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author | Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> | 2012-01-03 14:23:08 -0500 |
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committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2012-01-17 16:17:00 -0500 |
commit | 633b45454503489209b0d9a45f9e3cd1b852c614 (patch) | |
tree | 591363d3be6b773f872b979727d4ac1a9691ec82 /lib/Kconfig.debug | |
parent | 0a300be6d5be8f66cd96609334710c268d0bfdce (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-633b45454503489209b0d9a45f9e3cd1b852c614.tar.gz linux-stable-633b45454503489209b0d9a45f9e3cd1b852c614.tar.bz2 linux-stable-633b45454503489209b0d9a45f9e3cd1b852c614.zip |
audit: only allow tasks to set their loginuid if it is -1
At the moment we allow tasks to set their loginuid if they have
CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL. In reality we want tasks to set the loginuid when they
log in and it be impossible to ever reset. We had to make it mutable even
after it was once set (with the CAP) because on update and admin might have
to restart sshd. Now sshd would get his loginuid and the next user which
logged in using ssh would not be able to set his loginuid.
Systemd has changed how userspace works and allowed us to make the kernel
work the way it should. With systemd users (even admins) are not supposed
to restart services directly. The system will restart the service for
them. Thus since systemd is going to loginuid==-1, sshd would get -1, and
sshd would be allowed to set a new loginuid without special permissions.
If an admin in this system were to manually start an sshd he is inserting
himself into the system chain of trust and thus, logically, it's his
loginuid that should be used! Since we have old systems I make this a
Kconfig option.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/Kconfig.debug')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions