diff options
| author | Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com> | 2022-09-26 14:57:10 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> | 2022-11-14 10:07:22 -0800 |
| commit | 278294798ac9118412c9624a801d3f20f2279363 (patch) | |
| tree | 092943d3b23e267091559bb3729a2bee721fdcde /kernel | |
| parent | f0c4d9fc9cc9462659728d168387191387e903cc (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-278294798ac9118412c9624a801d3f20f2279363.tar.gz linux-stable-278294798ac9118412c9624a801d3f20f2279363.tar.bz2 linux-stable-278294798ac9118412c9624a801d3f20f2279363.zip | |
PCI: Allow drivers to request exclusive config regions
PCI config space access from user space has traditionally been
unrestricted with writes being an understood risk for device operation.
Unfortunately, device breakage or odd behavior from config writes lacks
indicators that can leave driver writers confused when evaluating
failures. This is especially true with the new PCIe Data Object
Exchange (DOE) mailbox protocol where backdoor shenanigans from user
space through things such as vendor defined protocols may affect device
operation without complete breakage.
A prior proposal restricted read and writes completely.[1] Greg and
Bjorn pointed out that proposal is flawed for a couple of reasons.
First, lspci should always be allowed and should not interfere with any
device operation. Second, setpci is a valuable tool that is sometimes
necessary and it should not be completely restricted.[2] Finally
methods exist for full lock of device access if required.
Even though access should not be restricted it would be nice for driver
writers to be able to flag critical parts of the config space such that
interference from user space can be detected.
Introduce pci_request_config_region_exclusive() to mark exclusive config
regions. Such regions trigger a warning and kernel taint if accessed
via user space.
Create pci_warn_once() to restrict the user from spamming the log.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/161663543465.1867664.5674061943008380442.stgit@dwillia2-desk3.amr.corp.intel.com/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/YF8NGeGv9vYcMfTV@kroah.com/
Cc: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ira Weiny <ira.weiny@intel.com>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220926215711.2893286-2-ira.weiny@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/resource.c | 13 |
1 files changed, 8 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/resource.c b/kernel/resource.c index 4c5e80b92f2f..82ed54cd1f0d 100644 --- a/kernel/resource.c +++ b/kernel/resource.c @@ -1707,18 +1707,15 @@ static int strict_iomem_checks; * * Returns true if exclusive to the kernel, otherwise returns false. */ -bool iomem_is_exclusive(u64 addr) +bool resource_is_exclusive(struct resource *root, u64 addr, resource_size_t size) { const unsigned int exclusive_system_ram = IORESOURCE_SYSTEM_RAM | IORESOURCE_EXCLUSIVE; bool skip_children = false, err = false; - int size = PAGE_SIZE; struct resource *p; - addr = addr & PAGE_MASK; - read_lock(&resource_lock); - for_each_resource(&iomem_resource, p, skip_children) { + for_each_resource(root, p, skip_children) { if (p->start >= addr + size) break; if (p->end < addr) { @@ -1757,6 +1754,12 @@ bool iomem_is_exclusive(u64 addr) return err; } +bool iomem_is_exclusive(u64 addr) +{ + return resource_is_exclusive(&iomem_resource, addr & PAGE_MASK, + PAGE_SIZE); +} + struct resource_entry *resource_list_create_entry(struct resource *res, size_t extra_size) { |