 	__uint128_t const *p;
 
-	if (!system_supports_sve())
+	if (!system_supports_sve() && !system_supports_sme())
 		return;
 
 	vl = thread_get_cur_vl(&task->thread);
@@ -835,7 +835,8 @@ void sve_sync_from_fpsimd_zeropad(struct task_struct *task)
 	void *sst = task->thread.sve_state;
 	struct user_fpsimd_state const *fst = &task->thread.uw.fpsimd_state;
 
-	if (!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SVE))
+	if (!test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SVE) &&
+	    !thread_sm_enabled(&task->thread))
 		return;
 
 	vq = sve_vq_from_vl(thread_get_cur_vl(&task->thread));
@@ -909,7 +910,7 @@ int vec_set_vector_length(struct task_struct *task, enum vec_type type,
 			 */
 			task->thread.svcr &= ~(SVCR_SM_MASK |
 					       SVCR_ZA_MASK);
-			clear_thread_flag(TIF_SME);
+			clear_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SME);
 			free_sme = true;
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
index d7f4f0d1ae12..5b9b4305248b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -932,11 +932,13 @@ static int sve_set_common(struct task_struct *target,
 	/*
 	 * Ensure target->thread.sve_state is up to date with target's
 	 * FPSIMD regs, so that a short copyin leaves trailing
-	 * registers unmodified.  Always enable SVE even if going into
-	 * streaming mode.
+	 * registers unmodified.  Only enable SVE if we are
+	 * configuring normal SVE, a system with streaming SVE may not
+	 * have normal SVE.
 	 */
 	fpsimd_sync_to_sve(target);
-	set_tsk_thread_flag(target, TIF_SVE);
+	if (type == ARM64_VEC_SVE)
+		set_tsk_thread_flag(target, TIF_SVE);
 	target->thread.fp_type = FP_STATE_SVE;
 
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(SVE_PT_SVE_OFFSET != sizeof(header));
@@ -1180,6 +1182,8 @@ static int zt_set(struct task_struct *target,
 	if (ret == 0)
 		target->thread.svcr |= SVCR_ZA_MASK;
 
+	fpsimd_flush_task_state(target);
+
 	return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
index 72dc53a75d1c..d1cb298a58a0 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ DECLARE_KVM_NVHE_PER_CPU(struct kvm_cpu_context, kvm_hyp_ctxt);
 
 static bool vgic_present, kvm_arm_initialised;
 
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned char, kvm_arm_hardware_enabled);
+static DEFINE_PER_CPU(unsigned char, kvm_hyp_initialized);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(userspace_irqchip_in_use);
 
 bool is_kvm_arm_initialised(void)
@@ -1864,18 +1864,24 @@ static void cpu_hyp_reinit(void)
 	cpu_hyp_init_features();
 }
 
-static void _kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void *discard)
+static void cpu_hyp_init(void *discard)
 {
-	if (!__this_cpu_read(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled)) {
+	if (!__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_initialized)) {
 		cpu_hyp_reinit();
-		__this_cpu_write(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled, 1);
+		__this_cpu_write(kvm_hyp_initialized, 1);
 	}
 }
 
-int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
+static void cpu_hyp_uninit(void *discard)
 {
-	int was_enabled;
+	if (__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_initialized)) {
+		cpu_hyp_reset();
+		__this_cpu_write(kvm_hyp_initialized, 0);
+	}
+}
 
+int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
+{
 	/*
 	 * Most calls to this function are made with migration
 	 * disabled, but not with preemption disabled. The former is
@@ -1884,36 +1890,23 @@ int kvm_arch_hardware_enable(void)
 	 */
 	preempt_disable();
 
-	was_enabled = __this_cpu_read(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled);
-	_kvm_arch_hardware_enable(NULL);
+	cpu_hyp_init(NULL);
 
-	if (!was_enabled) {
-		kvm_vgic_cpu_up();
-		kvm_timer_cpu_up();
-	}
+	kvm_vgic_cpu_up();
+	kvm_timer_cpu_up();
 
 	preempt_enable();
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void _kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void *discard)
-{
-	if (__this_cpu_read(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled)) {
-		cpu_hyp_reset();
-		__this_cpu_write(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled, 0);
-	}
-}
-
 void kvm_arch_hardware_disable(void)
 {
-	if (__this_cpu_read(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled)) {
-		kvm_timer_cpu_down();
-		kvm_vgic_cpu_down();
-	}
+	kvm_timer_cpu_down();
+	kvm_vgic_cpu_down();
 
 	if (!is_protected_kvm_enabled())
-		_kvm_arch_hardware_disable(NULL);
+		cpu_hyp_uninit(NULL);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_PM
@@ -1922,16 +1915,16 @@ static int hyp_init_cpu_pm_notifier(struct notifier_block *self,
 				    void *v)
 {
 	/*
-	 * kvm_arm_hardware_enabled is left with its old value over
+	 * kvm_hyp_initialized is left with its old value over
 	 * PM_ENTER->PM_EXIT. It is used to indicate PM_EXIT should
 	 * re-enable hyp.
 	 */
 	switch (cmd) {
 	case CPU_PM_ENTER:
-		if (__this_cpu_read(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled))
+		if (__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_initialized))
 			/*
-			 * don't update kvm_arm_hardware_enabled here
-			 * so that the hardware will be re-enabled
+			 * don't update kvm_hyp_initialized here
+			 * so that the hyp will be re-enabled
 			 * when we resume. See below.
 			 */
 			cpu_hyp_reset();
@@ -1939,8 +1932,8 @@ static int hyp_init_cpu_pm_notifier(struct notifier_block *self,
 		return NOTIFY_OK;
 	case CPU_PM_ENTER_FAILED:
 	case CPU_PM_EXIT:
-		if (__this_cpu_read(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled))
-			/* The hardware was enabled before suspend. */
+		if (__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_initialized))
+			/* The hyp was enabled before suspend. */
 			cpu_hyp_reinit();
 
 		return NOTIFY_OK;
@@ -2021,7 +2014,7 @@ static int __init init_subsystems(void)
 	/*
 	 * Enable hardware so that subsystem initialisation can access EL2.
 	 */
-	on_each_cpu(_kvm_arch_hardware_enable, NULL, 1);
+	on_each_cpu(cpu_hyp_init, NULL, 1);
 
 	/*
 	 * Register CPU lower-power notifier
@@ -2059,7 +2052,7 @@ out:
 		hyp_cpu_pm_exit();
 
 	if (err || !is_protected_kvm_enabled())
-		on_each_cpu(_kvm_arch_hardware_disable, NULL, 1);
+		on_each_cpu(cpu_hyp_uninit, NULL, 1);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -2097,7 +2090,7 @@ static int __init do_pkvm_init(u32 hyp_va_bits)
 	 * The stub hypercalls are now disabled, so set our local flag to
 	 * prevent a later re-init attempt in kvm_arch_hardware_enable().
 	 */
-	__this_cpu_write(kvm_arm_hardware_enabled, 1);
+	__this_cpu_write(kvm_hyp_initialized, 1);
 	preempt_enable();
 
 	return ret;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
index 4bddb8541bec..34f222af6165 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/include/hyp/switch.h
@@ -457,6 +457,7 @@ static bool handle_ampere1_tcr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 */
 	val &= ~(TCR_HD | TCR_HA);
 	write_sysreg_el1(val, SYS_TCR);
+	__kvm_skip_instr(vcpu);
 	return true;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
index 58dcd92bf346..ab4f5d160c58 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/ffa.c
@@ -705,7 +705,20 @@ int hyp_ffa_init(void *pages)
 	if (res.a0 == FFA_RET_NOT_SUPPORTED)
 		return 0;
 
-	if (res.a0 != FFA_VERSION_1_0)
+	/*
+	 * Firmware returns the maximum supported version of the FF-A
+	 * implementation. Check that the returned version is
+	 * backwards-compatible with the hyp according to the rules in DEN0077A
+	 * v1.1 REL0 13.2.1.
+	 *
+	 * Of course, things are never simple when dealing with firmware. v1.1
+	 * broke ABI with v1.0 on several structures, which is itself
+	 * incompatible with the aforementioned versioning scheme. The
+	 * expectation is that v1.x implementations that do not support the v1.0
+	 * ABI return NOT_SUPPORTED rather than a version number, according to
+	 * DEN0077A v1.1 REL0 18.6.4.
+	 */
+	if (FFA_MAJOR_VERSION(res.a0) != 1)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
 	arm_smccc_1_1_smc(FFA_ID_GET, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, &res);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
index 0a6271052def..e89a23153e85 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/switch.c
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static void __activate_traps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		__activate_traps_fpsimd32(vcpu);
 	}
 
-	write_sysreg(val, cptr_el2);
+	kvm_write_cptr_el2(val);
 	write_sysreg(__this_cpu_read(kvm_hyp_vector), vbar_el2);
 
 	if (cpus_have_final_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_SPECULATIVE_AT)) {
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/pci-dma.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/pci-dma.c
index d818ece23b4a..3f6b507970eb 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/pci-dma.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/pci-dma.c
@@ -417,14 +417,6 @@ void *arch_dma_alloc(struct device *dev, size_t size,
 	map_uncached_pages(vaddr, size, paddr);
 	*dma_handle = (dma_addr_t) paddr;
 
-#if 0
-/* This probably isn't needed to support EISA cards.
-** ISA cards will certainly only support 24-bit DMA addressing.
-** Not clear if we can, want, or need to support ISA.
-*/
-	if (!dev || *dev->coherent_dma_mask < 0xffffffff)
-		gfp |= GFP_DMA;
-#endif
 	return (void *)vaddr;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
index 033b9e50b44a..813062701922 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/unaligned.c
@@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ static int emulate_std(struct pt_regs *regs, int frreg, int flop)
 	: "r19", "r20", "r21", "r22", "r1" );
 #else
     {
-	unsigned long valh=(val>>32),vall=(val&0xffffffffl);
+	unsigned long valh = (val >> 32), vall = (val & 0xffffffffl);
 	__asm__ __volatile__ (
 "	mtsp	%4, %%sr1\n"
 "	zdep	%2, 29, 2, %%r19\n"
@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ void handle_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	case OPCODE_LDWA_I:
 	case OPCODE_LDW_S:
 	case OPCODE_LDWA_S:
-		ret = emulate_ldw(regs, R3(regs->iir),0);
+		ret = emulate_ldw(regs, R3(regs->iir), 0);
 		break;
 
 	case OPCODE_STH:
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ void handle_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
 
 	case OPCODE_STW:
 	case OPCODE_STWA:
-		ret = emulate_stw(regs, R2(regs->iir),0);
+		ret = emulate_stw(regs, R2(regs->iir), 0);
 		break;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
@@ -490,12 +490,12 @@ void handle_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	case OPCODE_LDDA_I:
 	case OPCODE_LDD_S:
 	case OPCODE_LDDA_S:
-		ret = emulate_ldd(regs, R3(regs->iir),0);
+		ret = emulate_ldd(regs, R3(regs->iir), 0);
 		break;
 
 	case OPCODE_STD:
 	case OPCODE_STDA:
-		ret = emulate_std(regs, R2(regs->iir),0);
+		ret = emulate_std(regs, R2(regs->iir), 0);
 		break;
 #endif
 
@@ -503,24 +503,24 @@ void handle_unaligned(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	case OPCODE_FLDWS:
 	case OPCODE_FLDWXR:
 	case OPCODE_FLDWSR:
-		ret = emulate_ldw(regs,FR3(regs->iir),1);
+		ret = emulate_ldw(regs, FR3(regs->iir), 1);
 		break;
 
 	case OPCODE_FLDDX:
 	case OPCODE_FLDDS:
-		ret = emulate_ldd(regs,R3(regs->iir),1);
+		ret = emulate_ldd(regs, R3(regs->iir), 1);
 		break;
 
 	case OPCODE_FSTWX:
 	case OPCODE_FSTWS:
 	case OPCODE_FSTWXR:
 	case OPCODE_FSTWSR:
-		ret = emulate_stw(regs,FR3(regs->iir),1);
+		ret = emulate_stw(regs, FR3(regs->iir), 1);
 		break;
 
 	case OPCODE_FSTDX:
 	case OPCODE_FSTDS:
-		ret = emulate_std(regs,R3(regs->iir),1);
+		ret = emulate_std(regs, R3(regs->iir), 1);
 		break;
 
 	case OPCODE_LDCD_I:
diff --git a/arch/parisc/mm/fixmap.c b/arch/parisc/mm/fixmap.c
index cc15d737fda6..ae3493dae9dc 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/mm/fixmap.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/mm/fixmap.c
@@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ void notrace set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys)
 	pmd_t *pmd = pmd_offset(pud, vaddr);
 	pte_t *pte;
 
-	if (pmd_none(*pmd))
-		pte = pte_alloc_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
-
 	pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, vaddr);
 	set_pte_at(&init_mm, vaddr, pte, __mk_pte(phys, PAGE_KERNEL_RWX));
 	flush_tlb_kernel_range(vaddr, vaddr + PAGE_SIZE);
diff --git a/arch/parisc/mm/init.c b/arch/parisc/mm/init.c
index 406c52fe23d5..389941c7f209 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/mm/init.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/mm/init.c
@@ -669,6 +669,39 @@ static void __init gateway_init(void)
 		  PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_GATEWAY, 1);
 }
 
+static void __init fixmap_init(void)
+{
+	unsigned long addr = FIXMAP_START;
+	unsigned long end = FIXMAP_START + FIXMAP_SIZE;
+	pgd_t *pgd = pgd_offset_k(addr);
+	p4d_t *p4d = p4d_offset(pgd, addr);
+	pud_t *pud = pud_offset(p4d, addr);
+	pmd_t *pmd;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(FIXMAP_SIZE > PMD_SIZE);
+
+#if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS == 3
+	if (pud_none(*pud)) {
+		pmd = memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE << PMD_TABLE_ORDER,
+				     PAGE_SIZE << PMD_TABLE_ORDER);
+		if (!pmd)
+			panic("fixmap: pmd allocation failed.\n");
+		pud_populate(NULL, pud, pmd);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	pmd = pmd_offset(pud, addr);
+	do {
+		pte_t *pte = memblock_alloc(PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
+		if (!pte)
+			panic("fixmap: pte allocation failed.\n");
+
+		pmd_populate_kernel(&init_mm, pmd, pte);
+
+		addr += PAGE_SIZE;
+	} while (addr < end);
+}
+
 static void __init parisc_bootmem_free(void)
 {
 	unsigned long max_zone_pfn[MAX_NR_ZONES] = { 0, };
@@ -683,6 +716,7 @@ void __init paging_init(void)
 	setup_bootmem();
 	pagetable_init();
 	gateway_init();
+	fixmap_init();
 	flush_cache_all_local(); /* start with known state */
 	flush_tlb_all_local(NULL);
 
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
index f132d8704263..6440b1bb332a 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -375,8 +375,7 @@ _GLOBAL(generic_secondary_smp_init)
 	beq	20f
 
 	/* start the specified thread */
-	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r5, fsl_secondary_thread_init)
-	ld	r4, 0(r5)
+	LOAD_REG_ADDR(r5, DOTSYM(fsl_secondary_thread_init))
 	bl	book3e_start_thread
 
 	/* stop the current thread */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace_mprofile.S b/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace_mprofile.S
index ffb1db386849..1f7d86de1538 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace_mprofile.S
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/trace/ftrace_mprofile.S
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
  * and then arrange for the ftrace function to be called.
  */
 .macro	ftrace_regs_entry allregs
+	/* Create a minimal stack frame for representing B */
+	PPC_STLU	r1, -STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE(r1)
+
 	/* Create our stack frame + pt_regs */
 	PPC_STLU	r1,-SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE(r1)
 
@@ -42,7 +45,7 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PPC64
 	/* Save the original return address in A's stack frame */
-	std	r0, LRSAVE+SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE(r1)
+	std	r0, LRSAVE+SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE+STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE(r1)
 	/* Ok to continue? */
 	lbz	r3, PACA_FTRACE_ENABLED(r13)
 	cmpdi	r3, 0
@@ -77,6 +80,8 @@
 	mflr	r7
 	/* Save it as pt_regs->nip */
 	PPC_STL	r7, _NIP(r1)
+	/* Also save it in B's stackframe header for proper unwind */
+	PPC_STL	r7, LRSAVE+SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE(r1)
 	/* Save the read LR in pt_regs->link */
 	PPC_STL	r0, _LINK(r1)
 
@@ -142,7 +147,7 @@
 #endif
 
 	/* Pop our stack frame */
-	addi r1, r1, SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE
+	addi r1, r1, SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE+STACK_FRAME_MIN_SIZE
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_LIVEPATCH_64
         /* Based on the cmpd above, if the NIP was altered handle livepatch */
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/init_64.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/init_64.c
index fe1b83020e0d..0ec5b45b1e86 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/mm/init_64.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/init_64.c
@@ -314,8 +314,7 @@ void __ref vmemmap_free(unsigned long start, unsigned long end,
 	start = ALIGN_DOWN(start, page_size);
 	if (altmap) {
 		alt_start = altmap->base_pfn;
-		alt_end = altmap->base_pfn + altmap->reserve +
-			  altmap->free + altmap->alloc + altmap->align;
+		alt_end = altmap->base_pfn + altmap->reserve + altmap->free;
 	}
 
 	pr_debug("vmemmap_free %lx...%lx\n", start, end);
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/smp.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/smp.c
index 9c43cf32f4c9..40aa58206888 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/smp.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/smp.c
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ static void wake_hw_thread(void *info)
 	unsigned long inia;
 	int cpu = *(const int *)info;
 
-	inia = *(unsigned long *)fsl_secondary_thread_init;
+	inia = ppc_function_entry(fsl_secondary_thread_init);
 	book3e_start_thread(cpu_thread_in_core(cpu), inia);
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/time.c b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/time.c
index 4c5790aff1b5..8633891b7aa5 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/time.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/powermac/time.c
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@
 #include <linux/rtc.h>
 #include <linux/of_address.h>
 
+#include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
 #include <asm/sections.h>
-#include <asm/io.h>
 #include <asm/machdep.h>
 #include <asm/time.h>
 #include <asm/nvram.h>
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static int __init via_calibrate_decr(void)
 		return 0;
 	}
 	of_node_put(vias);
-	via = ioremap(rsrc.start, resource_size(&rsrc));
+	via = early_ioremap(rsrc.start, resource_size(&rsrc));
 	if (via == NULL) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR "Failed to map VIA for timer calibration !\n");
 		return 0;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int __init via_calibrate_decr(void)
 
 	ppc_tb_freq = (dstart - dend) * 100 / 6;
 
-	iounmap(via);
+	early_iounmap((void *)via, resource_size(&rsrc));
 
 	return 1;
 }
diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/acpi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/acpi.h
index f71ce21ff684..d5604d2073bc 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/acpi.h
+++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/acpi.h
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ typedef u64 phys_cpuid_t;
 #define PHYS_CPUID_INVALID INVALID_HARTID
 
 /* ACPI table mapping after acpi_permanent_mmap is set */
-void *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size);
+void __iomem *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size);
 #define acpi_os_ioremap acpi_os_ioremap
 
 #define acpi_strict 1	/* No out-of-spec workarounds on RISC-V */
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/acpi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/acpi.c
index 5ee03ebab80e..56cb2c986c48 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/acpi.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/acpi.c
@@ -215,9 +215,9 @@ void __init __acpi_unmap_table(void __iomem *map, unsigned long size)
 	early_iounmap(map, size);
 }
 
-void *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size)
+void __iomem *acpi_os_ioremap(acpi_physical_address phys, acpi_size size)
 {
-	return memremap(phys, size, MEMREMAP_WB);
+	return (void __iomem *)memremap(phys, size, MEMREMAP_WB);
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_PCI
diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/crash_core.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/crash_core.c
index b351a3c01355..55f1d7856b54 100644
--- a/arch/riscv/kernel/crash_core.c
+++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/crash_core.c
@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@ void arch_crash_save_vmcoreinfo(void)
 	vmcoreinfo_append_str("NUMBER(MODULES_END)=0x%lx\n", MODULES_END);
 #endif
 	vmcoreinfo_append_str("NUMBER(KERNEL_LINK_ADDR)=0x%lx\n", KERNEL_LINK_ADDR);
+	vmcoreinfo_append_str("NUMBER(va_kernel_pa_offset)=0x%lx\n",
+						kernel_map.va_kernel_pa_offset);
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7422db409770..e36261b4ea14 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2593,6 +2593,13 @@ config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
 	  This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
 	  performance.
 
+config CPU_SRSO
+	bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
+
 config SLS
 	bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
 	depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
@@ -2603,6 +2610,25 @@ config SLS
 	  against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
 	  larger.
 
+config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
+	bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default n
+	help
+	  Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
+	  unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
+	  vector registers.
+
+	  This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
+	  command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
+	  AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
+	  the microcode any userspace code that unconditionally uses AVX will
+	  break with this option set.
+
+	  Setting this option on systems not vulnerable to GDS has no effect.
+
+	  If in doubt, say N.
+
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c
index 1fbda2f94184..b21335e6a210 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c
@@ -107,7 +107,6 @@ static bool cpu_is_self(int cpu)
 static bool __send_ipi_mask_ex(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector,
 		bool exclude_self)
 {
-	struct hv_send_ipi_ex **arg;
 	struct hv_send_ipi_ex *ipi_arg;
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int nr_bank = 0;
@@ -117,9 +116,8 @@ static bool __send_ipi_mask_ex(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector,
 		return false;
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
-	arg = (struct hv_send_ipi_ex **)this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
+	ipi_arg = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
 
-	ipi_arg = *arg;
 	if (unlikely(!ipi_arg))
 		goto ipi_mask_ex_done;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
index 6c04b52f139b..953e280c07c3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <asm/apic.h>
 #include <asm/desc.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
+#include <asm/ibt.h>
 #include <asm/hypervisor.h>
 #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
 #include <asm/mshyperv.h>
@@ -472,6 +473,26 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)
 	}
 
 	/*
+	 * Some versions of Hyper-V that provide IBT in guest VMs have a bug
+	 * in that there's no ENDBR64 instruction at the entry to the
+	 * hypercall page. Because hypercalls are invoked via an indirect call
+	 * to the hypercall page, all hypercall attempts fail when IBT is
+	 * enabled, and Linux panics. For such buggy versions, disable IBT.
+	 *
+	 * Fixed versions of Hyper-V always provide ENDBR64 on the hypercall
+	 * page, so if future Linux kernel versions enable IBT for 32-bit
+	 * builds, additional hypercall page hackery will be required here
+	 * to provide an ENDBR32.
+	 */
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) &&
+	    *(u32 *)hv_hypercall_pg != gen_endbr()) {
+		setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT);
+		pr_warn("Hyper-V: Disabling IBT because of Hyper-V bug\n");
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
 	 * hyperv_init() is called before LAPIC is initialized: see
 	 * apic_intr_mode_init() -> x86_platform.apic_post_init() and
 	 * apic_bsp_setup() -> setup_local_APIC(). The direct-mode STIMER
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c
index 85d38b9f3586..db5d2ea39fc0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/hv_vtl.c
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ void __init hv_vtl_init_platform(void)
 	x86_init.irqs.pre_vector_init = x86_init_noop;
 	x86_init.timers.timer_init = x86_init_noop;
 
+	/* Avoid searching for BIOS MP tables */
+	x86_init.mpparse.find_smp_config = x86_init_noop;
+	x86_init.mpparse.get_smp_config = x86_init_uint_noop;
+
 	x86_platform.get_wallclock = get_rtc_noop;
 	x86_platform.set_wallclock = set_rtc_noop;
 	x86_platform.get_nmi_reason = hv_get_nmi_reason;
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
index 14f46ad2ca64..28be6df88063 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hv_ghcb_msr_read);
 static int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
 			   enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility)
 {
-	struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility **input_pcpu, *input;
+	struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility *input;
 	u16 pages_processed;
 	u64 hv_status;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -263,9 +263,8 @@ static int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],
 	}
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
-	input_pcpu = (struct hv_gpa_range_for_visibility **)
-			this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
-	input = *input_pcpu;
+	input = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
+
 	if (unlikely(!input)) {
 		local_irq_restore(flags);
 		return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
index 8460bd35e10c..1cc113200ff5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/mmu.c
@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_multi(const struct cpumask *cpus,
 				   const struct flush_tlb_info *info)
 {
 	int cpu, vcpu, gva_n, max_gvas;
-	struct hv_tlb_flush **flush_pcpu;
 	struct hv_tlb_flush *flush;
 	u64 status;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -74,10 +73,7 @@ static void hyperv_flush_tlb_multi(const struct cpumask *cpus,
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
-	flush_pcpu = (struct hv_tlb_flush **)
-		     this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
-
-	flush = *flush_pcpu;
+	flush = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
 
 	if (unlikely(!flush)) {
 		local_irq_restore(flags);
@@ -178,17 +174,13 @@ static u64 hyperv_flush_tlb_others_ex(const struct cpumask *cpus,
 				      const struct flush_tlb_info *info)
 {
 	int nr_bank = 0, max_gvas, gva_n;
-	struct hv_tlb_flush_ex **flush_pcpu;
 	struct hv_tlb_flush_ex *flush;
 	u64 status;
 
 	if (!(ms_hyperv.hints & HV_X64_EX_PROCESSOR_MASKS_RECOMMENDED))
 		return HV_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER;
 
-	flush_pcpu = (struct hv_tlb_flush_ex **)
-		     this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
-
-	flush = *flush_pcpu;
+	flush = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
 
 	if (info->mm) {
 		/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/nested.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/nested.c
index 5d70968c8538..9dc259fa322e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/hyperv/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/nested.c
@@ -19,7 +19,6 @@
 
 int hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(u64 as)
 {
-	struct hv_guest_mapping_flush **flush_pcpu;
 	struct hv_guest_mapping_flush *flush;
 	u64 status;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -30,10 +29,7 @@ int hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(u64 as)
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
-	flush_pcpu = (struct hv_guest_mapping_flush **)
-		this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
-
-	flush = *flush_pcpu;
+	flush = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
 
 	if (unlikely(!flush)) {
 		local_irq_restore(flags);
@@ -90,7 +86,6 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(hyperv_fill_flush_guest_mapping_list);
 int hyperv_flush_guest_mapping_range(u64 as,
 		hyperv_fill_flush_list_func fill_flush_list_func, void *data)
 {
-	struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list **flush_pcpu;
 	struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list *flush;
 	u64 status;
 	unsigned long flags;
@@ -102,10 +97,8 @@ int hyperv_flush_guest_mapping_range(u64 as,
 
 	local_irq_save(flags);
 
-	flush_pcpu = (struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list **)
-		this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
+	flush = *this_cpu_ptr(hyperv_pcpu_input_arg);
 
-	flush = *flush_pcpu;
 	if (unlikely(!flush)) {
 		local_irq_restore(flags);
 		goto fault;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index cb8ca46213be..b69b0d7756aa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
  * Defines x86 CPU feature bits
  */
 #define NCAPINTS			21	   /* N 32-bit words worth of info */
-#define NBUGINTS			1	   /* N 32-bit bug flags */
+#define NBUGINTS			2	   /* N 32-bit bug flags */
 
 /*
  * Note: If the comment begins with a quoted string, that string is used
@@ -309,6 +309,10 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_SMBA		(11*32+21) /* "" Slow Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
 #define X86_FEATURE_BMEC		(11*32+22) /* "" Bandwidth Monitoring Event Configuration */
 
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO		(11*32+24) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS		(11*32+25) /* "" AMD BTB untrain RETs through aliasing */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT	(11*32+26) /* "" Issue an IBPB only on VMEXIT */
+
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16		(12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */
@@ -442,6 +446,10 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS		(20*32+ 8) /* "" Automatic IBRS */
 #define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR	(20*32+ 9) /* "" SMM_CTL MSR is not present */
 
+#define X86_FEATURE_SBPB		(20*32+27) /* "" Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE		(20*32+28) /* "" MSR_PRED_CMD[IBPB] flushes all branch type predictions */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO		(20*32+29) /* "" CPU is not affected by SRSO */
+
 /*
  * BUG word(s)
  */
@@ -483,5 +491,9 @@
 #define X86_BUG_RETBLEED		X86_BUG(27) /* CPU is affected by RETBleed */
 #define X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB		X86_BUG(28) /* EIBRS is vulnerable to Post Barrier RSB Predictions */
 #define X86_BUG_SMT_RSB			X86_BUG(29) /* CPU is vulnerable to Cross-Thread Return Address Predictions */
+#define X86_BUG_GDS			X86_BUG(30) /* CPU is affected by Gather Data Sampling */
 
+/* BUG word 2 */
+#define X86_BUG_SRSO			X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */
+#define X86_BUG_DIV0			X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
index 88d9ef98e087..fa83d88e4c99 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/nmi.h>
 #include <linux/msi.h>
-#include <asm/io.h>
+#include <linux/io.h>
 #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index a00a53e15ab7..1d111350197f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 
 #define MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD		0x00000049 /* Prediction Command */
 #define PRED_CMD_IBPB			BIT(0)	   /* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier */
+#define PRED_CMD_SBPB			BIT(7)	   /* Selective Branch Prediction Barrier */
 
 #define MSR_PPIN_CTL			0x0000004e
 #define MSR_PPIN			0x0000004f
@@ -155,6 +156,15 @@
 						 * Not susceptible to Post-Barrier
 						 * Return Stack Buffer Predictions.
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL		BIT(25)	/*
+						 * CPU is vulnerable to Gather
+						 * Data Sampling (GDS) and
+						 * has controls for mitigation.
+						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO			BIT(26)	/*
+						 * CPU is not vulnerable to Gather
+						 * Data Sampling (GDS).
+						 */
 
 #define ARCH_CAP_XAPIC_DISABLE		BIT(21)	/*
 						 * IA32_XAPIC_DISABLE_STATUS MSR
@@ -178,6 +188,8 @@
 #define RNGDS_MITG_DIS			BIT(0)	/* SRBDS support */
 #define RTM_ALLOW			BIT(1)	/* TSX development mode */
 #define FB_CLEAR_DIS			BIT(3)	/* CPU Fill buffer clear disable */
+#define GDS_MITG_DIS			BIT(4)	/* Disable GDS mitigation */
+#define GDS_MITG_LOCKED			BIT(5)	/* GDS mitigation locked */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS		0x00000174
 #define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP		0x00000175
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 1a65cf4acb2b..3faf044569a5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -211,7 +211,8 @@
  * eventually turn into it's own annotation.
  */
 .macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
-#if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)
+#if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
+	(defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
 	ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
 	nop
 #endif
@@ -289,13 +290,18 @@
  */
 .macro UNTRAIN_RET
 #if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) || \
-	defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING)
+	defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
 	VALIDATE_UNRET_END
 	ALTERNATIVE_3 "",						\
 		      CALL_ZEN_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET,		\
 		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB,	\
 		      __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
+			  "call srso_untrain_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
+#endif
 .endm
 
 .macro UNTRAIN_RET_FROM_CALL
@@ -307,6 +313,11 @@
 		      "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB,	\
 		      __stringify(RESET_CALL_DEPTH_FROM_CALL), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
 #endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "", "call srso_untrain_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
+			  "call srso_untrain_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
+#endif
 .endm
 
 
@@ -332,6 +343,8 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
 
 extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
 extern void zen_untrain_ret(void);
+extern void srso_untrain_ret(void);
+extern void srso_untrain_ret_alias(void);
 extern void entry_ibpb(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CALL_THUNKS
@@ -479,11 +492,11 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
 		: "memory");
 }
 
+extern u64 x86_pred_cmd;
+
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {
-	u64 val = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
-
-	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, val, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
+	alternative_msr_write(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, x86_pred_cmd, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB);
 }
 
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index d46300e94f85..973db0406528 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -682,9 +682,13 @@ extern u16 get_llc_id(unsigned int cpu);
 #ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD
 extern u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void);
 extern u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void);
+extern bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void);
+extern void amd_clear_divider(void);
 #else
 static inline u32 amd_get_nodes_per_socket(void)	{ return 0; }
 static inline u32 amd_get_highest_perf(void)		{ return 0; }
+static inline bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)	{ return false; }
+static inline void amd_clear_divider(void)		{ }
 #endif
 
 extern unsigned long arch_align_stack(unsigned long sp);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index 26ad7ca423e7..b55d8f82b621 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -75,6 +75,10 @@ static const int amd_zenbleed[] =
 			   AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x60, 0x0, 0x7f, 0xf),
 			   AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0xa0, 0x0, 0xaf, 0xf));
 
+static const int amd_div0[] =
+	AMD_LEGACY_ERRATUM(AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x00, 0x0, 0x2f, 0xf),
+			   AMD_MODEL_RANGE(0x17, 0x50, 0x0, 0x5f, 0xf));
+
 static bool cpu_has_amd_erratum(struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, const int *erratum)
 {
 	int osvw_id = *erratum++;
@@ -1130,6 +1134,11 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS));
 
 	zenbleed_check(c);
+
+	if (cpu_has_amd_erratum(c, amd_div0)) {
+		pr_notice_once("AMD Zen1 DIV0 bug detected. Disable SMT for full protection.\n");
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_DIV0);
+	}
 }
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
@@ -1290,3 +1299,32 @@ void amd_check_microcode(void)
 {
 	on_each_cpu(zenbleed_check_cpu, NULL, 1);
 }
+
+bool cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode(void)
+{
+	switch (boot_cpu_data.x86) {
+	/* Zen1/2 IBPB flushes branch type predictions too. */
+	case 0x17:
+		return boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB);
+	case 0x19:
+		/* Poke the MSR bit on Zen3/4 to check its presence. */
+		if (!wrmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_SBPB)) {
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SBPB);
+			return true;
+		} else {
+			return false;
+		}
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Issue a DIV 0/1 insn to clear any division data from previous DIV
+ * operations.
+ */
+void noinstr amd_clear_divider(void)
+{
+	asm volatile(ALTERNATIVE("", "div %2\n\t", X86_BUG_DIV0)
+		     :: "a" (0), "d" (0), "r" (1));
+}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 95507448e781..d02f73c5339d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
 static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
+static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
 
 /* The base value of the SPEC_CTRL MSR without task-specific bits set */
 u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
@@ -56,6 +58,9 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_base);
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 
+u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_pred_cmd);
+
 static DEFINE_MUTEX(spec_ctrl_mutex);
 
 /* Update SPEC_CTRL MSR and its cached copy unconditionally */
@@ -160,6 +165,8 @@ void __init cpu_select_mitigations(void)
 	md_clear_select_mitigation();
 	srbds_select_mitigation();
 	l1d_flush_select_mitigation();
+	srso_select_mitigation();
+	gds_select_mitigation();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -646,6 +653,149 @@ static int __init l1d_flush_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 early_param("l1d_flush", l1d_flush_parse_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"GDS: " fmt
+
+enum gds_mitigations {
+	GDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+	GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE,
+	GDS_MITIGATION_FULL,
+	GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED,
+	GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION)
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+#else
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+#endif
+
+static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
+	[GDS_MITIGATION_OFF]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]	= "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+	[GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE]		= "Mitigation: AVX disabled, no microcode",
+	[GDS_MITIGATION_FULL]		= "Mitigation: Microcode",
+	[GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED]	= "Mitigation: Microcode (locked)",
+	[GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]	= "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
+};
+
+bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
+{
+	return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
+		gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated);
+
+void update_gds_msr(void)
+{
+	u64 mcu_ctrl_after;
+	u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+	switch (gds_mitigation) {
+	case GDS_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+		mcu_ctrl |= GDS_MITG_DIS;
+		break;
+	case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED:
+		/*
+		 * The LOCKED state comes from the boot CPU. APs might not have
+		 * the same state. Make sure the mitigation is enabled on all
+		 * CPUs.
+		 */
+	case GDS_MITIGATION_FULL:
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+		mcu_ctrl &= ~GDS_MITG_DIS;
+		break;
+	case GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE:
+	case GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+	case GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR:
+		return;
+	};
+
+	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check to make sure that the WRMSR value was not ignored. Writes to
+	 * GDS_MITG_DIS will be ignored if this processor is locked but the boot
+	 * processor was not.
+	 */
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl_after);
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(mcu_ctrl != mcu_ctrl_after);
+}
+
+static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	u64 mcu_ctrl;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+		return;
+
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR)) {
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	/* Will verify below that mitigation _can_ be disabled */
+
+	/* No microcode */
+	if (!(x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_GDS_CTRL)) {
+		if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
+			/*
+			 * This only needs to be done on the boot CPU so do it
+			 * here rather than in update_gds_msr()
+			 */
+			setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_AVX);
+			pr_warn("Microcode update needed! Disabling AVX as mitigation.\n");
+		} else {
+			gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Microcode has mitigation, use it */
+	if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+
+	rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, mcu_ctrl);
+	if (mcu_ctrl & GDS_MITG_LOCKED) {
+		if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+			pr_warn("Mitigation locked. Disable failed.\n");
+
+		/*
+		 * The mitigation is selected from the boot CPU. All other CPUs
+		 * _should_ have the same state. If the boot CPU isn't locked
+		 * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state
+		 * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will
+		 * ensure the other CPUs have the mitigation enabled.
+		 */
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
+	}
+
+	update_gds_msr();
+out:
+	pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
+}
+
+static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "force"))
+		gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline);
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V1 : " fmt
 
 enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
@@ -2188,6 +2338,165 @@ static int __init l1tf_cmdline(char *str)
 early_param("l1tf", l1tf_cmdline);
 
 #undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Speculative Return Stack Overflow: " fmt
+
+enum srso_mitigation {
+	SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE,
+	SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE,
+	SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET,
+	SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB,
+	SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+};
+
+enum srso_mitigation_cmd {
+	SRSO_CMD_OFF,
+	SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE,
+	SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET,
+	SRSO_CMD_IBPB,
+	SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+};
+
+static const char * const srso_strings[] = {
+	[SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE]           = "Vulnerable",
+	[SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE]      = "Mitigation: microcode",
+	[SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET]	 = "Mitigation: safe RET",
+	[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB]		 = "Mitigation: IBPB",
+	[SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT] = "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT only"
+};
+
+static enum srso_mitigation srso_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRSO_MITIGATION_NONE;
+static enum srso_mitigation_cmd srso_cmd __ro_after_init = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
+
+static int __init srso_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "microcode"))
+		srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "safe-ret"))
+		srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb"))
+		srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "ibpb-vmexit"))
+		srso_cmd = SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+	else
+		pr_err("Ignoring unknown SRSO option (%s).", str);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("spec_rstack_overflow", srso_parse_cmdline);
+
+#define SRSO_NOTICE "WARNING: See https://kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/srso.html for mitigation options."
+
+static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	bool has_microcode;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO) || cpu_mitigations_off())
+		goto pred_cmd;
+
+	/*
+	 * The first check is for the kernel running as a guest in order
+	 * for guests to verify whether IBPB is a viable mitigation.
+	 */
+	has_microcode = boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE) || cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode();
+	if (!has_microcode) {
+		pr_warn("IBPB-extending microcode not applied!\n");
+		pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Enable the synthetic (even if in a real CPUID leaf)
+		 * flags for guests.
+		 */
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_BRTYPE);
+
+		/*
+		 * Zen1/2 with SMT off aren't vulnerable after the right
+		 * IBPB microcode has been applied.
+		 */
+		if ((boot_cpu_data.x86 < 0x19) &&
+		    (!cpu_smt_possible() || (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_DISABLED)))
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
+	}
+
+	if (retbleed_mitigation == RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB) {
+		if (has_microcode) {
+			pr_err("Retbleed IBPB mitigation enabled, using same for SRSO\n");
+			srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+			goto pred_cmd;
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (srso_cmd) {
+	case SRSO_CMD_OFF:
+		return;
+
+	case SRSO_CMD_MICROCODE:
+		if (has_microcode) {
+			srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_MICROCODE;
+			pr_warn(SRSO_NOTICE);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+			/*
+			 * Enable the return thunk for generated code
+			 * like ftrace, static_call, etc.
+			 */
+			setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK);
+
+			if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x19)
+				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS);
+			else
+				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SRSO);
+			srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET;
+		} else {
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+			goto pred_cmd;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+			if (has_microcode) {
+				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
+				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
+			}
+		} else {
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+			goto pred_cmd;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
+		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+			if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
+				setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
+				srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
+			}
+		} else {
+			pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+			goto pred_cmd;
+                }
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	pr_info("%s%s\n", srso_strings[srso_mitigation], (has_microcode ? "" : ", no microcode"));
+
+pred_cmd:
+	if ((boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO) || srso_cmd == SRSO_CMD_OFF) &&
+	     boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SBPB))
+		x86_pred_cmd = PRED_CMD_SBPB;
+}
+
+#undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) fmt
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
@@ -2385,6 +2694,18 @@ static ssize_t retbleed_show_state(char *buf)
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
 }
 
+static ssize_t srso_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s%s\n",
+			  srso_strings[srso_mitigation],
+			  (cpu_has_ibpb_brtype_microcode() ? "" : ", no microcode"));
+}
+
+static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -2434,6 +2755,12 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_RETBLEED:
 		return retbleed_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_SRSO:
+		return srso_show_state(buf);
+
+	case X86_BUG_GDS:
+		return gds_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -2498,4 +2825,14 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_retbleed(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, cha
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRSO);
+}
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_GDS);
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 0ba1067f4e5f..e3a65e9fc750 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1250,6 +1250,10 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define RETBLEED	BIT(3)
 /* CPU is affected by SMT (cross-thread) return predictions */
 #define SMT_RSB		BIT(4)
+/* CPU is affected by SRSO */
+#define SRSO		BIT(5)
+/* CPU is affected by GDS */
+#define GDS		BIT(6)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
@@ -1262,27 +1266,30 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
-	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x17, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB | SRSO),
 	VULNBL_HYGON(0x18, RETBLEED | SMT_RSB),
+	VULNBL_AMD(0x19, SRSO),
 	{}
 };
 
@@ -1406,6 +1413,21 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SMT_RSB))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SMT_RSB);
 
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO)) {
+		if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, SRSO))
+			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if CPU is vulnerable to GDS. If running in a virtual machine on
+	 * an affected processor, the VMM may have disabled the use of GATHER by
+	 * disabling AVX2. The only way to do this in HW is to clear XCR0[2],
+	 * which means that AVX will be disabled.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, GDS) && !(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO) &&
+	    boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AVX))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_GDS);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
@@ -1962,6 +1984,8 @@ void identify_secondary_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	validate_apic_and_package_id(c);
 	x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap();
 	update_srbds_msr();
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS))
+		update_gds_msr();
 
 	tsx_ap_init();
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
index 1c44630d4789..1dcd7d4e38ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ void cpu_select_mitigations(void);
 
 extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void);
 extern void update_srbds_msr(void);
+extern void update_gds_msr(void);
 
 extern enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
index 4a817d20ce3b..1885326a8f65 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
@@ -206,6 +206,8 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_divide_error)
 {
 	do_error_trap(regs, 0, "divide error", X86_TRAP_DE, SIGFPE,
 		      FPE_INTDIV, error_get_trap_addr(regs));
+
+	amd_clear_divider();
 }
 
 DEFINE_IDTENTRY(exc_overflow)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 03c885d3640f..e76813230192 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -134,13 +134,27 @@ SECTIONS
 		SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
 		__indirect_thunk_start = .;
-		*(.text.__x86.*)
+		*(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk)
+		*(.text.__x86.return_thunk)
 		__indirect_thunk_end = .;
 #endif
 		STATIC_CALL_TEXT
 
 		ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+		*(.text.__x86.rethunk_untrain)
+#endif
+
 		ENTRY_TEXT
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+		/*
+		 * See the comment above srso_untrain_ret_alias()'s
+		 * definition.
+		 */
+		. = srso_untrain_ret_alias | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20);
+		*(.text.__x86.rethunk_safe)
+#endif
 		ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END
 		*(.gnu.warning)
 
@@ -509,7 +523,18 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
-. = ASSERT((__x86_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "__x86_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
+. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned");
+. = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned");
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+/*
+ * GNU ld cannot do XOR so do: (A | B) - (A & B) in order to compute the XOR
+ * of the two function addresses:
+ */
+. = ASSERT(((srso_untrain_ret_alias | srso_safe_ret_alias) -
+		(srso_untrain_ret_alias & srso_safe_ret_alias)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)),
+		"SRSO function pair won't alias");
 #endif
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 7f4d13383cf2..d3432687c9e6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -729,6 +729,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		F(NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE) | F(AUTOIBRS) | 0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */
 	);
 
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO))
+		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_SRSO_NO);
+
 	kvm_cpu_cap_init_kvm_defined(CPUID_8000_0022_EAX,
 		F(PERFMON_V2)
 	);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 07756b7348ae..d3aec1f2cad2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -2417,15 +2417,18 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	 */
 	memset(vcpu->arch.regs, 0, sizeof(vcpu->arch.regs));
 
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(ghcb);
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(ghcb);
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(ghcb);
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(ghcb);
-	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(ghcb);
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap) != sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
+	memcpy(&svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap, &ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
 
-	svm->vmcb->save.cpl = ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rax_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rbx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rcx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = kvm_ghcb_get_rdx_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+	vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI] = kvm_ghcb_get_rsi_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
 
-	if (ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb)) {
+	svm->vmcb->save.cpl = kvm_ghcb_get_cpl_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
+
+	if (kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm)) {
 		vcpu->arch.xcr0 = ghcb_get_xcr0(ghcb);
 		kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(vcpu);
 	}
@@ -2436,84 +2439,88 @@ static void sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	control->exit_code_hi = upper_32_bits(exit_code);
 	control->exit_info_1 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb);
 	control->exit_info_2 = ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb);
+	svm->sev_es.sw_scratch = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_scratch_if_valid(svm, ghcb);
 
 	/* Clear the valid entries fields */
 	memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
 }
 
+static u64 kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(struct vmcb_control_area *control)
+{
+	return (((u64)control->exit_code_hi) << 32) | control->exit_code;
+}
+
 static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
-	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
-	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
 	u64 exit_code;
 	u64 reason;
 
-	ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
-
 	/*
 	 * Retrieve the exit code now even though it may not be marked valid
 	 * as it could help with debugging.
 	 */
-	exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
+	exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control);
 
 	/* Only GHCB Usage code 0 is supported */
-	if (ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
+	if (svm->sev_es.ghcb->ghcb_usage) {
 		reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE;
 		goto vmgexit_err;
 	}
 
 	reason = GHCB_ERR_MISSING_INPUT;
 
-	if (!ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(ghcb) ||
-	    !ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(ghcb) ||
-	    !ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(ghcb))
+	if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_code_is_valid(svm) ||
+	    !kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_info_1_is_valid(svm) ||
+	    !kvm_ghcb_sw_exit_info_2_is_valid(svm))
 		goto vmgexit_err;
 
-	switch (ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb)) {
+	switch (exit_code) {
 	case SVM_EXIT_READ_DR7:
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_WRITE_DR7:
-		if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm))
 			goto vmgexit_err;
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_RDTSC:
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_RDPMC:
-		if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
 			goto vmgexit_err;
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_CPUID:
-		if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
-		    !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
 			goto vmgexit_err;
-		if (ghcb_get_rax(ghcb) == 0xd)
-			if (!ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX] == 0xd)
+			if (!kvm_ghcb_xcr0_is_valid(svm))
 				goto vmgexit_err;
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_INVD:
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_IOIO:
-		if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
-			if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_STR_MASK) {
+			if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(svm))
 				goto vmgexit_err;
 		} else {
-			if (!(ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb) & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
-				if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb))
+			if (!(control->exit_info_1 & SVM_IOIO_TYPE_MASK))
+				if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm))
 					goto vmgexit_err;
 		}
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_MSR:
-		if (!ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
 			goto vmgexit_err;
-		if (ghcb_get_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb)) {
-			if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
-			    !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (control->exit_info_1) {
+			if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+			    !kvm_ghcb_rdx_is_valid(svm))
 				goto vmgexit_err;
 		}
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_VMMCALL:
-		if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
-		    !ghcb_cpl_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_cpl_is_valid(svm))
 			goto vmgexit_err;
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_RDTSCP:
@@ -2521,19 +2528,19 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	case SVM_EXIT_WBINVD:
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_MONITOR:
-		if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
-		    !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb) ||
-		    !ghcb_rdx_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_rdx_is_valid(svm))
 			goto vmgexit_err;
 		break;
 	case SVM_EXIT_MWAIT:
-		if (!ghcb_rax_is_valid(ghcb) ||
-		    !ghcb_rcx_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_rax_is_valid(svm) ||
+		    !kvm_ghcb_rcx_is_valid(svm))
 			goto vmgexit_err;
 		break;
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_WRITE:
-		if (!ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(ghcb))
+		if (!kvm_ghcb_sw_scratch_is_valid(svm))
 			goto vmgexit_err;
 		break;
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE:
@@ -2549,11 +2556,9 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	return 0;
 
 vmgexit_err:
-	vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
-
 	if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_USAGE) {
 		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: ghcb usage %#x is not valid\n",
-			    ghcb->ghcb_usage);
+			    svm->sev_es.ghcb->ghcb_usage);
 	} else if (reason == GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT) {
 		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmgexit: exit code %#llx is not valid\n",
 			    exit_code);
@@ -2563,11 +2568,8 @@ vmgexit_err:
 		dump_ghcb(svm);
 	}
 
-	/* Clear the valid entries fields */
-	memset(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap, 0, sizeof(ghcb->save.valid_bitmap));
-
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, reason);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, reason);
 
 	/* Resume the guest to "return" the error code. */
 	return 1;
@@ -2586,7 +2588,7 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 		 */
 		if (svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync) {
 			kvm_write_guest(svm->vcpu.kvm,
-					ghcb_get_sw_scratch(svm->sev_es.ghcb),
+					svm->sev_es.sw_scratch,
 					svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa,
 					svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_len);
 			svm->sev_es.ghcb_sa_sync = false;
@@ -2632,12 +2634,11 @@ void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu)
 static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
 {
 	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
-	struct ghcb *ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb;
 	u64 ghcb_scratch_beg, ghcb_scratch_end;
 	u64 scratch_gpa_beg, scratch_gpa_end;
 	void *scratch_va;
 
-	scratch_gpa_beg = ghcb_get_sw_scratch(ghcb);
+	scratch_gpa_beg = svm->sev_es.sw_scratch;
 	if (!scratch_gpa_beg) {
 		pr_err("vmgexit: scratch gpa not provided\n");
 		goto e_scratch;
@@ -2708,8 +2709,8 @@ static int setup_vmgexit_scratch(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool sync, u64 len)
 	return 0;
 
 e_scratch:
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_SCRATCH_AREA);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_SCRATCH_AREA);
 
 	return 1;
 }
@@ -2822,7 +2823,6 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
 	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
 	u64 ghcb_gpa, exit_code;
-	struct ghcb *ghcb;
 	int ret;
 
 	/* Validate the GHCB */
@@ -2847,20 +2847,18 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 
 	svm->sev_es.ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
-	ghcb = svm->sev_es.ghcb_map.hva;
 
-	trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, ghcb);
-
-	exit_code = ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(ghcb);
+	trace_kvm_vmgexit_enter(vcpu->vcpu_id, svm->sev_es.ghcb);
 
+	sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
 	ret = sev_es_validate_vmgexit(svm);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	sev_es_sync_from_ghcb(svm);
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 0);
-	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, 0);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 0);
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 0);
 
+	exit_code = kvm_ghcb_get_sw_exit_code(control);
 	switch (exit_code) {
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_MMIO_READ:
 		ret = setup_vmgexit_scratch(svm, true, control->exit_info_2);
@@ -2898,13 +2896,13 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 			break;
 		case 1:
 			/* Get AP jump table address */
-			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
+			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, sev->ap_jump_table);
 			break;
 		default:
 			pr_err("svm: vmgexit: unsupported AP jump table request - exit_info_1=%#llx\n",
 			       control->exit_info_1);
-			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(ghcb, 2);
-			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT);
+			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_1(svm->sev_es.ghcb, 2);
+			ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, GHCB_ERR_INVALID_INPUT);
 		}
 
 		ret = 1;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index 956726d867aa..03e852dedcc1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -1498,7 +1498,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 
 	if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
 		sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
-		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+
+		if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT))
+			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
 	}
 	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
 		avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index 18af7e712a5a..8239c8de45ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -190,10 +190,12 @@ struct vcpu_sev_es_state {
 	/* SEV-ES support */
 	struct sev_es_save_area *vmsa;
 	struct ghcb *ghcb;
+	u8 valid_bitmap[16];
 	struct kvm_host_map ghcb_map;
 	bool received_first_sipi;
 
 	/* SEV-ES scratch area support */
+	u64 sw_scratch;
 	void *ghcb_sa;
 	u32 ghcb_sa_len;
 	bool ghcb_sa_sync;
@@ -744,4 +746,28 @@ void sev_es_unmap_ghcb(struct vcpu_svm *svm);
 void __svm_sev_es_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool spec_ctrl_intercepted);
 void __svm_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, bool spec_ctrl_intercepted);
 
+#define DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(field)						\
+	static __always_inline bool kvm_ghcb_##field##_is_valid(const struct vcpu_svm *svm) \
+	{									\
+		return test_bit(GHCB_BITMAP_IDX(field),				\
+				(unsigned long *)&svm->sev_es.valid_bitmap);	\
+	}									\
+										\
+	static __always_inline u64 kvm_ghcb_get_##field##_if_valid(struct vcpu_svm *svm, struct ghcb *ghcb) \
+	{									\
+		return kvm_ghcb_##field##_is_valid(svm) ? ghcb->save.field : 0;	\
+	}									\
+
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(cpl)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rax)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rcx)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rdx)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rbx)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(rsi)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_code)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch)
+DEFINE_KVM_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0)
+
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
index 8e8295e774f0..265452fc9ebe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -224,6 +224,9 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
 	 */
 	UNTRAIN_RET
 
+	/* SRSO */
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "call entry_ibpb", X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT
+
 	/*
 	 * Clear all general purpose registers except RSP and RAX to prevent
 	 * speculative use of the guest's values, even those that are reloaded
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 278dbd37dab2..19d9ff92d699 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -314,6 +314,8 @@ u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0;
 
 static struct kmem_cache *x86_emulator_cache;
 
+extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void);
+
 /*
  * When called, it means the previous get/set msr reached an invalid msr.
  * Return true if we want to ignore/silent this failed msr access.
@@ -1616,7 +1618,7 @@ static bool kvm_is_immutable_feature_msr(u32 msr)
 	 ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH | ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO | \
 	 ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \
 	 ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \
-	 ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO)
+	 ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO)
 
 static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 {
@@ -1673,6 +1675,9 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 		 */
 	}
 
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated())
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO;
+
 	return data;
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 3fd066d42ec0..2cff585f22f2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <asm/unwind_hints.h>
 #include <asm/percpu.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
+#include <asm/nops.h>
 
 	.section .text.__x86.indirect_thunk
 
@@ -131,6 +132,46 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
  */
 #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
 
+/*
+ * srso_untrain_ret_alias() and srso_safe_ret_alias() are placed at
+ * special addresses:
+ *
+ * - srso_untrain_ret_alias() is 2M aligned
+ * - srso_safe_ret_alias() is also in the same 2M page but bits 2, 8, 14
+ * and 20 in its virtual address are set (while those bits in the
+ * srso_untrain_ret_alias() function are cleared).
+ *
+ * This guarantees that those two addresses will alias in the branch
+ * target buffer of Zen3/4 generations, leading to any potential
+ * poisoned entries at that BTB slot to get evicted.
+ *
+ * As a result, srso_safe_ret_alias() becomes a safe return.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+	.section .text.__x86.rethunk_untrain
+
+SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+	ASM_NOP2
+	lfence
+	jmp __x86_return_thunk
+SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
+__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret_alias)
+
+	.section .text.__x86.rethunk_safe
+#endif
+
+/* Needs a definition for the __x86_return_thunk alternative below. */
+SYM_START(srso_safe_ret_alias, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+	add $8, %_ASM_SP
+	UNWIND_HINT_FUNC
+#endif
+	ANNOTATE_UNRET_SAFE
+	ret
+	int3
+SYM_FUNC_END(srso_safe_ret_alias)
+
 	.section .text.__x86.return_thunk
 
 /*
@@ -143,7 +184,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
  *    from re-poisioning the BTB prediction.
  */
 	.align 64
-	.skip 64 - (__x86_return_thunk - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc
+	.skip 64 - (__ret - zen_untrain_ret), 0xcc
 SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	/*
@@ -175,10 +216,10 @@ SYM_START(zen_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
 	 * evicted, __x86_return_thunk will suffer Straight Line Speculation
 	 * which will be contained safely by the INT3.
 	 */
-SYM_INNER_LABEL(__x86_return_thunk, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(__ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	ret
 	int3
-SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
+SYM_CODE_END(__ret)
 
 	/*
 	 * Ensure the TEST decoding / BTB invalidation is complete.
@@ -189,11 +230,45 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
 	 * Jump back and execute the RET in the middle of the TEST instruction.
 	 * INT3 is for SLS protection.
 	 */
-	jmp __x86_return_thunk
+	jmp __ret
 	int3
 SYM_FUNC_END(zen_untrain_ret)
 __EXPORT_THUNK(zen_untrain_ret)
 
+/*
+ * SRSO untraining sequence for Zen1/2, similar to zen_untrain_ret()
+ * above. On kernel entry, srso_untrain_ret() is executed which is a
+ *
+ * movabs $0xccccccc308c48348,%rax
+ *
+ * and when the return thunk executes the inner label srso_safe_ret()
+ * later, it is a stack manipulation and a RET which is mispredicted and
+ * thus a "safe" one to use.
+ */
+	.align 64
+	.skip 64 - (srso_safe_ret - srso_untrain_ret), 0xcc
+SYM_START(srso_untrain_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL, SYM_A_NONE)
+	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
+	.byte 0x48, 0xb8
+
+SYM_INNER_LABEL(srso_safe_ret, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
+	add $8, %_ASM_SP
+	ret
+	int3
+	int3
+	int3
+	lfence
+	call srso_safe_ret
+	int3
+SYM_CODE_END(srso_safe_ret)
+SYM_FUNC_END(srso_untrain_ret)
+__EXPORT_THUNK(srso_untrain_ret)
+
+SYM_FUNC_START(__x86_return_thunk)
+	ALTERNATIVE_2 "jmp __ret", "call srso_safe_ret", X86_FEATURE_SRSO, \
+			"call srso_safe_ret_alias", X86_FEATURE_SRSO_ALIAS
+	int3
+SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */