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| author | Philipp Stanner <pstanner@redhat.com> | 2023-11-02 19:15:26 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> | 2023-12-01 08:00:53 -0800 |
| commit | 1f829359c8c37f77a340575957686ca8c4bca317 (patch) | |
| tree | 3115597707b88ccfafc3cc83e32b2d4dd36fe7c8 /virt | |
| parent | 8c4976772d9b5858b8b456e84783e089c6cfa66e (diff) | |
| download | linux-stable-1f829359c8c37f77a340575957686ca8c4bca317.tar.gz linux-stable-1f829359c8c37f77a340575957686ca8c4bca317.tar.bz2 linux-stable-1f829359c8c37f77a340575957686ca8c4bca317.zip | |
KVM: Harden copying of userspace-array against overflow
kvm_main.c utilizes vmemdup_user() and array_size() to copy a userspace
array. Currently, this does not check for an overflow.
Use the new wrapper vmemdup_array_user() to copy the array more safely.
Note, KVM explicitly checks the number of entries before duplicating the
array, i.e. adding the overflow check should be a glorified nop.
Suggested-by: Dave Airlie <airlied@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <pstanner@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231102181526.43279-4-pstanner@redhat.com
[sean: call out that KVM pre-checks the number of entries]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'virt')
| -rw-r--r-- | virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 5 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c index b744eddecbc0..e76d49daa470 100644 --- a/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c +++ b/virt/kvm/kvm_main.c @@ -5262,9 +5262,8 @@ static long kvm_vm_ioctl(struct file *filp, goto out; if (routing.nr) { urouting = argp; - entries = vmemdup_user(urouting->entries, - array_size(sizeof(*entries), - routing.nr)); + entries = vmemdup_array_user(urouting->entries, + routing.nr, sizeof(*entries)); if (IS_ERR(entries)) { r = PTR_ERR(entries); goto out; |