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authorJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>2022-09-26 17:43:14 +0200
committerJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>2022-09-29 21:36:27 +0200
commitf62384995e4cb7703e5295779c44135c5311770d (patch)
treec0ee8ba6ff507f5f48a9657b10dd052742f08640 /drivers/char
parent748bc4dd9e663f23448d8ad7e58c011a67ea1eca (diff)
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random: split initialization into early step and later step
The full RNG initialization relies on some timestamps, made possible with initialization functions like time_init() and timekeeping_init(). However, these are only available rather late in initialization. Meanwhile, other things, such as memory allocator functions, make use of the RNG much earlier. So split RNG initialization into two phases. We can provide arch randomness very early on, and then later, after timekeeping and such are available, initialize the rest. This ensures that, for example, slabs are properly randomized if RDRAND is available. Without this, CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM=y loses a degree of its security, because its random seed is potentially deterministic, since it hasn't yet incorporated RDRAND. It also makes it possible to use a better seed in kfence, which currently relies on only the cycle counter. Another positive consequence is that on systems with RDRAND, running with CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM=y results in no warnings at all. One subtle side effect of this change is that on systems with no RDRAND, RDTSC is now only queried by random_init() once, committing the moment of the function call, instead of multiple times as before. This is intentional, as the multiple RDTSCs in a loop before weren't accomplishing very much, with jitter being better provided by try_to_generate_entropy(). Plus, filling blocks with RDTSC is still being done in extract_entropy(), which is necessarily called before random bytes are served anyway. Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Reviewed-by: Dominik Brodowski <linux@dominikbrodowski.net> Signed-off-by: Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/char')
-rw-r--r--drivers/char/random.c50
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 20 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index e591c6aadca4..1427f66252c6 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -772,18 +772,13 @@ static int random_pm_notification(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long actio
static struct notifier_block pm_notifier = { .notifier_call = random_pm_notification };
/*
- * The first collection of entropy occurs at system boot while interrupts
- * are still turned off. Here we push in latent entropy, RDSEED, a timestamp,
- * utsname(), and the command line. Depending on the above configuration knob,
- * RDSEED may be considered sufficient for initialization. Note that much
- * earlier setup may already have pushed entropy into the input pool by the
- * time we get here.
+ * This is called extremely early, before time keeping functionality is
+ * available, but arch randomness is. Interrupts are not yet enabled.
*/
-int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
+void __init random_init_early(const char *command_line)
{
- ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
- size_t i, longs, arch_bits;
unsigned long entropy[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE / sizeof(long)];
+ size_t i, longs, arch_bits;
#if defined(LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN)
static const u8 compiletime_seed[BLAKE2S_BLOCK_SIZE] __initconst __latent_entropy;
@@ -803,34 +798,49 @@ int __init random_init(const char *command_line)
i += longs;
continue;
}
- entropy[0] = random_get_entropy();
- _mix_pool_bytes(entropy, sizeof(*entropy));
arch_bits -= sizeof(*entropy) * 8;
++i;
}
- _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
- _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+
_mix_pool_bytes(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+
+ /* Reseed if already seeded by earlier phases. */
+ if (crng_ready())
+ crng_reseed();
+ else if (trust_cpu)
+ _credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called a little bit after the prior function, and now there is
+ * access to timestamps counters. Interrupts are not yet enabled.
+ */
+void __init random_init(void)
+{
+ unsigned long entropy = random_get_entropy();
+ ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
+
+ _mix_pool_bytes(utsname(), sizeof(*(utsname())));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&now, sizeof(now));
+ _mix_pool_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
add_latent_entropy();
/*
- * If we were initialized by the bootloader before jump labels are
- * initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where
+ * If we were initialized by the cpu or bootloader before jump labels
+ * are initialized, then we should enable the static branch here, where
* it's guaranteed that jump labels have been initialized.
*/
if (!static_branch_likely(&crng_is_ready) && crng_init >= CRNG_READY)
crng_set_ready(NULL);
+ /* Reseed if already seeded by earlier phases. */
if (crng_ready())
crng_reseed();
- else if (trust_cpu)
- _credit_init_bits(arch_bits);
WARN_ON(register_pm_notifier(&pm_notifier));
- WARN(!random_get_entropy(), "Missing cycle counter and fallback timer; RNG "
- "entropy collection will consequently suffer.");
- return 0;
+ WARN(!entropy, "Missing cycle counter and fallback timer; RNG "
+ "entropy collection will consequently suffer.");
}
/*