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author | Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> | 2021-07-26 16:43:17 -0700 |
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committer | Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org> | 2021-07-29 09:27:29 -0700 |
commit | 81a448d7b0668ae39c08e6f34a54cc7eafb844f1 (patch) | |
tree | cb66bd3f94bd6aa8efd2453a174b2aa311a26d5e /fs/nls/nls_iso8859-2.c | |
parent | 9d110014205cb1129fa570d8de83d486fa199354 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-81a448d7b0668ae39c08e6f34a54cc7eafb844f1.tar.gz linux-stable-81a448d7b0668ae39c08e6f34a54cc7eafb844f1.tar.bz2 linux-stable-81a448d7b0668ae39c08e6f34a54cc7eafb844f1.zip |
xfs: prevent spoofing of rtbitmap blocks when recovering buffers
While reviewing the buffer item recovery code, the thought occurred to
me: in V5 filesystems we use log sequence number (LSN) tracking to avoid
replaying older metadata updates against newer log items. However, we
use the magic number of the ondisk buffer to find the LSN of the ondisk
metadata, which means that if an attacker can control the layout of the
realtime device precisely enough that the start of an rt bitmap block
matches the magic and UUID of some other kind of block, they can control
the purported LSN of that spoofed block and thereby break log replay.
Since realtime bitmap and summary blocks don't have headers at all, we
have no way to tell if a block really should be replayed. The best we
can do is replay unconditionally and hope for the best.
Signed-off-by: Darrick J. Wong <djwong@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Dave Chinner <dchinner@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Carlos Maiolino <cmaiolino@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/nls/nls_iso8859-2.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions