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| author | Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com> | 2011-03-15 13:35:21 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net> | 2011-03-15 13:35:21 +0100 |
| commit | 42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143 (patch) | |
| tree | b30e101f5503847706a7aa24455d47f5e45cf7e1 /net/ipv4 | |
| parent | 4656c4d61adb8dc3ee04c08f57a5cc7598814420 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143.tar.gz linux-stable-42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143.tar.bz2 linux-stable-42eab94fff18cb1091d3501cd284d6bd6cc9c143.zip | |
netfilter: arp_tables: fix infoleak to userspace
Structures ipt_replace, compat_ipt_replace, and xt_get_revision are
copied from userspace. Fields of these structs that are
zero-terminated strings are not checked. When they are used as argument
to a format string containing "%s" in request_module(), some sensitive
information is leaked to userspace via argument of spawned modprobe
process.
The first bug was introduced before the git epoch; the second is
introduced by 6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1); the third is introduced by
6b7d31fc (v2.6.15-rc1). To trigger the bug one should have
CAP_NET_ADMIN.
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kulikov <segoon@openwall.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/ipv4')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c index e95054c690c6..4b5d457c2d76 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c @@ -1066,6 +1066,7 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, const void __user *user, /* overflow check */ if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1488,6 +1489,7 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, void __user *user, return -ENOMEM; if (tmp.num_counters >= INT_MAX / sizeof(struct xt_counters)) return -ENOMEM; + tmp.name[sizeof(tmp.name)-1] = 0; newinfo = xt_alloc_table_info(tmp.size); if (!newinfo) @@ -1740,6 +1742,7 @@ static int do_arpt_get_ctl(struct sock *sk, int cmd, void __user *user, int *len ret = -EFAULT; break; } + rev.name[sizeof(rev.name)-1] = 0; try_then_request_module(xt_find_revision(NFPROTO_ARP, rev.name, rev.revision, 1, &ret), |