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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-12-24 12:40:07 -0800
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2020-12-24 12:40:07 -0800
commit4a1106afeed26012de69f4837b8d7a8b83f28489 (patch)
tree370d18dff1e55af225757abcc1cbfa78885aeb64 /security/integrity
parent60e8edd2513abffdb6d4a9b5affca7f9dd5ec73d (diff)
parent3dcb8b53cbd2cc5618863b19ef00f8ea82f27e83 (diff)
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Merge tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull EFI updates from Borislav Petkov: "These got delayed due to a last minute ia64 build issue which got fixed in the meantime. EFI updates collected by Ard Biesheuvel: - Don't move BSS section around pointlessly in the x86 decompressor - Refactor helper for discovering the EFI secure boot mode - Wire up EFI secure boot to IMA for arm64 - Some fixes for the capsule loader - Expose the RT_PROP table via the EFI test module - Relax DT and kernel placement restrictions on ARM with a few followup fixes: - fix the build breakage on IA64 caused by recent capsule loader changes - suppress a type mismatch build warning in the expansion of EFI_PHYS_ALIGN on ARM" * tag 'efi_updates_for_v5.11' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: efi: arm: force use of unsigned type for EFI_PHYS_ALIGN efi: ia64: disable the capsule loader efi: stub: get rid of efi_get_max_fdt_addr() efi/efi_test: read RuntimeServicesSupported efi: arm: reduce minimum alignment of uncompressed kernel efi: capsule: clean scatter-gather entries from the D-cache efi: capsule: use atomic kmap for transient sglist mappings efi: x86/xen: switch to efi_get_secureboot_mode helper arm64/ima: add ima_arch support ima: generalize x86/EFI arch glue for other EFI architectures efi: generalize efi_get_secureboot efi/libstub: EFI_GENERIC_STUB_INITRD_CMDLINE_LOADER should not default to yes efi/x86: Only copy the compressed kernel image in efi_relocate_kernel() efi/libstub/x86: simplify efi_is_native()
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/Makefile4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c73
2 files changed, 77 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
index 67dabca670e2..2499f2485c04 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile
@@ -14,3 +14,7 @@ ima-$(CONFIG_HAVE_IMA_KEXEC) += ima_kexec.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += ima_mok.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += ima_asymmetric_keys.o
ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS) += ima_queue_keys.o
+
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI),y)
+ima-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_efi.o
+endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..71786d01946f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation
+ */
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
+#include <asm/efi.h>
+
+#ifndef arch_ima_efi_boot_mode
+#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset
+#endif
+
+static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void)
+{
+ enum efi_secureboot_mode mode;
+
+ if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) {
+ pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n");
+ return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown;
+ }
+
+ mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable);
+ if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled)
+ pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n");
+ else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown)
+ pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n");
+ return mode;
+}
+
+bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void)
+{
+ static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode;
+ static bool initialized;
+
+ if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) {
+ sb_mode = arch_ima_efi_boot_mode;
+
+ if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset)
+ sb_mode = get_sb_mode();
+ initialized = true;
+ }
+
+ if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled)
+ return true;
+ else
+ return false;
+}
+
+/* secureboot arch rules */
+static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG)
+ "appraise func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG */
+ "measure func=KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK",
+#if !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)
+ "appraise func=MODULE_CHECK appraise_type=imasig",
+#endif
+ "measure func=MODULE_CHECK",
+ NULL
+};
+
+const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void)
+{
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG))
+ set_module_sig_enforced();
+ return sb_arch_rules;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}