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author | Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com> | 2016-12-02 16:35:09 +0100 |
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committer | Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> | 2017-03-16 02:26:34 +0000 |
commit | f649564dfebd5d85a855b327763a91ed0f4c6a11 (patch) | |
tree | ce54f728c2fc2331a9e7e72e164a3f3bb6584ab3 /fs | |
parent | 0d22b33aa66134d555aa53e4c759f7c1f9f14d16 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-f649564dfebd5d85a855b327763a91ed0f4c6a11.tar.gz linux-stable-f649564dfebd5d85a855b327763a91ed0f4c6a11.tar.bz2 linux-stable-f649564dfebd5d85a855b327763a91ed0f4c6a11.zip |
libceph: verify authorize reply on connect
commit 5c056fdc5b474329037f2aa18401bd73033e0ce0 upstream.
After sending an authorizer (ceph_x_authorize_a + ceph_x_authorize_b),
the client gets back a ceph_x_authorize_reply, which it is supposed to
verify to ensure the authenticity and protect against replay attacks.
The code for doing this is there (ceph_x_verify_authorizer_reply(),
ceph_auth_verify_authorizer_reply() + plumbing), but it is never
invoked by the the messenger.
AFAICT this goes back to 2009, when ceph authentication protocols
support was added to the kernel client in 4e7a5dcd1bba ("ceph:
negotiate authentication protocol; implement AUTH_NONE protocol").
The second param of ceph_connection_operations::verify_authorizer_reply
is unused all the way down. Pass 0 to facilitate backporting, and kill
it in the next commit.
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Sage Weil <sage@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions