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authorwilly tarreau <w@1wt.eu>2016-01-10 07:54:56 +0100
committerDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>2016-01-11 00:05:30 -0500
commit712f4aad406bb1ed67f3f98d04c044191f0ff593 (patch)
treeee2f45594b6acfc83a69988a914b9fe15d6e4367 /net/unix/af_unix.c
parent3e4006f0b86a5ae5eb0e8215f9a9e1db24506977 (diff)
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unix: properly account for FDs passed over unix sockets
It is possible for a process to allocate and accumulate far more FDs than the process' limit by sending them over a unix socket then closing them to keep the process' fd count low. This change addresses this problem by keeping track of the number of FDs in flight per user and preventing non-privileged processes from having more FDs in flight than their configured FD limit. Reported-by: socketpair@gmail.com Reported-by: Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp> Mitigates: CVE-2013-4312 (Linux 2.0+) Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Acked-by: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org> Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/unix/af_unix.c')
-rw-r--r--net/unix/af_unix.c24
1 files changed, 20 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
index ef05cd9403d4..e3f85bc8b135 100644
--- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
+++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
@@ -1513,6 +1513,21 @@ static void unix_destruct_scm(struct sk_buff *skb)
sock_wfree(skb);
}
+/*
+ * The "user->unix_inflight" variable is protected by the garbage
+ * collection lock, and we just read it locklessly here. If you go
+ * over the limit, there might be a tiny race in actually noticing
+ * it across threads. Tough.
+ */
+static inline bool too_many_unix_fds(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ struct user_struct *user = current_user();
+
+ if (unlikely(user->unix_inflight > task_rlimit(p, RLIMIT_NOFILE)))
+ return !capable(CAP_SYS_RESOURCE) && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ return false;
+}
+
#define MAX_RECURSION_LEVEL 4
static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -1521,6 +1536,9 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
unsigned char max_level = 0;
int unix_sock_count = 0;
+ if (too_many_unix_fds(current))
+ return -ETOOMANYREFS;
+
for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
struct sock *sk = unix_get_socket(scm->fp->fp[i]);
@@ -1542,10 +1560,8 @@ static int unix_attach_fds(struct scm_cookie *scm, struct sk_buff *skb)
if (!UNIXCB(skb).fp)
return -ENOMEM;
- if (unix_sock_count) {
- for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
- unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
- }
+ for (i = scm->fp->count - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+ unix_inflight(scm->fp->fp[i]);
return max_level;
}