x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerability

Skylake suffers from RSB underflow speculation issues; report this
vulnerability and it's mitigation (spectre_v2=ibrs).

  [jpoimboe: cleanups, eibrs]

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

3 files changed, 46 insertions, 18 deletions

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index d27e0581b777..059c7e500ab4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
 #define MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES	0x0000010a
 #define ARCH_CAP_RDCL_NO		BIT(0)	/* Not susceptible to Meltdown */
 #define ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL		BIT(1)	/* Enhanced IBRS support */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RSBA			BIT(2)	/* RET may use alternative branch predictors */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH	BIT(3)	/* Skip L1D flush on vmentry */
 #define ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO			BIT(4)	/*
 						 * Not susceptible to Speculative Store Bypass
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index c546a9e4ed17..05f29db9473b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -790,12 +790,17 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str)
 }
 early_param("nospectre_v1", nospectre_v1_cmdline);
 
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
+	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "RETBleed: " fmt
 
 enum retbleed_mitigation {
 	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE,
 	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET,
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS,
+	RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS,
 };
 
 enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
@@ -807,6 +812,8 @@ enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd {
 const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
 	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE]	= "Vulnerable",
 	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET]	= "Mitigation: untrained return thunk",
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS]	= "Mitigation: IBRS",
+	[RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS]	= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
 };
 
 static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -849,6 +856,7 @@ early_param("retbleed", retbleed_parse_cmdline);
 
 #define RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_MSG "WARNING: BTB untrained return thunk mitigation is only effective on AMD/Hygon!\n"
 #define RETBLEED_COMPILER_MSG "WARNING: kernel not compiled with RETPOLINE or -mfunction-return capable compiler!\n"
+#define RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG "WARNING: Spectre v2 mitigation leaves CPU vulnerable to RETBleed attacks, data leaks possible!\n"
 
 static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 {
@@ -865,12 +873,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 
 	case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
 	default:
-		if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED))
-			break;
-
 		if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
 		    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON)
 			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
+
+		/*
+		 * The Intel mitigation (IBRS) was already selected in
+		 * spectre_v2_select_mitigation().
+		 */
+
 		break;
 	}
 
@@ -900,15 +911,31 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Let IBRS trump all on Intel without affecting the effects of the
+	 * retbleed= cmdline option.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL) {
+		switch (spectre_v2_enabled) {
+		case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS:
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBRS;
+			break;
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+			retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_EIBRS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			pr_err(RETBLEED_INTEL_MSG);
+		}
+	}
+
 	pr_info("%s\n", retbleed_strings[retbleed_mitigation]);
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "Spectre V2 : " fmt
 
-static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled __ro_after_init =
-	SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
-
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
 	SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
 static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 4089c173c6ae..75a5c720c852 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1237,24 +1237,24 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X,	BIT(3) | BIT(4) | BIT(6) |
-						BIT(7) | BIT(0xB),              MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO),
+						BIT(7) | BIT(0xB),              MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPINGS(0x3, 0x3),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE,		X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC),	SRBDS | MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xC),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD),	SRBDS | MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x9, 0xD),	SRBDS | MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x8),	SRBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x5, 0x5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x4, 0x6),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE,	BIT(2) | BIT(3) | BIT(5),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x1, 0x1),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0),	MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
@@ -1364,7 +1364,7 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	    !arch_cap_mmio_immune(ia32_cap))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA);
 
-	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED))
+	if ((cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RETBLEED) || (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RSBA)))
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED);
 
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))