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author | John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | 2017-06-09 17:07:58 -0700 |
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committer | John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com> | 2017-06-10 17:11:47 -0700 |
commit | e00b02bb6ac2a1893227ce8014b649028d6425d2 (patch) | |
tree | 15875adce81ab528892d9642108d4821c75f2e59 /security | |
parent | 89dbf1962aa636341658c26034c0e113cc9d1776 (diff) | |
download | linux-stable-e00b02bb6ac2a1893227ce8014b649028d6425d2.tar.gz linux-stable-e00b02bb6ac2a1893227ce8014b649028d6425d2.tar.bz2 linux-stable-e00b02bb6ac2a1893227ce8014b649028d6425d2.zip |
apparmor: move change_profile mediation to using labels
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/domain.c | 191 |
1 files changed, 123 insertions, 68 deletions
diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index a1d73033b42e..d0594446ae3f 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -301,26 +301,6 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, return label_match(profile, target, stack, start, true, request, perms); } -static struct aa_perms change_profile_perms_wrapper(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct aa_profile *target, - u32 request, - unsigned int start) -{ - struct aa_perms perms; - - if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { - perms.allow = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE | AA_MAY_ONEXEC; - perms.audit = perms.quiet = perms.kill = 0; - return perms; - } - - if (change_profile_perms(profile, &target->label, false, request, - start, &perms)) - return nullperms; - - return perms; -} - /** * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) @@ -1140,6 +1120,39 @@ fail: } +static int change_profile_perms_wrapper(const char *op, const char *name, + struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_label *target, bool stack, + u32 request, struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + const char *info = NULL; + int error = 0; + + /* + * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions when no_new_privs + * and not unconfined OR the transition results in a stack on + * the current label. + * Stacking domain transitions and transitions from unconfined are + * allowed even when no_new_privs is set because this aways results + * in a reduction of permissions. + */ + if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !stack && + !profile_unconfined(profile) && + !aa_label_is_subset(target, &profile->label)) { + info = "no new privs"; + error = -EPERM; + } + + if (!error) + error = change_profile_perms(profile, target, stack, request, + profile->file.start, perms); + if (error) + error = aa_audit_file(profile, perms, op, request, name, + NULL, target, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, + error); + + return error; +} /** * aa_change_profile - perform a one-way profile transition @@ -1157,12 +1170,14 @@ fail: */ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) { - const struct cred *cred; - struct aa_label *label; - struct aa_profile *profile, *target = NULL; + struct aa_label *label, *new = NULL, *target = NULL; + struct aa_profile *profile; struct aa_perms perms = {}; - const char *info = NULL, *op; + const char *info = NULL; + const char *auditname = fqname; /* retain leading & if stack */ + bool stack = flags & AA_CHANGE_STACK; int error = 0; + char *op; u32 request; if (!fqname || !*fqname) { @@ -1172,76 +1187,116 @@ int aa_change_profile(const char *fqname, int flags) if (flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC) { request = AA_MAY_ONEXEC; - op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC; + if (stack) + op = OP_STACK_ONEXEC; + else + op = OP_CHANGE_ONEXEC; } else { request = AA_MAY_CHANGE_PROFILE; - op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE; + if (stack) + op = OP_STACK; + else + op = OP_CHANGE_PROFILE; } - cred = get_current_cred(); - label = aa_get_newest_cred_label(cred); - profile = labels_profile(label); + label = aa_get_current_label(); - /* - * Fail explicitly requested domain transitions if no_new_privs - * and not unconfined. - * Domain transitions from unconfined are allowed even when - * no_new_privs is set because this aways results in a reduction - * of permissions. - */ - if (task_no_new_privs(current) && !profile_unconfined(profile)) { - put_cred(cred); - return -EPERM; + if (*fqname == '&') { + stack = true; + /* don't have label_parse() do stacking */ + fqname++; } + target = aa_label_parse(label, fqname, GFP_KERNEL, true, false); + if (IS_ERR(target)) { + struct aa_profile *tprofile; - target = aa_fqlookupn_profile(label, fqname, strlen(fqname)); - if (!target) { - info = "profile not found"; - error = -ENOENT; + info = "label not found"; + error = PTR_ERR(target); + target = NULL; + /* + * TODO: fixme using labels_profile is not right - do profile + * per complain profile + */ if ((flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST) || - !COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) + !COMPLAIN_MODE(labels_profile(label))) goto audit; /* released below */ - target = aa_new_null_profile(profile, false, fqname, - GFP_KERNEL); - if (!target) { + tprofile = aa_new_null_profile(labels_profile(label), false, + fqname, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!tprofile) { info = "failed null profile create"; error = -ENOMEM; goto audit; } + target = &tprofile->label; + goto check; } - perms = change_profile_perms_wrapper(profile, target, request, - profile->file.start); - if (!(perms.allow & request)) { - error = -EACCES; - goto audit; - } + /* + * self directed transitions only apply to current policy ns + * TODO: currently requiring perms for stacking and straight change + * stacking doesn't strictly need this. Determine how much + * we want to loosen this restriction for stacking + * + * if (!stack) { + */ + error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, + change_profile_perms_wrapper(op, auditname, + profile, target, stack, + request, &perms)); + if (error) + /* auditing done in change_profile_perms_wrapper */ + goto out; + /* } */ + +check: /* check if tracing task is allowed to trace target domain */ - error = may_change_ptraced_domain(&target->label, &info); - if (error) { - info = "ptrace prevents transition"; + error = may_change_ptraced_domain(target, &info); + if (error && !fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, + COMPLAIN_MODE(profile))) goto audit; - } + /* TODO: add permission check to allow this + * if ((flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC) && !current_is_single_threaded()) { + * info = "not a single threaded task"; + * error = -EACCES; + * goto audit; + * } + */ if (flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST) - goto audit; + goto out; - if (flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC) - error = aa_set_current_onexec(&target->label, 0); - else - error = aa_replace_current_label(&target->label); + if (!(flags & AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC)) { + /* only transition profiles in the current ns */ + if (stack) + new = aa_label_merge(label, target, GFP_KERNEL); + else + new = fn_label_build_in_ns(label, profile, GFP_KERNEL, + aa_get_label(target), + aa_get_label(&profile->label)); + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(new)) { + info = "failed to build target label"; + error = PTR_ERR(new); + new = NULL; + perms.allow = 0; + goto audit; + } + error = aa_replace_current_label(new); + } else + /* full transition will be built in exec path */ + error = aa_set_current_onexec(target, stack); audit: - if (!(flags & AA_CHANGE_TEST)) - error = aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, NULL, - fqname, NULL, GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, - error); + error = fn_for_each_in_ns(label, profile, + aa_audit_file(profile, &perms, op, request, auditname, + NULL, new ? new : target, + GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, info, error)); - aa_put_profile(target); +out: + aa_put_label(new); + aa_put_label(target); aa_put_label(label); - put_cred(cred); return error; } |