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* docs: trusted-encrypted: add DCP as new trust sourceDavid Gstir2024-05-091-0/+53
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new trust source: - Describe security properties of DCP trust source - Describe key usage - Document blob format Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> Co-developed-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: David Oberhollenzer <david.oberhollenzer@sigma-star.at> Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Bagas Sanjaya <bagasdotme@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* Documentation: Destage TEE subsystem documentationSumit Garg2023-12-081-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a separate documentation directory for TEE subsystem since it is a standalone subsystem which already offers devices consumed by multiple different subsystem drivers. Split overall TEE subsystem documentation modularly where: - The userspace API has been moved to Documentation/userspace-api/tee.rst. - The driver API has been moved to Documentation/driver-api/tee.rst. - The first module covers the overview of TEE subsystem. - The further modules are dedicated to different TEE implementations like: - OP-TEE - AMD-TEE - and so on for future TEE implementation support. Acked-by: Rijo Thomas <Rijo-john.Thomas@amd.com> Acked-by: Jens Wiklander <jens.wiklander@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231128072352.866859-1-sumit.garg@linaro.org
* Documentation: Fix typosBjorn Helgaas2023-08-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Fix typos in Documentation. Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230814212822.193684-4-helgaas@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided dataNikolaus Voss2022-10-191-1/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead. Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a small shell script, e.g.: BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32) keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long. The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter. The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been fixed (see link below). Fixes: cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") Cc: stable@kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/ltp/20221006081709.92303897@mail.steuer-voss.de/ Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Nikolaus Voss <nikolaus.voss@haag-streit.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* Documentation: update watch_queue.rst referencesMauro Carvalho Chehab2022-07-071-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | Changeset f5461124d59b ("Documentation: move watch_queue to core-api") renamed: Documentation/watch_queue.rst to: Documentation/core-api/watch_queue.rst. Update the cross-references accordingly. Fixes: f5461124d59b ("Documentation: move watch_queue to core-api") Reviewed-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1c220de9c58f35e815a3df9458ac2bea323c8bfb.1656234456.git.mchehab@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: trusted-encrypted: describe new CAAM trust sourceAhmad Fatoum2022-05-231-1/+39
| | | | | | | | | | Update documentation for trusted key use with the Cryptographic Acceleration and Assurance Module (CAAM), an IP on NXP SoCs. Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* KEYS: trusted: allow use of kernel RNG for key materialAhmad Fatoum2022-05-231-8/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The two existing trusted key sources don't make use of the kernel RNG, but instead let the hardware doing the sealing/unsealing also generate the random key material. However, both users and future backends may want to place less trust into the quality of the trust source's random number generator and instead reuse the kernel entropy pool, which can be seeded from multiple entropy sources. Make this possible by adding a new trusted.rng parameter, that will force use of the kernel RNG. In its absence, it's up to the trust source to decide, which random numbers to use, maintaining the existing behavior. Suggested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Acked-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Acked-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at> Reviewed-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Tested-by: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com> Tested-by: Michael Walle <michael@walle.cc> # on ls1028a (non-E and E) Tested-by: John Ernberg <john.ernberg@actia.se> # iMX8QXP Signed-off-by: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted dataYael Tzur2022-02-211-6/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | For availability and performance reasons master keys often need to be released outside of a Key Management Service (KMS) to clients. It would be beneficial to provide a mechanism where the wrapping/unwrapping of data encryption keys (DEKs) is not dependent on a remote call at runtime yet security is not (or only minimally) compromised. Master keys could be securely stored in the Kernel and be used to wrap/unwrap keys from Userspace. The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <decrypted data> that allows to inject and encrypt user-provided decrypted data. The decrypted data must be hex-ascii encoded. Signed-off-by: Yael Tzur <yaelt@google.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* doc: trusted-encrypted: updates with TEE as a new trust sourceSumit Garg2021-04-141-33/+138
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Update documentation for Trusted and Encrypted Keys with TEE as a new trust source. Following is brief description of updates: - Add a section to demonstrate a list of supported devices along with their security properties/guarantees. - Add a key generation section. - Updates for usage section including differences specific to a trust source. Co-developed-by: Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Elaine Palmer <erpalmer@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobsJames Bottomley2021-04-141-0/+58
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Modify the TPM2 key format blob output to export and import in the ASN.1 form for TPM2 sealed object keys. For compatibility with prior trusted keys, the importer will also accept two TPM2B quantities representing the public and private parts of the key. However, the export via keyctl pipe will only output the ASN.1 format. The benefit of the ASN.1 format is that it's a standard and thus the exported key can be used by userspace tools (openssl_tpm2_engine, openconnect and tpm2-tss-engine). The format includes policy specifications, thus it gets us out of having to construct policy handles in userspace and the format includes the parent meaning you don't have to keep passing it in each time. This patch only implements basic handling for the ASN.1 format, so keys with passwords but no policy. Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
* watch_queue: Drop references to /dev/watch_queueGabriel Krisman Bertazi2021-01-211-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | The merged API doesn't use a watch_queue device, but instead relies on pipes, so let the documentation reflect that. Fixes: f7e47677e39a ("watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility") Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org> Reviewed-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com>
* docs: trusted-encrypted.rst: update parameters for command examplesColy Li2020-09-091-3/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The parameters in command examples for tpm2_createprimary and tpm2_evictcontrol are outdated, people (like me) are not able to create trusted key by these command examples. This patch updates the parameters of command example tpm2_createprimary and tpm2_evictcontrol in trusted-encrypted.rst. With Linux kernel v5.8 and tpm2-tools-4.1, people can create a trusted key by following the examples in this document. Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Peter Huewe <peterhuewe@gmx.de> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200821135356.15737-1-colyli@suse.de Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* Documentation: security/keys: eliminate duplicated wordRandy Dunlap2020-07-131-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Drop the doubled word "in". Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200707180414.10467-19-rdunlap@infradead.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* docs: crypto: convert asymmetric-keys.txt to ReSTMauro Carvalho Chehab2020-06-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This file is almost compatible with ReST. Just minor changes were needed: - Adjust document and titles markups; - Adjust numbered list markups; - Add a comments markup for the Contents section; - Add markups for literal blocks. Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/c2275ea94e0507a01b020ab66dfa824d8b1c2545.1592203650.git.mchehab+huawei@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* Merge tag 'notifications-20200601' of ↵Linus Torvalds2020-06-131-0/+57
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs Pull notification queue from David Howells: "This adds a general notification queue concept and adds an event source for keys/keyrings, such as linking and unlinking keys and changing their attributes. Thanks to Debarshi Ray, we do have a pull request to use this to fix a problem with gnome-online-accounts - as mentioned last time: https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-online-accounts/merge_requests/47 Without this, g-o-a has to constantly poll a keyring-based kerberos cache to find out if kinit has changed anything. [ There are other notification pending: mount/sb fsinfo notifications for libmount that Karel Zak and Ian Kent have been working on, and Christian Brauner would like to use them in lxc, but let's see how this one works first ] LSM hooks are included: - A set of hooks are provided that allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a watch may be set. Each of these hooks takes a different "watched object" parameter, so they're not really shareable. The LSM should use current's credentials. [Wanted by SELinux & Smack] - A hook is provided to allow an LSM to rule on whether or not a particular message may be posted to a particular queue. This is given the credentials from the event generator (which may be the system) and the watch setter. [Wanted by Smack] I've provided SELinux and Smack with implementations of some of these hooks. WHY === Key/keyring notifications are desirable because if you have your kerberos tickets in a file/directory, your Gnome desktop will monitor that using something like fanotify and tell you if your credentials cache changes. However, we also have the ability to cache your kerberos tickets in the session, user or persistent keyring so that it isn't left around on disk across a reboot or logout. Keyrings, however, cannot currently be monitored asynchronously, so the desktop has to poll for it - not so good on a laptop. This facility will allow the desktop to avoid the need to poll. DESIGN DECISIONS ================ - The notification queue is built on top of a standard pipe. Messages are effectively spliced in. The pipe is opened with a special flag: pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE); The special flag has the same value as O_EXCL (which doesn't seem like it will ever be applicable in this context)[?]. It is given up front to make it a lot easier to prohibit splice&co from accessing the pipe. [?] Should this be done some other way? I'd rather not use up a new O_* flag if I can avoid it - should I add a pipe3() system call instead? The pipe is then configured:: ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, queue_depth); ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter); Messages are then read out of the pipe using read(). - It should be possible to allow write() to insert data into the notification pipes too, but this is currently disabled as the kernel has to be able to insert messages into the pipe *without* holding pipe->mutex and the code to make this work needs careful auditing. - sendfile(), splice() and vmsplice() are disabled on notification pipes because of the pipe->mutex issue and also because they sometimes want to revert what they just did - but one or more notification messages might've been interleaved in the ring. - The kernel inserts messages with the wait queue spinlock held. This means that pipe_read() and pipe_write() have to take the spinlock to update the queue pointers. - Records in the buffer are binary, typed and have a length so that they can be of varying size. This allows multiple heterogeneous sources to share a common buffer; there are 16 million types available, of which I've used just a few, so there is scope for others to be used. Tags may be specified when a watchpoint is created to help distinguish the sources. - Records are filterable as types have up to 256 subtypes that can be individually filtered. Other filtration is also available. - Notification pipes don't interfere with each other; each may be bound to a different set of watches. Any particular notification will be copied to all the queues that are currently watching for it - and only those that are watching for it. - When recording a notification, the kernel will not sleep, but will rather mark a queue as having lost a message if there's insufficient space. read() will fabricate a loss notification message at an appropriate point later. - The notification pipe is created and then watchpoints are attached to it, using one of: keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01); watch_mount(AT_FDCWD, "/", 0, fd, 0x02); watch_sb(AT_FDCWD, "/mnt", 0, fd, 0x03); where in both cases, fd indicates the queue and the number after is a tag between 0 and 255. - Watches are removed if either the notification pipe is destroyed or the watched object is destroyed. In the latter case, a message will be generated indicating the enforced watch removal. Things I want to avoid: - Introducing features that make the core VFS dependent on the network stack or networking namespaces (ie. usage of netlink). - Dumping all this stuff into dmesg and having a daemon that sits there parsing the output and distributing it as this then puts the responsibility for security into userspace and makes handling namespaces tricky. Further, dmesg might not exist or might be inaccessible inside a container. - Letting users see events they shouldn't be able to see. TESTING AND MANPAGES ==================== - The keyutils tree has a pipe-watch branch that has keyctl commands for making use of notifications. Proposed manual pages can also be found on this branch, though a couple of them really need to go to the main manpages repository instead. If the kernel supports the watching of keys, then running "make test" on that branch will cause the testing infrastructure to spawn a monitoring process on the side that monitors a notifications pipe for all the key/keyring changes induced by the tests and they'll all be checked off to make sure they happened. https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/keyutils.git/log/?h=pipe-watch - A test program is provided (samples/watch_queue/watch_test) that can be used to monitor for keyrings, mount and superblock events. Information on the notifications is simply logged to stdout" * tag 'notifications-20200601' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs: smack: Implement the watch_key and post_notification hooks selinux: Implement the watch_key security hook keys: Make the KEY_NEED_* perms an enum rather than a mask pipe: Add notification lossage handling pipe: Allow buffers to be marked read-whole-or-error for notifications Add sample notification program watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facility security: Add hooks to rule on setting a watch pipe: Add general notification queue support pipe: Add O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE security: Add a hook for the point of notification insertion uapi: General notification queue definitions
| * watch_queue: Add a key/keyring notification facilityDavid Howells2020-05-191-0/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a key/keyring change notification facility whereby notifications about changes in key and keyring content and attributes can be received. Firstly, an event queue needs to be created: pipe2(fds, O_NOTIFICATION_PIPE); ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_SIZE, 256); then a notification can be set up to report notifications via that queue: struct watch_notification_filter filter = { .nr_filters = 1, .filters = { [0] = { .type = WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY, .subtype_filter[0] = UINT_MAX, }, }, }; ioctl(fds[1], IOC_WATCH_QUEUE_SET_FILTER, &filter); keyctl_watch_key(KEY_SPEC_SESSION_KEYRING, fds[1], 0x01); After that, records will be placed into the queue when events occur in which keys are changed in some way. Records are of the following format: struct key_notification { struct watch_notification watch; __u32 key_id; __u32 aux; } *n; Where: n->watch.type will be WATCH_TYPE_KEY_NOTIFY. n->watch.subtype will indicate the type of event, such as NOTIFY_KEY_REVOKED. n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_LENGTH will indicate the length of the record. n->watch.info & WATCH_INFO_ID will be the second argument to keyctl_watch_key(), shifted. n->key will be the ID of the affected key. n->aux will hold subtype-dependent information, such as the key being linked into the keyring specified by n->key in the case of NOTIFY_KEY_LINKED. Note that it is permissible for event records to be of variable length - or, at least, the length may be dependent on the subtype. Note also that the queue can be shared between multiple notifications of various types. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com>
* | Documentation: security: core.rst: add missing argumentBen Boeckel2020-06-021-2/+6
|/ | | | | | | | This argument was just never documented in the first place. Signed-off-by: Ben Boeckel <mathstuf@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
* Documentation: security: core.rst: fix warningsDaniel W. S. Almeida2019-11-221-1/+1
| | | | | | | | Fix warnings due to missing markup, no change in content otherwise. Signed-off-by: Daniel W. S. Almeida <dwlsalmeida@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191122041806.68650-1-dwlsalmeida@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* Revert "Merge tag 'keys-acl-20190703' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-07-102-106/+31
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs" This reverts merge 0f75ef6a9cff49ff612f7ce0578bced9d0b38325 (and thus effectively commits 7a1ade847596 ("keys: Provide KEYCTL_GRANT_PERMISSION") 2e12256b9a76 ("keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACL") that the merge brought in). It turns out that it breaks booting with an encrypted volume, and Eric biggers reports that it also breaks the fscrypt tests [1] and loading of in-kernel X.509 certificates [2]. The root cause of all the breakage is likely the same, but David Howells is off email so rather than try to work it out it's getting reverted in order to not impact the rest of the merge window. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710011559.GA7973@sol.localdomain/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20190710013225.GB7973@sol.localdomain/ Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/CAHk-=wjxoeMJfeBahnWH=9zShKp2bsVy527vo3_y8HfOdhwAAw@mail.gmail.com/ Reported-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
* Merge tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds2019-07-092-7/+13
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull Documentation updates from Jonathan Corbet: "It's been a relatively busy cycle for docs: - A fair pile of RST conversions, many from Mauro. These create more than the usual number of simple but annoying merge conflicts with other trees, unfortunately. He has a lot more of these waiting on the wings that, I think, will go to you directly later on. - A new document on how to use merges and rebases in kernel repos, and one on Spectre vulnerabilities. - Various improvements to the build system, including automatic markup of function() references because some people, for reasons I will never understand, were of the opinion that :c:func:``function()`` is unattractive and not fun to type. - We now recommend using sphinx 1.7, but still support back to 1.4. - Lots of smaller improvements, warning fixes, typo fixes, etc" * tag 'docs-5.3' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (129 commits) docs: automarkup.py: ignore exceptions when seeking for xrefs docs: Move binderfs to admin-guide Disable Sphinx SmartyPants in HTML output doc: RCU callback locks need only _bh, not necessarily _irq docs: format kernel-parameters -- as code Doc : doc-guide : Fix a typo platform: x86: get rid of a non-existent document Add the RCU docs to the core-api manual Documentation: RCU: Add TOC tree hooks Documentation: RCU: Rename txt files to rst Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU UP systems to reST Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU linked list to reST Documentation: RCU: Convert RCU basic concepts to reST docs: filesystems: Remove uneeded .rst extension on toctables scripts/sphinx-pre-install: fix out-of-tree build docs: zh_CN: submitting-drivers.rst: Remove a duplicated Documentation/ Documentation: PGP: update for newer HW devices Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities for Spectre Documentation: platform: Delete x86-laptop-drivers.txt docs: Note that :c:func: should no longer be used ...
| * docs: security: core.rst: Fix several warningsMauro Carvalho Chehab2019-06-081-6/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Multi-line literal markups only work when they're idented at the same level, with is not the case here: Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1597: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1598: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1598: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1600: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline literal start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Documentation/security/keys/core.rst:1666: WARNING: Inline emphasis start-string without end-string. Fix it by using a code-block instead. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
| * docs: security: trusted-encrypted.rst: fix code-block tagMauro Carvalho Chehab2019-06-081-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The code-block tag is at the wrong place, causing those warnings: Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:112: WARNING: Literal block expected; none found. Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:121: WARNING: Unexpected indentation. Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:122: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst:123: WARNING: Block quote ends without a blank line; unexpected unindent. Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+samsung@kernel.org> Acked-by: James Morris <jamorris@linux.microsoft.com> Acked-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* | keys: Replace uid/gid/perm permissions checking with an ACLDavid Howells2019-06-272-31/+106
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Replace the uid/gid/perm permissions checking on a key with an ACL to allow the SETATTR and SEARCH permissions to be split. This will also allow a greater range of subjects to represented. ============ WHY DO THIS? ============ The problem is that SETATTR and SEARCH cover a slew of actions, not all of which should be grouped together. For SETATTR, this includes actions that are about controlling access to a key: (1) Changing a key's ownership. (2) Changing a key's security information. (3) Setting a keyring's restriction. And actions that are about managing a key's lifetime: (4) Setting an expiry time. (5) Revoking a key. and (proposed) managing a key as part of a cache: (6) Invalidating a key. Managing a key's lifetime doesn't really have anything to do with controlling access to that key. Expiry time is awkward since it's more about the lifetime of the content and so, in some ways goes better with WRITE permission. It can, however, be set unconditionally by a process with an appropriate authorisation token for instantiating a key, and can also be set by the key type driver when a key is instantiated, so lumping it with the access-controlling actions is probably okay. As for SEARCH permission, that currently covers: (1) Finding keys in a keyring tree during a search. (2) Permitting keyrings to be joined. (3) Invalidation. But these don't really belong together either, since these actions really need to be controlled separately. Finally, there are number of special cases to do with granting the administrator special rights to invalidate or clear keys that I would like to handle with the ACL rather than key flags and special checks. =============== WHAT IS CHANGED =============== The SETATTR permission is split to create two new permissions: (1) SET_SECURITY - which allows the key's owner, group and ACL to be changed and a restriction to be placed on a keyring. (2) REVOKE - which allows a key to be revoked. The SEARCH permission is split to create: (1) SEARCH - which allows a keyring to be search and a key to be found. (2) JOIN - which allows a keyring to be joined as a session keyring. (3) INVAL - which allows a key to be invalidated. The WRITE permission is also split to create: (1) WRITE - which allows a key's content to be altered and links to be added, removed and replaced in a keyring. (2) CLEAR - which allows a keyring to be cleared completely. This is split out to make it possible to give just this to an administrator. (3) REVOKE - see above. Keys acquire ACLs which consist of a series of ACEs, and all that apply are unioned together. An ACE specifies a subject, such as: (*) Possessor - permitted to anyone who 'possesses' a key (*) Owner - permitted to the key owner (*) Group - permitted to the key group (*) Everyone - permitted to everyone Note that 'Other' has been replaced with 'Everyone' on the assumption that you wouldn't grant a permit to 'Other' that you wouldn't also grant to everyone else. Further subjects may be made available by later patches. The ACE also specifies a permissions mask. The set of permissions is now: VIEW Can view the key metadata READ Can read the key content WRITE Can update/modify the key content SEARCH Can find the key by searching/requesting LINK Can make a link to the key SET_SECURITY Can change owner, ACL, expiry INVAL Can invalidate REVOKE Can revoke JOIN Can join this keyring CLEAR Can clear this keyring The KEYCTL_SETPERM function is then deprecated. The KEYCTL_SET_TIMEOUT function then is permitted if SET_SECURITY is set, or if the caller has a valid instantiation auth token. The KEYCTL_INVALIDATE function then requires INVAL. The KEYCTL_REVOKE function then requires REVOKE. The KEYCTL_JOIN_SESSION_KEYRING function then requires JOIN to join an existing keyring. The JOIN permission is enabled by default for session keyrings and manually created keyrings only. ====================== BACKWARD COMPATIBILITY ====================== To maintain backward compatibility, KEYCTL_SETPERM will translate the permissions mask it is given into a new ACL for a key - unless KEYCTL_SET_ACL has been called on that key, in which case an error will be returned. It will convert possessor, owner, group and other permissions into separate ACEs, if each portion of the mask is non-zero. SETATTR permission turns on all of INVAL, REVOKE and SET_SECURITY. WRITE permission turns on WRITE, REVOKE and, if a keyring, CLEAR. JOIN is turned on if a keyring is being altered. The KEYCTL_DESCRIBE function translates the ACL back into a permissions mask to return depending on possessor, owner, group and everyone ACEs. It will make the following mappings: (1) INVAL, JOIN -> SEARCH (2) SET_SECURITY -> SETATTR (3) REVOKE -> WRITE if SETATTR isn't already set (4) CLEAR -> WRITE Note that the value subsequently returned by KEYCTL_DESCRIBE may not match the value set with KEYCTL_SETATTR. ======= TESTING ======= This passes the keyutils testsuite for all but a couple of tests: (1) tests/keyctl/dh_compute/badargs: The first wrong-key-type test now returns EOPNOTSUPP rather than ENOKEY as READ permission isn't removed if the type doesn't have ->read(). You still can't actually read the key. (2) tests/keyctl/permitting/valid: The view-other-permissions test doesn't work as Other has been replaced with Everyone in the ACL. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | keys: Pass the network namespace into request_key mechanismDavid Howells2019-06-272-14/+43
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Create a request_key_net() function and use it to pass the network namespace domain tag into DNS revolver keys and rxrpc/AFS keys so that keys for different domains can coexist in the same keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-cifs@vger.kernel.org cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
* | keys: Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searchesDavid Howells2019-06-261-4/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a 'recurse' flag for keyring searches so that the flag can be omitted and recursion disabled, thereby allowing just the nominated keyring to be searched and none of the children. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | keys: Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}David Howells2019-06-262-53/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | Kill off request_key_async{,_with_auxdata}() as they're not currently used. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | keys: Cache result of request_key*() temporarily in task_structDavid Howells2019-06-191-1/+6
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | If a filesystem uses keys to hold authentication tokens, then it needs a token for each VFS operation that might perform an authentication check - either by passing it to the server, or using to perform a check based on authentication data cached locally. For open files this isn't a problem, since the key should be cached in the file struct since it represents the subject performing operations on that file descriptor. During pathwalk, however, there isn't anywhere to cache the key, except perhaps in the nameidata struct - but that isn't exposed to the filesystems. Further, a pathwalk can incur a lot of operations, calling one or more of the following, for instance: ->lookup() ->permission() ->d_revalidate() ->d_automount() ->get_acl() ->getxattr() on each dentry/inode it encounters - and each one may need to call request_key(). And then, at the end of pathwalk, it will call the actual operation: ->mkdir() ->mknod() ->getattr() ->open() ... which may need to go and get the token again. However, it is very likely that all of the operations on a single dentry/inode - and quite possibly a sequence of them - will all want to use the same authentication token, which suggests that caching it would be a good idea. To this end: (1) Make it so that a positive result of request_key() and co. that didn't require upcalling to userspace is cached temporarily in task_struct. (2) The cache is 1 deep, so a new result displaces the old one. (3) The key is released by exit and by notify-resume. (4) The cache is cleared in a newly forked process. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | keys: Provide request_key_rcu()David Howells2019-06-192-0/+19
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide a request_key_rcu() function that can be used to request a key under RCU conditions. It can only search and check permissions; it cannot allocate a new key, upcall or wait for an upcall to complete. It may return a partially constructed key. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | keys: Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functionsDavid Howells2019-06-191-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Move the RCU locks outwards from the keyring search functions so that it will become possible to provide an RCU-capable partial request_key() function in a later commit. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | keys: Fix request_key() lack of Link perm check on found keyDavid Howells2019-06-191-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The request_key() syscall allows a process to gain access to the 'possessor' permits of any key that grants it Search permission by virtue of request_key() not checking whether a key it finds grants Link permission to the caller. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* | keys: Add a keyctl to move a key between keyringsDavid Howells2019-05-301-0/+21
|/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Add a keyctl to atomically move a link to a key from one keyring to another. The key must exist in "from" keyring and a flag can be given to cause the operation to fail if there's a matching key already in the "to" keyring. This can be done with: keyctl(KEYCTL_MOVE, key_serial_t key, key_serial_t from_keyring, key_serial_t to_keyring, unsigned int flags); The key being moved must grant Link permission and both keyrings must grant Write permission. flags should be 0 or KEYCTL_MOVE_EXCL, with the latter preventing displacement of a matching key from the "to" keyring. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Merge branch 'next-integrity' of ↵Linus Torvalds2019-01-021-1/+30
|\ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security Pull integrity updates from James Morris: "In Linux 4.19, a new LSM hook named security_kernel_load_data was upstreamed, allowing LSMs and IMA to prevent the kexec_load syscall. Different signature verification methods exist for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image. This adds additional support in IMA to prevent loading unsigned kernel images via the kexec_load syscall, independently of the IMA policy rules, based on the runtime "secure boot" flag. An initial IMA kselftest is included. In addition, this pull request defines a new, separate keyring named ".platform" for storing the preboot/firmware keys needed for verifying the kexec'ed kernel image's signature and includes the associated IMA kexec usage of the ".platform" keyring. (David Howell's and Josh Boyer's patches for reading the preboot/firmware keys, which were previously posted for a different use case scenario, are included here)" * 'next-integrity' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security: integrity: Remove references to module keyring ima: Use inode_is_open_for_write ima: Support platform keyring for kernel appraisal efi: Allow the "db" UEFI variable to be suppressed efi: Import certificates from UEFI Secure Boot efi: Add an EFI signature blob parser efi: Add EFI signature data types integrity: Load certs to the platform keyring integrity: Define a trusted platform keyring selftests/ima: kexec_load syscall test ima: don't measure/appraise files on efivarfs x86/ima: retry detecting secure boot mode docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0 x86/ima: define arch_get_ima_policy() for x86 ima: add support for arch specific policies ima: refactor ima_init_policy() ima: prevent kexec_load syscall based on runtime secureboot flag x86/ima: define arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity: support new struct public_key_signature encoding field
| * docs: Extend trusted keys documentation for TPM 2.0Stefan Berger2018-12-111-1/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Extend the documentation for trusted keys with documentation for how to set up a key for a TPM 2.0 so it can be used with a TPM 2.0 as well. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Acked-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com> Acked-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
* | Merge tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linuxLinus Torvalds2018-12-291-1/+1
|\ \ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Pull documentation update from Jonathan Corbet: "A fairly normal cycle for documentation stuff. We have a new document on perf security, more Italian translations, more improvements to the memory-management docs, improvements to the pathname lookup documentation, and the usual array of smaller fixes. As is often the case, there are a few reaches outside of Documentation/ to adjust kerneldoc comments" * tag 'docs-5.0' of git://git.lwn.net/linux: (38 commits) docs: improve pathname-lookup document structure configfs: fix wrong name of struct in documentation docs/mm-api: link slab_common.c to "The Slab Cache" section slab: make kmem_cache_create{_usercopy} description proper kernel-doc doc:process: add links where missing docs/core-api: make mm-api.rst more structured x86, boot: documentation whitespace fixup Documentation: devres: note checking needs when converting doc:it: add some process/* translations doc:it: fixes in process/1.Intro Documentation: convert path-lookup from markdown to resturctured text Documentation/admin-guide: update admin-guide index.rst Documentation/admin-guide: introduce perf-security.rst file scripts/kernel-doc: Fix struct and struct field attribute processing Documentation: dev-tools: Fix typos in index.rst Correct gen_init_cpio tool's documentation Document /proc/pid PID reuse behavior Documentation: update path-lookup.md for parallel lookups Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst" dmaengine: Add mailing list address to the documentation ...
| * | Documentation: Use "while" instead of "whilst"Will Deacon2018-11-201-1/+1
| |/ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Whilst making an unrelated change to some Documentation, Linus sayeth: | Afaik, even in Britain, "whilst" is unusual and considered more | formal, and "while" is the common word. | | [...] | | Can we just admit that we work with computers, and we don't need to | use þe eald Englisc spelling of words that most of the world never | uses? dictionary.com refers to the word as "Chiefly British", which is probably an undesirable attribute for technical documentation. Replace all occurrences under Documentation/ with "while". Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Liam Girdwood <lgirdwood@gmail.com> Cc: Chris Wilson <chris@chris-wilson.co.uk> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@google.com> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* / keys-encrypted: add nvdimm key format type to encrypted keysDave Jiang2018-12-131-1/+5
|/ | | | | | | | | Adding nvdimm key format type to encrypted keys in order to limit the size of the key to 32bytes. Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com> Acked-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
* KEYS: Provide keyctls to drive the new key type ops for asymmetric keys [ver #2]David Howells2018-10-261-0/+111
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide five keyctl functions that permit userspace to make use of the new key type ops for accessing and driving asymmetric keys. (*) Query an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_QUERY, key_serial_t key, unsigned long reserved, struct keyctl_pkey_query *info); Get information about an asymmetric key. The information is returned in the keyctl_pkey_query struct: __u32 supported_ops; A bit mask of flags indicating which ops are supported. This is constructed from a bitwise-OR of: KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_{ENCRYPT,DECRYPT,SIGN,VERIFY} __u32 key_size; The size in bits of the key. __u16 max_data_size; __u16 max_sig_size; __u16 max_enc_size; __u16 max_dec_size; The maximum sizes in bytes of a blob of data to be signed, a signature blob, a blob to be encrypted and a blob to be decrypted. reserved must be set to 0. This is intended for future use to hand over one or more passphrases needed unlock a key. If successful, 0 is returned. If the key is not an asymmetric key, EOPNOTSUPP is returned. (*) Encrypt, decrypt, sign or verify a blob using an asymmetric key. long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, void *out); long keyctl(KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY, const struct keyctl_pkey_params *params, const char *info, const void *in, const void *in2); Use an asymmetric key to perform a public-key cryptographic operation a blob of data. The parameter block pointed to by params contains a number of integer values: __s32 key_id; __u32 in_len; __u32 out_len; __u32 in2_len; For a given operation, the in and out buffers are used as follows: Operation ID in,in_len out,out_len in2,in2_len ======================= =============== =============== =========== KEYCTL_PKEY_ENCRYPT Raw data Encrypted data - KEYCTL_PKEY_DECRYPT Encrypted data Raw data - KEYCTL_PKEY_SIGN Raw data Signature - KEYCTL_PKEY_VERIFY Raw data - Signature info is a string of key=value pairs that supply supplementary information. The __spare space in the parameter block must be set to 0. This is intended, amongst other things, to allow the passing of passphrases required to unlock a key. If successful, encrypt, decrypt and sign all return the amount of data written into the output buffer. Verification returns 0 on success. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* KEYS: Provide key type operations for asymmetric key ops [ver #2]David Howells2018-10-261-0/+106
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Provide five new operations in the key_type struct that can be used to provide access to asymmetric key operations. These will be implemented for the asymmetric key type in a later patch and may refer to a key retained in RAM by the kernel or a key retained in crypto hardware. int (*asym_query)(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, struct kernel_pkey_query *info); int (*asym_eds_op)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, void *out); int (*asym_verify_signature)(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, const void *in, const void *in2); Since encrypt, decrypt and sign are identical in their interfaces, they're rolled together in the asym_eds_op() operation and there's an operation ID in the params argument to distinguish them. Verify is different in that we supply the data and the signature instead and get an error value (or 0) as the only result on the expectation that this may well be how a hardware crypto device may work. Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org> Reviewed-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Tested-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
* doc: Fix acronym "FEKEK" in ecryptfsFelix Eckhofer2018-09-201-4/+4
| | | | | | | | "FEFEK" was incorrectly used as acronym for "File Encryption Key Encryption Key". This replaces all occurences with "FEKEK". Signed-off-by: Felix Eckhofer <felix@eckhofer.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* KEYS: fix in-kernel documentation for keyctl_read()Eric Biggers2017-11-151-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | When keyctl_read() is passed a buffer that is too small, the behavior is inconsistent. Some key types will fill as much of the buffer as possible, while others won't copy anything. Moreover, the in-kernel documentation contradicted the man page on this point. Update the in-kernel documentation to say that this point is unspecified. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@google.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
* Documentation: fix security related doc refsTom Saeger2017-10-121-1/+1
| | | | | | | Make security document refs valid. Signed-off-by: Tom Saeger <tom.saeger@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* docs: ReSTify table of contents in core.rstJosh Holland2017-08-301-11/+1
| | | | | | | | Sphinx will now generate the table of contents automatically, which avoids having the ToC getting out of sync with the rest of the document. Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* docs: Fix paths in security/keysJosh Holland2017-08-243-4/+4
| | | | | | | Several paths in the security/keys documentation were incorrect. Signed-off-by: Josh Holland <anowlcalledjosh@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* KEYS: Add documentation for asymmetric keyring restrictionsMat Martineau2017-07-141-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | Provide more specific examples of keyring restrictions as applied to X.509 signature chain verification. Signed-off-by: Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>
* docs: Fix some formatting issues in request-key.rstJonathan Corbet2017-05-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | The white space in the big enumerated list was inconsistent, leading to some strange formatting artifacts. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-trusted-encrypted.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-0/+176
| | | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-request-key.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-0/+200
| | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys-ecryptfs.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-0/+74
| | | | | | | | | Adjusts for ReST markup and moves under keys security devel index. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
* doc: ReSTify keys.txtKees Cook2017-05-182-0/+1558
This creates a new section in the security development index for kernel keys, and adjusts for ReST markup. Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2024-06-15 11:32:16 +0000