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| author | Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com> | 2024-04-28 19:16:38 +0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> | 2024-04-30 18:30:43 -0700 |
| commit | 9f8eeea1643c213c0e1ad2e546a15536200d216b (patch) | |
| tree | 01122840aeefafa388129b6b082332beaa5d91a5 /net | |
| parent | ba1cb99b559e3b12db8b65ca9ff03358ea318064 (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-9f8eeea1643c213c0e1ad2e546a15536200d216b.tar.gz linux-stable-9f8eeea1643c213c0e1ad2e546a15536200d216b.tar.bz2 linux-stable-9f8eeea1643c213c0e1ad2e546a15536200d216b.zip | |
rxrpc: Fix using alignmask being zero for __page_frag_alloc_align()
rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf() may be called with data_align being
zero in none_alloc_txbuf() and rxkad_alloc_txbuf(), data_align
is supposed to be an order-based alignment value, but zero is
not a valid order-based alignment value, and '~(data_align - 1)'
doesn't result in a valid mask-based alignment value for
__page_frag_alloc_align().
Fix it by passing a valid order-based alignment value in
none_alloc_txbuf() and rxkad_alloc_txbuf().
Also use page_frag_alloc_align() expecting an order-based
alignment value in rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf() to avoid doing the
alignment converting operation and to catch possible invalid
alignment value in the future. Remove the 'if (data_align)'
checking too, as it is always true for a valid order-based
alignment value.
Fixes: 6b2536462fd4 ("rxrpc: Fix use of changed alignment param to page_frag_alloc_align()")
Fixes: 49489bb03a50 ("rxrpc: Do zerocopy using MSG_SPLICE_PAGES and page frags")
CC: Alexander Duyck <alexander.duyck@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yunsheng Lin <linyunsheng@huawei.com>
Acked-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240428111640.27306-1-linyunsheng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/insecure.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | net/rxrpc/txbuf.c | 10 |
3 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c index f2701068ed9e..6716c021a532 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/insecure.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/insecure.c @@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ static int none_init_connection_security(struct rxrpc_connection *conn, */ static struct rxrpc_txbuf *none_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t remain, gfp_t gfp) { - return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, min_t(size_t, remain, RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN), 0, gfp); + return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, min_t(size_t, remain, RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN), 1, gfp); } static int none_secure_packet(struct rxrpc_call *call, struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb) diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c index f1a68270862d..48a1475e6b06 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c @@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ static struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxkad_alloc_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t rem switch (call->conn->security_level) { default: space = min_t(size_t, remain, RXRPC_JUMBO_DATALEN); - return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, space, 0, gfp); + return rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(call, space, 1, gfp); case RXRPC_SECURITY_AUTH: shdr = sizeof(struct rxkad_level1_hdr); break; diff --git a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c index e0679658d9de..c3913d8a50d3 100644 --- a/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c +++ b/net/rxrpc/txbuf.c @@ -21,20 +21,20 @@ struct rxrpc_txbuf *rxrpc_alloc_data_txbuf(struct rxrpc_call *call, size_t data_ { struct rxrpc_wire_header *whdr; struct rxrpc_txbuf *txb; - size_t total, hoff = 0; + size_t total, hoff; void *buf; txb = kmalloc(sizeof(*txb), gfp); if (!txb) return NULL; - if (data_align) - hoff = round_up(sizeof(*whdr), data_align) - sizeof(*whdr); + hoff = round_up(sizeof(*whdr), data_align) - sizeof(*whdr); total = hoff + sizeof(*whdr) + data_size; + data_align = umax(data_align, L1_CACHE_BYTES); mutex_lock(&call->conn->tx_data_alloc_lock); - buf = __page_frag_alloc_align(&call->conn->tx_data_alloc, total, gfp, - ~(data_align - 1) & ~(L1_CACHE_BYTES - 1)); + buf = page_frag_alloc_align(&call->conn->tx_data_alloc, total, gfp, + data_align); mutex_unlock(&call->conn->tx_data_alloc_lock); if (!buf) { kfree(txb); |