diff options
| author | Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> | 2022-04-05 16:35:38 -0700 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2022-06-14 18:36:11 +0200 |
| commit | 3308676ec525901bf1656014003c443a60730a04 (patch) | |
| tree | 513b000d3b6d591455aca8afcf5aefd07ea8de8b /net/core | |
| parent | 4d481469137d461c6b7479f51df9261f0f0522df (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-3308676ec525901bf1656014003c443a60730a04.tar.gz linux-stable-3308676ec525901bf1656014003c443a60730a04.tar.bz2 linux-stable-3308676ec525901bf1656014003c443a60730a04.zip | |
tcp: add accessors to read/set tp->snd_cwnd
[ Upstream commit 40570375356c874b1578e05c1dcc3ff7c1322dbe ]
We had various bugs over the years with code
breaking the assumption that tp->snd_cwnd is greater
than zero.
Lately, syzbot reported the WARN_ON_ONCE(!tp->prior_cwnd) added
in commit 8b8a321ff72c ("tcp: fix zero cwnd in tcp_cwnd_reduction")
can trigger, and without a repro we would have to spend
considerable time finding the bug.
Instead of complaining too late, we want to catch where
and when tp->snd_cwnd is set to an illegal value.
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Acked-by: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220405233538.947344-1-eric.dumazet@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/core')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/core/filter.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/net/core/filter.c b/net/core/filter.c index 707e2e48d769..0816468c545c 100644 --- a/net/core/filter.c +++ b/net/core/filter.c @@ -4885,7 +4885,7 @@ static int _bpf_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, if (val <= 0 || tp->data_segs_out > tp->syn_data) ret = -EINVAL; else - tp->snd_cwnd = val; + tcp_snd_cwnd_set(tp, val); break; case TCP_BPF_SNDCWND_CLAMP: if (val <= 0) { |