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author | Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> | 2018-01-29 17:03:21 -0800 |
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committer | Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> | 2018-01-30 21:54:32 +0100 |
commit | edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360 (patch) | |
tree | 359a23abbd70ceb523c2c04bb45243ab84e876f6 /arch | |
parent | 259d8c1e984318497c84eef547bbb6b1d9f4eb05 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360.tar.gz linux-stable-edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360.tar.bz2 linux-stable-edfbae53dab8348fca778531be9f4855d2ca0360.zip |
x86/spectre: Report get_user mitigation for spectre_v1
Reflect the presence of get_user(), __get_user(), and 'syscall' protections
in sysfs. The expectation is that new and better tooling will allow the
kernel to grow more usages of array_index_nospec(), for now, only claim
mitigation for __user pointer de-references.
Reported-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: gregkh@linuxfoundation.org
Cc: torvalds@linux-foundation.org
Cc: alan@linux.intel.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/151727420158.33451.11658324346540434635.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 400c34ec9179..fdb6068a23b5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v1(struct device *dev, { if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V1)) return sprintf(buf, "Not affected\n"); - return sprintf(buf, "Vulnerable\n"); + return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: __user pointer sanitization\n"); } ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, |