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authorEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2023-03-27 21:15:05 -0700
committerEric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>2023-04-11 19:23:23 -0700
commit39049b69ec9fc125fa1f314165dcc86f72cb72ec (patch)
treef7551132981d66deaf709634edee1fd69c4c3147 /fs/verity
parent8eb8af4b3df5965dc65a24a32768043f39d82d59 (diff)
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fsverity: explicitly check for buffer overflow in build_merkle_tree()
The new Merkle tree construction algorithm is a bit fragile in that it may overflow the 'root_hash' array if the tree actually generated does not match the calculated tree parameters. This should never happen unless there is a filesystem bug that allows the file size to change despite deny_write_access(), or a bug in the Merkle tree logic itself. Regardless, it's fairly easy to check for buffer overflow here, so let's do so. This is a robustness improvement only; this case is not currently known to be reachable. I've added a Fixes tag anyway, since I recommend that this be included in kernels that have the mentioned commit. Fixes: 56124d6c87fd ("fsverity: support enabling with tree block size < PAGE_SIZE") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230328041505.110162-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/verity')
-rw-r--r--fs/verity/enable.c10
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/fs/verity/enable.c b/fs/verity/enable.c
index 541c2a277c5c..bbec6f93172c 100644
--- a/fs/verity/enable.c
+++ b/fs/verity/enable.c
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
struct block_buffer {
u32 filled;
+ bool is_root_hash;
u8 *data;
};
@@ -24,6 +25,14 @@ static int hash_one_block(struct inode *inode,
struct block_buffer *next = cur + 1;
int err;
+ /*
+ * Safety check to prevent a buffer overflow in case of a filesystem bug
+ * that allows the file size to change despite deny_write_access(), or a
+ * bug in the Merkle tree logic itself
+ */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next->is_root_hash && next->filled != 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Zero-pad the block if it's shorter than the block size. */
memset(&cur->data[cur->filled], 0, params->block_size - cur->filled);
@@ -97,6 +106,7 @@ static int build_merkle_tree(struct file *filp,
}
}
buffers[num_levels].data = root_hash;
+ buffers[num_levels].is_root_hash = true;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(level_offset) != sizeof(params->level_start));
memcpy(level_offset, params->level_start, sizeof(level_offset));