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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-04-28 20:19:04 -0700 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2016-04-28 20:19:04 -0700 |
commit | 814dd9481d2045cc99a10a45d267a6167c5cd8ff (patch) | |
tree | 1f3218b72700fe097f67e5d29b79ac4a351d9006 /kernel | |
parent | 2113caed87dd372e5ca2d9b3cba415f4da38936b (diff) | |
parent | cf3beb7c90a8efa16a06b26634cddddc92bb819c (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-814dd9481d2045cc99a10a45d267a6167c5cd8ff.tar.gz linux-stable-814dd9481d2045cc99a10a45d267a6167c5cd8ff.tar.bz2 linux-stable-814dd9481d2045cc99a10a45d267a6167c5cd8ff.zip |
Merge branch 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull perf fixes from Ingo Molnar:
"x86 PMU driver fixes plus a core code race fix"
* 'perf-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
perf/x86/intel: Fix incorrect lbr_sel_mask value
perf/x86/intel/pt: Don't die on VMXON
perf/core: Fix perf_event_open() vs. execve() race
perf/x86/amd: Set the size of event map array to PERF_COUNT_HW_MAX
perf/core: Make sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent conform to documentation
perf/x86/intel/rapl: Add missing Haswell model
perf/x86/intel: Add model number for Skylake Server to perf
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/events/core.c | 55 |
1 files changed, 38 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index 52bedc5a5aaa..4e2ebf6f2f1f 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -412,7 +412,8 @@ int perf_cpu_time_max_percent_handler(struct ctl_table *table, int write, if (ret || !write) return ret; - if (sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 100) { + if (sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 100 || + sysctl_perf_cpu_time_max_percent == 0) { printk(KERN_WARNING "perf: Dynamic interrupt throttling disabled, can hang your system!\n"); WRITE_ONCE(perf_sample_allowed_ns, 0); @@ -1105,6 +1106,7 @@ static void put_ctx(struct perf_event_context *ctx) * function. * * Lock order: + * cred_guard_mutex * task_struct::perf_event_mutex * perf_event_context::mutex * perf_event::child_mutex; @@ -3420,7 +3422,6 @@ static struct task_struct * find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid) { struct task_struct *task; - int err; rcu_read_lock(); if (!vpid) @@ -3434,16 +3435,7 @@ find_lively_task_by_vpid(pid_t vpid) if (!task) return ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); - /* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. */ - err = -EACCES; - if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) - goto errout; - return task; -errout: - put_task_struct(task); - return ERR_PTR(err); - } /* @@ -8413,6 +8405,24 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, get_online_cpus(); + if (task) { + err = mutex_lock_interruptible(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + if (err) + goto err_cpus; + + /* + * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. + * + * We must hold cred_guard_mutex across this and any potential + * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to + * serialize against exec() altering our credentials (and the + * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). + */ + err = -EACCES; + if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) + goto err_cred; + } + if (flags & PERF_FLAG_PID_CGROUP) cgroup_fd = pid; @@ -8420,7 +8430,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, NULL, NULL, cgroup_fd); if (IS_ERR(event)) { err = PTR_ERR(event); - goto err_cpus; + goto err_cred; } if (is_sampling_event(event)) { @@ -8479,11 +8489,6 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_context; } - if (task) { - put_task_struct(task); - task = NULL; - } - /* * Look up the group leader (we will attach this event to it): */ @@ -8581,6 +8586,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, WARN_ON_ONCE(ctx->parent_ctx); + /* + * This is the point on no return; we cannot fail hereafter. This is + * where we start modifying current state. + */ + if (move_group) { /* * See perf_event_ctx_lock() for comments on the details @@ -8652,6 +8662,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, mutex_unlock(&gctx->mutex); mutex_unlock(&ctx->mutex); + if (task) { + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); + put_task_struct(task); + } + put_online_cpus(); mutex_lock(¤t->perf_event_mutex); @@ -8684,6 +8699,9 @@ err_alloc: */ if (!event_file) free_event(event); +err_cred: + if (task) + mutex_unlock(&task->signal->cred_guard_mutex); err_cpus: put_online_cpus(); err_task: @@ -8968,6 +8986,9 @@ static void perf_event_exit_task_context(struct task_struct *child, int ctxn) /* * When a child task exits, feed back event values to parent events. + * + * Can be called with cred_guard_mutex held when called from + * install_exec_creds(). */ void perf_event_exit_task(struct task_struct *child) { |