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path: root/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
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* KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVMDaniel Sneddon2023-08-081-0/+7
* x86/speculation: Add Kconfig option for GDSDaniel Sneddon2023-08-081-0/+4
* x86/speculation: Add force option to GDS mitigationDaniel Sneddon2023-08-081-1/+19
* x86/speculation: Add Gather Data Sampling mitigationDaniel Sneddon2023-08-081-0/+129
* x86/cpu: Switch to arch_cpu_finalize_init()Thomas Gleixner2023-08-081-50/+1
* x86/speculation: Allow enabling STIBP with legacy IBRSKP Singh2023-03-111-7/+18
* x86/bugs: Reset speculation control settings on initBreno Leitao2023-03-111-1/+9
* x86/bugs: Flush IBP in ib_prctl_set()Rodrigo Branco2023-01-181-0/+2
* x86/bugs: Make sure MSR_SPEC_CTRL is updated properly upon resume from S3Pawan Gupta2022-12-081-7/+14
* x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protectionsDaniel Sneddon2022-11-231-23/+64
* x86/bugs: Warn when "ibrs" mitigation is selected on Enhanced IBRS partsPawan Gupta2022-11-231-0/+3
* x86/speculation: Disable RRSBA behaviorPawan Gupta2022-11-231-0/+26
* x86/speculation: Fill RSB on vmexit for IBRSJosh Poimboeuf2022-11-231-5/+58
* KVM: VMX: Prevent guest RSB poisoning attacks with eIBRSJosh Poimboeuf2022-11-231-0/+4
* x86/speculation: Remove x86_spec_ctrl_maskJosh Poimboeuf2022-11-231-30/+1
* x86/speculation: Use cached host SPEC_CTRL value for guest entry/exitJosh Poimboeuf2022-11-231-11/+1
* x86/speculation: Fix SPEC_CTRL write on SMT state changeJosh Poimboeuf2022-11-231-1/+2
* intel_idle: Disable IBRS during long idlePeter Zijlstra2022-11-231-0/+6
* x86/bugs: Report Intel retbleed vulnerabilityPeter Zijlstra2022-11-231-5/+31
* x86/bugs: Split spectre_v2_select_mitigation() and spectre_v2_user_select_mit...Peter Zijlstra2022-11-231-8/+17
* x86/speculation: Add spectre_v2=ibrs option to support Kernel IBRSPawan Gupta2022-11-231-14/+52
* x86/bugs: Optimize SPEC_CTRL MSR writesPeter Zijlstra2022-11-231-6/+12
* x86/bugs: Keep a per-CPU IA32_SPEC_CTRL valuePeter Zijlstra2022-11-231-5/+23
* x86/bugs: Add AMD retbleed= boot parameterAlexandre Chartre2022-11-231-1/+73
* x86/bugs: Report AMD retbleed vulnerabilityAlexandre Chartre2022-11-231-0/+13
* Revert "x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protections"Suleiman Souhlal2022-11-231-60/+1
* x86/bugs: Add "unknown" reporting for MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta2022-09-051-2/+12
* x86/speculation: Add RSB VM Exit protectionsDaniel Sneddon2022-08-111-1/+60
* x86/speculation/mmio: Print SMT warningJosh Poimboeuf2022-06-161-0/+11
* x86/speculation/srbds: Update SRBDS mitigation selectionPawan Gupta2022-06-161-3/+5
* x86/speculation/mmio: Add sysfs reporting for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta2022-06-161-0/+22
* x86/speculation/mmio: Enable CPU Fill buffer clearing on idlePawan Gupta2022-06-161-2/+14
* x86/bugs: Group MDS, TAA & Processor MMIO Stale Data mitigationsPawan Gupta2022-06-161-10/+16
* x86/speculation/mmio: Add mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale DataPawan Gupta2022-06-161-4/+107
* x86/speculation: Add a common function for MD_CLEAR mitigation updatePawan Gupta2022-06-161-26/+33
* x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMTJosh Poimboeuf2022-03-111-2/+25
* x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigationJosh Poimboeuf2022-03-111-0/+5
* x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMDKim Phillips2022-03-111-8/+0
* x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation re...Josh Poimboeuf2022-03-111-6/+29
* x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline optionsPeter Zijlstra2022-03-111-36/+95
* x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCEPeter Zijlstra (Intel)2022-03-111-11/+18
* x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amdPeter Zijlstra2022-03-111-6/+0
* x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()Borislav Petkov2022-03-111-9/+4
* x86/speculation: Fix prctl() when spectre_v2_user={seccomp,prctl},ibpbAnand K Mistry2020-12-021-2/+2
* x86/speculation: Allow IBPB to be conditionally enabled on CPUs with always-o...Anand K Mistry2020-11-181-19/+33
* x86/speculation: PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE enforcement for indirect branches.Anthony Steinhauser2020-06-221-2/+5
* x86/speculation: Avoid force-disabling IBPB based on STIBP and enhanced IBRS.Anthony Steinhauser2020-06-221-37/+50
* x86/speculation: Add support for STIBP always-on preferred modeThomas Lendacky2020-06-221-6/+22
* x86/speculation: Change misspelled STIPB to STIBPWaiman Long2020-06-221-3/+3
* x86/speculation: Add Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigationMark Gross2020-06-101-0/+106
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