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| author | Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> | 2020-12-09 17:33:49 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> | 2020-12-14 21:50:10 +0100 |
| commit | cd17d38f8b28f808c368121041c0a4fa91757e0d (patch) | |
| tree | 2680d4ddec820fb6db0f787ad2308093ca1a0450 /kernel | |
| parent | a4d2a7ad86834092b327082004ead755d2603376 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-cd17d38f8b28f808c368121041c0a4fa91757e0d.tar.gz linux-stable-cd17d38f8b28f808c368121041c0a4fa91757e0d.tar.bz2 linux-stable-cd17d38f8b28f808c368121041c0a4fa91757e0d.zip | |
bpf: Permits pointers on stack for helper calls
Currently, when checking stack memory accessed by helper calls,
for spills, only PTR_TO_BTF_ID and SCALAR_VALUE are
allowed.
Song discovered an issue where the below bpf program
int dump_task(struct bpf_iter__task *ctx)
{
struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq;
static char[] info = "abc";
BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
return 0;
}
may cause a verifier failure.
The verifier output looks like:
; struct seq_file *seq = ctx->meta->seq;
1: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
2: (18) r2 = 0xffff9054400f6000
4: (7b) *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r2
5: (bf) r4 = r10
;
6: (07) r4 += -8
; BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(seq, "%s\n", info);
7: (18) r2 = 0xffff9054400fe000
9: (b4) w3 = 4
10: (b4) w5 = 8
11: (85) call bpf_seq_printf#126
R1_w=ptr_seq_file(id=0,off=0,imm=0) R2_w=map_value(id=0,off=0,ks=4,vs=4,imm=0)
R3_w=inv4 R4_w=fp-8 R5_w=inv8 R10=fp0 fp-8_w=map_value
last_idx 11 first_idx 0
regs=8 stack=0 before 10: (b4) w5 = 8
regs=8 stack=0 before 9: (b4) w3 = 4
invalid indirect read from stack off -8+0 size 8
Basically, the verifier complains the map_value pointer at "fp-8" location.
To fix the issue, if env->allow_ptr_leaks is true, let us also permit
pointers on the stack to be accessible by the helper.
Reported-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Suggested-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20201210013349.943719-1-yhs@fb.com
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 93def76cf32b..9159c9822ede 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -3769,7 +3769,8 @@ static int check_stack_boundary(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, goto mark; if (state->stack[spi].slot_type[0] == STACK_SPILL && - state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE) { + (state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE || + env->allow_ptr_leaks)) { __mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr); for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++) state->stack[spi].slot_type[j] = STACK_MISC; |