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authorFabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de>2022-04-20 09:06:01 -0300
committerHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>2022-04-29 13:44:58 +0800
commit4ee4cdad368a26de3967f2975806a9ee2fa245df (patch)
tree25282df2710798165b9f9e619090d257d7740f27 /drivers/crypto/caam
parentd3bae86698720f6fc2ca07d3850ec3167a11ec2b (diff)
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crypto: caam - fix i.MX6SX entropy delay value
Since commit 358ba762d9f1 ("crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG") the following CAAM errors can be seen on i.MX6SX: caam_jr 2101000.jr: 20003c5b: CCB: desc idx 60: RNG: Hardware error hwrng: no data available This error is due to an incorrect entropy delay for i.MX6SX. Fix it by increasing the minimum entropy delay for i.MX6SX as done in U-Boot: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/uboot/patch/20220415111049.2565744-1-gaurav.jain@nxp.com/ As explained in the U-Boot patch: "RNG self tests are run to determine the correct entropy delay. Such tests are executed with different voltages and temperatures to identify the worst case value for the entropy delay. For i.MX6SX, it was determined that after adding a margin value of 1000 the minimum entropy delay should be at least 12000." Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> Fixes: 358ba762d9f1 ("crypto: caam - enable prediction resistance in HRWNG") Signed-off-by: Fabio Estevam <festevam@denx.de> Reviewed-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Vabhav Sharma <vabhav.sharma@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Gaurav Jain <gaurav.jain@nxp.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/crypto/caam')
-rw-r--r--drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c18
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
index ca0361b2dbb0..f87aa2169e5f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/caam/ctrl.c
@@ -609,6 +609,13 @@ static bool check_version(struct fsl_mc_version *mc_version, u32 major,
}
#endif
+static bool needs_entropy_delay_adjustment(void)
+{
+ if (of_machine_is_compatible("fsl,imx6sx"))
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/* Probe routine for CAAM top (controller) level */
static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
{
@@ -855,6 +862,8 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
* Also, if a handle was instantiated, do not change
* the TRNG parameters.
*/
+ if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
+ ent_delay = 12000;
if (!(ctrlpriv->rng4_sh_init || inst_handles)) {
dev_info(dev,
"Entropy delay = %u\n",
@@ -871,6 +880,15 @@ static int caam_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
*/
ret = instantiate_rng(dev, inst_handles,
gen_sk);
+ /*
+ * Entropy delay is determined via TRNG characterization.
+ * TRNG characterization is run across different voltages
+ * and temperatures.
+ * If worst case value for ent_dly is identified,
+ * the loop can be skipped for that platform.
+ */
+ if (needs_entropy_delay_adjustment())
+ break;
if (ret == -EAGAIN)
/*
* if here, the loop will rerun,