Merge Linus master into drm-next

The merge is clean, but the arm build fails afterwards,
due to API changes in the regulator tree.

I've included the patch into the merge to fix the build.

Signed-off-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 311 insertions, 104 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index c09a821f381d..1ab3dc9c8f99 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
 
 #define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
 
-#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev)	(test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &(dev)->dev_flags) ? \
+#define AUTH_REQ_MASK(dev)	(hci_dev_test_flag(dev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) ? \
 				 0x1f : 0x07)
 #define KEY_DIST_MASK		0x07
 
@@ -70,7 +70,19 @@ enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY,
 	SMP_FLAG_WAIT_USER,
 	SMP_FLAG_DHKEY_PENDING,
-	SMP_FLAG_OOB,
+	SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB,
+	SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB,
+};
+
+struct smp_dev {
+	/* Secure Connections OOB data */
+	u8			local_pk[64];
+	u8			local_sk[32];
+	u8			local_rand[16];
+	bool			debug_key;
+
+	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
+	struct crypto_hash	*tfm_cmac;
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
@@ -84,7 +96,8 @@ struct smp_chan {
 	u8		rrnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (remote) */
 	u8		pcnf[16]; /* SMP Pairing Confirm */
 	u8		tk[16]; /* SMP Temporary Key */
-	u8		rr[16];
+	u8		rr[16]; /* Remote OOB ra/rb value */
+	u8		lr[16]; /* Local OOB ra/rb value */
 	u8		enc_key_size;
 	u8		remote_key_dist;
 	bdaddr_t	id_addr;
@@ -478,18 +491,18 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
 		     const bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+	struct smp_dev *smp;
 	u8 hash[3];
 	int err;
 
 	if (!chan || !chan->data)
 		return false;
 
-	tfm = chan->data;
+	smp = chan->data;
 
 	BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
 
-	err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
+	err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
 	if (err)
 		return false;
 
@@ -499,20 +512,20 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16],
 int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
+	struct smp_dev *smp;
 	int err;
 
 	if (!chan || !chan->data)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	tfm = chan->data;
+	smp = chan->data;
 
 	get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
 
 	rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f;	/* Clear two most significant bits */
 	rpa->b[5] |= 0x40;	/* Set second most significant bit */
 
-	err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
+	err = smp_ah(smp->tfm_aes, irk, &rpa->b[3], rpa->b);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
@@ -521,6 +534,53 @@ int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, const u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int smp_generate_oob(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 hash[16], u8 rand[16])
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	struct smp_dev *smp;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!chan || !chan->data)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	smp = chan->data;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
+		BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
+		memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
+		memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
+		smp->debug_key = true;
+	} else {
+		while (true) {
+			/* Generate local key pair for Secure Connections */
+			if (!ecc_make_key(smp->local_pk, smp->local_sk))
+				return -EIO;
+
+			/* This is unlikely, but we need to check that
+			 * we didn't accidentially generate a debug key.
+			 */
+			if (memcmp(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32))
+				break;
+		}
+		smp->debug_key = false;
+	}
+
+	SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
+	SMP_DBG("OOB Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
+	SMP_DBG("OOB Private Key:  %32phN", smp->local_sk);
+
+	get_random_bytes(smp->local_rand, 16);
+
+	err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->local_pk, smp->local_pk,
+		     smp->local_rand, 0, hash);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	memcpy(rand, smp->local_rand, 16);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -589,7 +649,7 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0, oob_flag = SMP_OOB_NOT_PRESENT;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &conn->hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
 		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
@@ -597,18 +657,18 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 		authreq &= ~SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
 	}
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
 		remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
 		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED) &&
 	    (authreq & SMP_AUTH_SC)) {
 		struct oob_data *oob_data;
 		u8 bdaddr_type;
 
-		if (test_bit(HCI_SSP_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+		if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SSP_ENABLED)) {
 			local_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
 			remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_LINK_KEY;
 		}
@@ -621,10 +681,12 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 		oob_data = hci_find_remote_oob_data(hdev, &hcon->dst,
 						    bdaddr_type);
 		if (oob_data && oob_data->present) {
-			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags);
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags);
 			oob_flag = SMP_OOB_PRESENT;
 			memcpy(smp->rr, oob_data->rand256, 16);
 			memcpy(smp->pcnf, oob_data->hash256, 16);
+			SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Confirmation: %16phN", smp->pcnf);
+			SMP_DBG("OOB Remote Random: %16phN", smp->rr);
 		}
 
 	} else {
@@ -681,9 +743,9 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
 	mgmt_smp_complete(hcon, complete);
 
-	kfree(smp->csrk);
-	kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
-	kfree(smp->link_key);
+	kzfree(smp->csrk);
+	kzfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+	kzfree(smp->link_key);
 
 	crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
 	crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
@@ -692,7 +754,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	 * support hasn't been explicitly enabled.
 	 */
 	if (smp->ltk && smp->ltk->type == SMP_LTK_P256_DEBUG &&
-	    !test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+	    !hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
 		list_del_rcu(&smp->ltk->list);
 		kfree_rcu(smp->ltk, rcu);
 		smp->ltk = NULL;
@@ -717,7 +779,7 @@ static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	}
 
 	chan->data = NULL;
-	kfree(smp);
+	kzfree(smp);
 	hci_conn_drop(hcon);
 }
 
@@ -818,6 +880,12 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+	/* If this function is used for SC -> legacy fallback we
+	 * can only recover the just-works case.
+	 */
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
 	if (smp->method != JUST_CFM) {
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
@@ -1052,7 +1120,7 @@ static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 			/* Don't keep debug keys around if the relevant
 			 * flag is not set.
 			 */
-			if (!test_bit(HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+			if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_KEEP_DEBUG_KEYS) &&
 			    key->type == HCI_LK_DEBUG_COMBINATION) {
 				list_del_rcu(&key->list);
 				kfree_rcu(key, rcu);
@@ -1097,13 +1165,13 @@ static void sc_generate_link_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		return;
 
 	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->tk, tmp1, smp->link_key)) {
-		kfree(smp->link_key);
+		kzfree(smp->link_key);
 		smp->link_key = NULL;
 		return;
 	}
 
 	if (smp_h6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->link_key, lebr, smp->link_key)) {
-		kfree(smp->link_key);
+		kzfree(smp->link_key);
 		smp->link_key = NULL;
 		return;
 	}
@@ -1252,7 +1320,10 @@ static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 		csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (csrk) {
-			csrk->master = 0x00;
+			if (hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+				csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_AUTHENTICATED;
+			else
+				csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_LOCAL_UNAUTHENTICATED;
 			memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
 		}
 		smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
@@ -1297,7 +1368,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
 	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
 		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
-		kfree(smp);
+		kzfree(smp);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -1305,7 +1376,7 @@ static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_cmac)) {
 		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
 		crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
-		kfree(smp);
+		kzfree(smp);
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -1601,15 +1672,15 @@ static void build_bredr_pairing_cmd(struct smp_chan *smp,
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE)) {
 		local_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 		remote_dist = SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY | SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 	}
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_RPA_RESOLVING, &hdev->dev_flags))
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_RPA_RESOLVING))
 		remote_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_PRIVACY, &hdev->dev_flags))
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_PRIVACY))
 		local_dist |= SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 
 	if (!rsp) {
@@ -1661,22 +1732,29 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
 	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
-	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
 	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
 		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
 		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
 
 	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
+	/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
+	 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
+	 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
+	 */
+	if (req->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
+
 	/* SMP over BR/EDR requires special treatment */
 	if (conn->hcon->type == ACL_LINK) {
 		/* We must have a BR/EDR SC link */
 		if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &conn->hcon->flags) &&
-		    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+		    !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
 			return SMP_CROSS_TRANSP_NOT_ALLOWED;
 
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
@@ -1734,14 +1812,19 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
 
+	/* Strictly speaking we shouldn't allow Pairing Confirm for the
+	 * SC case, however some implementations incorrectly copy RFU auth
+	 * req bits from our security request, which may create a false
+	 * positive SC enablement.
+	 */
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+
 	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
 		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY);
 		/* Clear bits which are generated but not distributed */
 		smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_SC_NO_DIST;
 		/* Wait for Public Key from Initiating Device */
 		return 0;
-	} else {
-		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
 	}
 
 	/* Request setup of TK */
@@ -1758,7 +1841,26 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 	BT_DBG("");
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS, &hdev->dev_flags)) {
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+		struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+		struct smp_dev *smp_dev;
+
+		if (!chan || !chan->data)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		smp_dev = chan->data;
+
+		memcpy(smp->local_pk, smp_dev->local_pk, 64);
+		memcpy(smp->local_sk, smp_dev->local_sk, 32);
+		memcpy(smp->lr, smp_dev->local_rand, 16);
+
+		if (smp_dev->debug_key)
+			set_bit(SMP_FLAG_DEBUG_KEY, &smp->flags);
+
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_USE_DEBUG_KEYS)) {
 		BT_DBG("Using debug keys");
 		memcpy(smp->local_pk, debug_pk, 64);
 		memcpy(smp->local_sk, debug_sk, 32);
@@ -1777,8 +1879,9 @@ static u8 sc_send_public_key(struct smp_chan *smp)
 		}
 	}
 
+done:
 	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key X: %32phN", smp->local_pk);
-	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->local_pk[32]);
+	SMP_DBG("Local Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->local_pk + 32);
 	SMP_DBG("Local Private Key:  %32phN", smp->local_sk);
 
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PUBLIC_KEY, 64, smp->local_pk);
@@ -1813,9 +1916,16 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
 		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
 
+	/* If the remote side's OOB flag is set it means it has
+	 * successfully received our local OOB data - therefore set the
+	 * flag to indicate that local OOB is in use.
+	 */
+	if (rsp->oob_flag == SMP_OOB_PRESENT)
+		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags);
+
 	smp->prsp[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP;
 	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], rsp, sizeof(*rsp));
 
@@ -1882,10 +1992,6 @@ static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 	BT_DBG("");
 
-	/* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
-	if (!test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
-		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-
 	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
 		return sc_passkey_round(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
 
@@ -1898,6 +2004,47 @@ static u8 sc_check_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* Work-around for some implementations that incorrectly copy RFU bits
+ * from our security request and thereby create the impression that
+ * we're doing SC when in fact the remote doesn't support it.
+ */
+static int fixup_sc_false_positive(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+	u8 auth;
+
+	/* The issue is only observed when we're in slave role */
+	if (hcon->out)
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY)) {
+		BT_ERR("Refusing SMP SC -> legacy fallback in SC-only mode");
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+	}
+
+	BT_ERR("Trying to fall back to legacy SMP");
+
+	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+
+	/* Rebuild key dist flags which may have been cleared for SC */
+	smp->remote_key_dist = (req->init_key_dist & rsp->resp_key_dist);
+
+	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
+
+	if (tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp->io_capability, req->io_capability)) {
+		BT_ERR("Failed to fall back to legacy SMP");
+		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+	}
+
+	clear_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
@@ -1911,8 +2058,19 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 
-	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags))
-		return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_SC, &smp->flags)) {
+		int ret;
+
+		/* Public Key exchange must happen before any other steps */
+		if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_PK, &smp->flags))
+			return sc_check_confirm(smp);
+
+		BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP Pairing Confirm");
+
+		ret = fixup_sc_false_positive(smp);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
+	}
 
 	if (conn->hcon->out) {
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
@@ -1923,8 +2081,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
 		return smp_confirm(smp);
-	else
-		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -2083,7 +2241,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK(hdev);
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ONLY, &hdev->dev_flags) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ONLY) && !(auth & SMP_AUTH_SC))
 		return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
 
 	if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
@@ -2104,7 +2262,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (!smp)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_BONDABLE) &&
 	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
 		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
@@ -2138,7 +2296,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	chan = conn->smp;
 
-	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
 		return 1;
 
 	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level, SMP_USE_LTK))
@@ -2167,7 +2325,7 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 
 	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
 
-	if (test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
+	if (hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
 		authreq |= SMP_AUTH_SC;
 
 	/* Require MITM if IO Capability allows or the security level
@@ -2352,7 +2510,10 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (csrk) {
-		csrk->master = 0x01;
+		if (conn->hcon->sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM)
+			csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_AUTHENTICATED;
+		else
+			csrk->type = MGMT_CSRK_REMOTE_UNAUTHENTICATED;
 		memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
 	}
 	smp->csrk = csrk;
@@ -2368,7 +2529,8 @@ static u8 sc_select_method(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *local, *remote;
 	u8 local_mitm, remote_mitm, local_io, remote_io, method;
 
-	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_OOB, &smp->flags))
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags) ||
+	    test_bit(SMP_FLAG_LOCAL_OOB, &smp->flags))
 		return REQ_OOB;
 
 	/* The preq/prsp contain the raw Pairing Request/Response PDUs
@@ -2422,6 +2584,16 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	memcpy(smp->remote_pk, key, 64);
 
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_REMOTE_OOB, &smp->flags)) {
+		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
+			     smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
+		if (err)
+			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+		if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
+			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
+	}
+
 	/* Non-initiating device sends its public key after receiving
 	 * the key from the initiating device.
 	 */
@@ -2432,7 +2604,7 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key X: %32phN", smp->remote_pk);
-	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", &smp->remote_pk[32]);
+	SMP_DBG("Remote Public Key Y: %32phN", smp->remote_pk + 32);
 
 	if (!ecdh_shared_secret(smp->remote_pk, smp->local_sk, smp->dhkey))
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
@@ -2470,14 +2642,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_public_key(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	}
 
 	if (smp->method == REQ_OOB) {
-		err = smp_f4(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->remote_pk, smp->remote_pk,
-			     smp->rr, 0, cfm.confirm_val);
-		if (err)
-			return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
-
-		if (memcmp(cfm.confirm_val, smp->pcnf, 16))
-			return SMP_CONFIRM_FAILED;
-
 		if (hcon->out)
 			smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM,
 				     sizeof(smp->prnd), smp->prnd);
@@ -2550,6 +2714,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_dhkey_check(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	if (smp->method == REQ_PASSKEY || smp->method == DSP_PASSKEY)
 		put_unaligned_le32(hcon->passkey_notify, r);
+	else if (smp->method == REQ_OOB)
+		memcpy(r, smp->lr, 16);
 
 	err = smp_f6(smp->tfm_cmac, smp->mackey, smp->rrnd, smp->prnd, r,
 		     io_cap, remote_addr, local_addr, e);
@@ -2600,7 +2766,7 @@ static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb->len < 1)
 		return -EILSEQ;
 
-	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hcon->hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED)) {
 		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 		goto done;
 	}
@@ -2738,16 +2904,16 @@ static void bredr_pairing(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 		return;
 
 	/* Secure Connections support must be enabled */
-	if (!test_bit(HCI_SC_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_SC_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	/* BR/EDR must use Secure Connections for SMP */
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_AES_CCM, &hcon->flags) &&
-	    !test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+	    !hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
 		return;
 
 	/* If our LE support is not enabled don't do anything */
-	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags))
+	if (!hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_LE_ENABLED))
 		return;
 
 	/* Don't bother if remote LE support is not enabled */
@@ -2851,7 +3017,7 @@ static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
 	skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
-	bt_cb(skb)->chan = chan;
+	bt_cb(skb)->l2cap.chan = chan;
 
 	return skb;
 }
@@ -2924,51 +3090,63 @@ static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
 static struct l2cap_chan *smp_add_cid(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 cid)
 {
 	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
-	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
+	struct smp_dev *smp;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+	struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac;
 
 	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP_BREDR) {
-		tfm_aes = NULL;
+		smp = NULL;
 		goto create_chan;
 	}
 
-	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, 0);
+	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!smp)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
 	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
-		BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
+		kzfree(smp);
 		return ERR_CAST(tfm_aes);
 	}
 
+	tfm_cmac = crypto_alloc_hash("cmac(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_cmac)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create CMAC crypto context");
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+		kzfree(smp);
+		return ERR_CAST(tfm_cmac);
+	}
+
+	smp->tfm_aes = tfm_aes;
+	smp->tfm_cmac = tfm_cmac;
+
 create_chan:
 	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
 	if (!chan) {
-		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+		if (smp) {
+			crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+			crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+			kzfree(smp);
+		}
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 	}
 
-	chan->data = tfm_aes;
+	chan->data = smp;
 
 	l2cap_add_scid(chan, cid);
 
 	l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
 
 	if (cid == L2CAP_CID_SMP) {
-		/* If usage of static address is forced or if the devices
-		 * does not have a public address, then listen on the static
-		 * address.
-		 *
-		 * In case BR/EDR has been disabled on a dual-mode controller
-		 * and a static address has been configued, then listen on
-		 * the static address instead.
-		 */
-		if (test_bit(HCI_FORCE_STATIC_ADDR, &hdev->dbg_flags) ||
-		    !bacmp(&hdev->bdaddr, BDADDR_ANY) ||
-		    (!test_bit(HCI_BREDR_ENABLED, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
-		     bacmp(&hdev->static_addr, BDADDR_ANY))) {
-			bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->static_addr);
-			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
-		} else {
-			bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
+		u8 bdaddr_type;
+
+		hci_copy_identity_address(hdev, &chan->src, &bdaddr_type);
+
+		if (bdaddr_type == ADDR_LE_DEV_PUBLIC)
 			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
-		}
+		else
+			chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_RANDOM;
 	} else {
 		bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
 		chan->src_type = BDADDR_BREDR;
@@ -2987,14 +3165,18 @@ create_chan:
 
 static void smp_del_chan(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
-	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
+	struct smp_dev *smp;
 
 	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
-	tfm_aes = chan->data;
-	if (tfm_aes) {
+	smp = chan->data;
+	if (smp) {
 		chan->data = NULL;
-		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+		if (smp->tfm_aes)
+			crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+		if (smp->tfm_cmac)
+			crypto_free_hash(smp->tfm_cmac);
+		kzfree(smp);
 	}
 
 	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
@@ -3007,7 +3189,7 @@ static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_read(struct file *file,
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = file->private_data;
 	char buf[3];
 
-	buf[0] = test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags) ? 'Y': 'N';
+	buf[0] = hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP) ? 'Y': 'N';
 	buf[1] = '\n';
 	buf[2] = '\0';
 	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, buf, 2);
@@ -3029,7 +3211,7 @@ static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
 	if (strtobool(buf, &enable))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (enable == test_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags))
+	if (enable == hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP))
 		return -EALREADY;
 
 	if (enable) {
@@ -3048,7 +3230,7 @@ static ssize_t force_bredr_smp_write(struct file *file,
 		smp_del_chan(chan);
 	}
 
-	change_bit(HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP, &hdev->dbg_flags);
+	hci_dev_change_flag(hdev, HCI_FORCE_BREDR_SMP);
 
 	return count;
 }
@@ -3367,6 +3549,21 @@ static int __init test_h6(struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static char test_smp_buffer[32];
+
+static ssize_t test_smp_read(struct file *file, char __user *user_buf,
+			     size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+	return simple_read_from_buffer(user_buf, count, ppos, test_smp_buffer,
+				       strlen(test_smp_buffer));
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations test_smp_fops = {
+	.open		= simple_open,
+	.read		= test_smp_read,
+	.llseek		= default_llseek,
+};
+
 static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes,
 				struct crypto_hash *tfm_cmac)
 {
@@ -3379,49 +3576,49 @@ static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes,
 	err = test_ah(tfm_aes);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("smp_ah test failed");
-		return err;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	err = test_c1(tfm_aes);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("smp_c1 test failed");
-		return err;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	err = test_s1(tfm_aes);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("smp_s1 test failed");
-		return err;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	err = test_f4(tfm_cmac);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("smp_f4 test failed");
-		return err;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	err = test_f5(tfm_cmac);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("smp_f5 test failed");
-		return err;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	err = test_f6(tfm_cmac);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("smp_f6 test failed");
-		return err;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	err = test_g2(tfm_cmac);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("smp_g2 test failed");
-		return err;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	err = test_h6(tfm_cmac);
 	if (err) {
 		BT_ERR("smp_h6 test failed");
-		return err;
+		goto done;
 	}
 
 	rettime = ktime_get();
@@ -3430,7 +3627,17 @@ static int __init run_selftests(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes,
 
 	BT_INFO("SMP test passed in %llu usecs", duration);
 
-	return 0;
+done:
+	if (!err)
+		snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer),
+			 "PASS (%llu usecs)\n", duration);
+	else
+		snprintf(test_smp_buffer, sizeof(test_smp_buffer), "FAIL\n");
+
+	debugfs_create_file("selftest_smp", 0444, bt_debugfs, NULL,
+			    &test_smp_fops);
+
+	return err;
 }
 
 int __init bt_selftest_smp(void)