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author | Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com> | 2018-10-16 15:06:41 +0200 |
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committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2018-10-17 22:00:22 -0700 |
commit | efa61c8cf2950ab5c0e66cff3cabe2a2b24e81ba (patch) | |
tree | aca302d3439f23b8282062a9c738485372d7ea9f /net/bpfilter | |
parent | 8c3bf9b62b667456a57aefcf1689e826df146159 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-efa61c8cf2950ab5c0e66cff3cabe2a2b24e81ba.tar.gz linux-stable-efa61c8cf2950ab5c0e66cff3cabe2a2b24e81ba.tar.bz2 linux-stable-efa61c8cf2950ab5c0e66cff3cabe2a2b24e81ba.zip |
ptp: fix Spectre v1 vulnerability
pin_index can be indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading
to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.
This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:
drivers/ptp/ptp_chardev.c:253 ptp_ioctl() warn: potential spectre issue
'ops->pin_config' [r] (local cap)
Fix this by sanitizing pin_index before using it to index
ops->pin_config, and before passing it as an argument to
function ptp_set_pinfunc(), in which it is used to index
info->pin_config.
Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is
to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be
completed with a dependent load/store [1].
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@embeddedor.com>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/bpfilter')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions