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| author | Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> | 2022-06-17 12:12:48 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> | 2022-06-27 10:34:00 +0200 |
| commit | acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126 (patch) | |
| tree | 6aa19c442a42d4deddd07a5fbfd07a19cbe823be /arch | |
| parent | bbb69e8bee1bd882784947095ffb2bfe0f7c9470 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126.tar.gz linux-stable-acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126.tar.bz2 linux-stable-acac5e98ef8d638a411cfa2ee676c87e1973f126.zip | |
x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_mask
This mask has been made redundant by kvm_spec_ctrl_test_value(). And it
doesn't even work when MSR interception is disabled, as the guest can
just write to SPEC_CTRL directly.
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 31 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 30 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index f884f9497666..efff8b9f1bbd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -86,12 +86,6 @@ u64 spec_ctrl_current(void) EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(spec_ctrl_current); /* - * The vendor and possibly platform specific bits which can be modified in - * x86_spec_ctrl_base. - */ -static u64 __ro_after_init x86_spec_ctrl_mask = SPEC_CTRL_IBRS; - -/* * AMD specific MSR info for Speculative Store Bypass control. * x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask is initialized in identify_boot_cpu(). */ @@ -146,10 +140,6 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base); - /* Allow STIBP in MSR_SPEC_CTRL if supported */ - if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP)) - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_STIBP; - /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */ spectre_v1_select_mitigation(); spectre_v2_select_mitigation(); @@ -208,19 +198,10 @@ void __init check_bugs(void) void x86_virt_spec_ctrl(u64 guest_spec_ctrl, u64 guest_virt_spec_ctrl, bool setguest) { - u64 msrval, guestval, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); + u64 msrval, guestval = guest_spec_ctrl, hostval = spec_ctrl_current(); struct thread_info *ti = current_thread_info(); - /* Is MSR_SPEC_CTRL implemented ? */ if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL)) { - /* - * Restrict guest_spec_ctrl to supported values. Clear the - * modifiable bits in the host base value and or the - * modifiable bits from the guest value. - */ - guestval = hostval & ~x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - guestval |= guest_spec_ctrl & x86_spec_ctrl_mask; - if (hostval != guestval) { msrval = setguest ? guestval : hostval; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, msrval); @@ -1666,16 +1647,6 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation __init __ssb_select_mitigation(void) } /* - * If SSBD is controlled by the SPEC_CTRL MSR, then set the proper - * bit in the mask to allow guests to use the mitigation even in the - * case where the host does not enable it. - */ - if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL_SSBD) || - static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_mask |= SPEC_CTRL_SSBD; - } - - /* * We have three CPU feature flags that are in play here: * - X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS - CPU is susceptible. * - X86_FEATURE_SSBD - CPU is able to turn off speculative store bypass |